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░ Introduction 
Early Morning Encounters
It was around 6 o’clock in the morning, but we were already late for 
the fields. I tried to explain to Piero, jokingly, that in English, ‘work in 
the fields’ can be verbally associated with ‘fieldwork’, which is what I 
was1 doing there as an anthropologist, spending time in Sicily as the 
most vital part of my London-based doctoral pursuit.2 He seemed unim-
pressed: ‘Is this British humour?’ As we stood looking at the hills on the 
horizon, kilometres away from the village boundaries, the cobalt blue of 
the spring skies seemed to intensify with every sip of the coffee, every 
drag of the cigarette. The staggeringly beautiful Welsh-like hills of the 
Palermitan hinterland in Western Sicily lay as the backdrop as a solemn 
crowd of men prepared themselves to drive towards the hilly landscape 
to dedicate their day to their land-plots.
This was the entrance to San Giovanni – a village located in the Spicco 
Vallata valley of Western Sicily – close to the main winery in this area of 
a tightly knit vineyard economy. We stood outside the bar Sangiovannaru, 
where most peasants took their morning coffee before setting off for 
their plots. The bar, in Italy, is a place where people gather to sip a coffee 
and, in the mornings, grab delicacies like a cornetto, a small croissant. In 
rural Sicily, places like the Sangiovannaru assembled exclusively men of 
all ages, from teenagers to those well into their eighties. No other place 
in San Giovanni was so lively as this bar at this time of day – or indeed 
any time of the day. I counted about forty people coming and going in 
the ten minutes we were there. This was the first month of my stay in 
the village. I had just met Piero, a member of the administration of the 
‘Giovanni Falcone’ cooperative. As he was from Palermo (located 31 kms 
away from the village), I was interested in seeing how he behaved in the 
village cafés, not being a local.
We were on our way to Saladino, a five-hectare tract of land that eight 
years previously had belonged to Giovanni Barbeto,3 a local imprisoned 
mafioso, which the state had confiscated and allocated to the Falcone 
cooperative. Our day plan – and this was in the first days of March, frosty 
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but clear in the early hours – was to arrive at the vineyard at 6 am and 
spend the day spraying sulphite (a natural preservative) on the organic 
vines. We stood around a stool just outside the bar doors, occasionally 
sharing a buongiorno with the incoming men. Just as we were about to 
light up a second cigarette, taking a few more minutes of indulgence, a 
middle-aged man approached us where we stood and started talking. He 
presented a lighter and lit our cigarettes. Without introducing himself, 
he then launched into a long complaint to Piero about the ‘complete 
mess the co-ops have made’ in local agricultural work relations. There 
used to be a genuine local market for agrarian labour that was now going 
through what he called, with particular emphasis, ‘worrying develop-
ments’. Emphasising every word he uttered, he pointed at Piero, saying,
You, your cooperatives, are ruining the game here, with your rules and 
regulations and stuff . . . you know, people that have worked for me, in my 
plots, as they’ve done for ages, all of a sudden ask for more dosh, saying, 
‘Hey you don’t give enough, and how about those [social security] contributions for 
a change? Look at these new cooperatives, they pay much more, they pay the social 
security, I might knock on their door instead.’ I’ve been having this since you 
anti-mafia people started your business.
The man left and we got back on the tractor that we came with and set 
off. I was a little perplexed but had an idea about what was going on – an 
idea that Piero confirmed: the man was a small-time mafioso. But, at the 
same time, Piero told me, the man’s rant was not atypical of local reac-
tions to, as he put it, ‘what the state and the cooperatives have achieved 
in San Giovanni’. I was presented with a tangible case of reactions to 
change as channelled through the cooperatives; this was why I was in 
Sicily, after all, to explore grassroots reactions to a social change inflicted 
from above but also pursued laterally among ordinary Sicilians.
This vignette is just one of many episodes illustrating how the coming 
of the ‘anti-mafia’4 cooperatives – cooperatives that cultivated land that 
the state had confiscated from mafiosi – brought about a small break-
through in the agrarian life of San Giovanni.5
When local agrarian workers talked about their work conditions with 
me, they said that mafia patronage had depressed wages for generations. 
In discussions about access to resources and labour markets, locals sug-
gested that the cooperatives6 had brought about a relative change in 
accessing jobs and also a (minor) shift in ways of thinking about labour 
– and the mafia. Expressing the aims of the cooperatives, Gianpiero (then 
a thirty-two-year-old man from Palermo), the representative of the Paolo 
Borsellino cooperative, told me,
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I feel that the aim of the co-ops will be reached when I hear the peasants in 
the bars talking about trade unionism, not just F. C. Juventus. Our aim is to 
offer access to the confiscated land, standardise labour rights and change 
consciousnesses.
Trade unionists told me that the Spicco Vallata anti-mafia cooperatives 
were arguably the first agrarian businesses in the area that always paid 
full social security contributions and a net pay of above six euros an hour 
for agricultural work. The cooperatives were composed of members who 
performed administrative office duties and members who worked the 
land. Moreover, they employed wage-earners for seasonal work. These 
daily workers, as well as the worker-members, typically earned a mini-
mum of 51.62 euros a day (net), an amount that far exceeded all other 
work and pay accounts I encountered locally. The cooperatives’ admin-
istrators had mostly monthly wages in addition to the full labour social 
security contribution made by the cooperative as their employer.
As the co-ops employed no more than one hundred people (members 
and short-term contract workers together), this wage and pay change was 
minute in the broader political economy of the area. Nonetheless, the 
cooperatives symbolically ‘took on’ the local mafia’s labour patronage 
and were important contributors the livelihoods of many local house-
holds and individuals. What is more, they had attracted attention and 
sympathy from across the cooperative movement as well as from the 
Italian civil society, with the odd journalist from domestic or foreign 
media7 rushing to San Giovanni every couple of months. They symbolised 
one of the most celebrated cases of grassroots economic activity against 
organised crime on possibly a global scale – and indeed, through work 
and the securing of livelihoods, ‘not just through words and good inten-
tions’, as one such journalist from Germany confided to me with awe and 
admiration in a private chat.
‘Legality’ (legalità), a term people used to denote a positively engaged 
relationship to law, was key to this achievement. Cooperative workers 
considered that having a job in the cooperatives established the regulari-
sation of workers’ rights, precisely solidified in ‘legality’. For cooperative 
administrators like Giampiero, the legality idea meant that community 
well-being would improve if all resources were legally regulated and 
mafia was curbed. Crucially, ‘legality’ entailed the end of informal work.
Giampiero spoke to me at length in an interview about the changes that 
wage employment in the cooperatives had brought about locally among 
the co-ops’ manual workers, peasants who cultivated conventional grain 
and vines but were employed by the cooperatives. He suggested that 
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Libertà, the NGO catering to anti-mafia, as well as the administrators of 
Borsellino, the co-op he worked in,
had managed to convince the peasants using only the wallet [col portafoglio 
solo]: we ask them how much the mafioso pays them, they tell us, ‘he pays 
thirty euro a day’ [iddu mi paga trenta euro a jurna]. . . . OK, we tell them; last 
year the daily pay according to the law, the daily contract for agriculture 
was 51.62 euros. . . . So, come to us! . . . This is how much they get, legally. 
It’s the norm [È la normalità]. And so, imagine Theo, for the Borsellino co-op 
there were three hundred applications for braccianti8 positions! People real-
ised that their interests were with the legality, the normality.
Problematising the implicit economism of this argumentation, cen-
tred on people’s ‘interests’ and a quasi-utilitarian siding with ‘legality’ 
to explore these interests, is a starting point for this ethnography. As 
economic anthropology is rooted in material concerns, one can note how 
people’s material life is embedded in a number of other commitments 
that transcend the economistic, yet important, shift in labour regimes 
that the anti-mafia cooperatives have brought about. Such commitments 
overlap with obligations and understandings that transgress Giampiero’s 
idea of the cooperative as an ‘enclave of good’ and an agent of change. 
These commitments lie in the social life of workers outside and around 
the cooperative environment, a social life including kinship and friend-
ship relations, memories of landscape and labour, attitudes to land and 
land neighbourliness, and the cosmological ramifications of gossip and 
community.
Legality in terms of legal pay is just one, albeit central, example of 
how co-ops in Sicily, like in many cases elsewhere, attempted to create 
enclaves of ‘good’ economic practice in what their administrators per-
ceived as a sea of sociocultural malice. This implies, to pursue the aquatic 
metaphor, that the tides of social life leave islets of benign capitalism 
undeterred. It also implies that people envision – and enact – economic 
practices based on ideas of ethical and fair logic by removing themselves 
from their environments.
But how can you seal out economic life from the social fodder it is 
embedded in? It might not come as a surprise that you probably cannot. 
This book explores and problematises the hows of this cannot, providing a 
total immersion in the world of the Sicilian antagonisms between mafia 
and anti-mafia. Its narrative takes a threefold argumentation format. 
Firstly, the book takes cooperatives struggling against the mafia as its 
focal point to examine how some members of these organisations aim 
to exclude themselves from the – sometimes controversial – richness of 
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local social life. Secondly, it explores how this proves to be impossible, 
as the lives of co-op members themselves are embedded in a series of 
obligations, commitments and generally social relations that often fly in 
the face of anti-mafia co-op principles. Thirdly, it elucidates how some 
of these principles – foundational ideas for the anti-mafia such as ‘food 
activism’, ‘community’ or ‘land boundaries’ – contradict the very internal 
coherence of cooperatives and exacerbate divisions within them.
The book therefore explains how this anti-mafia political intervention 
not only informed aspects of cooperative activity but also entailed the 
promotion of values and relationships that opposed those that some local 
people, including cooperative members, lived by. Different moralities9 
arose within the cooperatives, presenting the incongruities between the 
set goals of the project and its development on the ground. Consequently, 
I highlight the complex internal differentiations often faced by politi-
cised cooperatives (where the constitution and activity of cooperativism 
is driven by a political project). Divisions of labour develop in polit-
icised cooperativism because some cooperative members (are able to) 
identify with its basic political premises more so than others. Politicised 
cooperatives, albeit delivering degrees of social change, contain different 
ideas, practices and morals – sometimes complementary and others at 
odds with each other. Anti-mafia cooperatives’ main goal and practice 
was to offer stable employment, contributing to the bettering of locals’ 
livelihoods.
The book argues that co-op members’ embeddedness itself proves to 
be a renovating aspect for anti-mafia cooperativism, as co-ops really draw 
from local kinship, gossip, work memory and neighbourhood relations 
to acquire their actual operational form on the ground. The deployment 
of cooperative life is then fully immersed in the life of the locality: co-ops 
are constituted on the grounds of their members’ experiences, which 
are taking place both within and outside the co-op environments. This 
remark has a Sicilian premise, but I believe it addresses cooperativism at 
large as a project of egalitarianism – that is, an exercise in lateral econom-
ics and industrial democracy – that extends and is defined by the liveli-
hoods of the people making cooperatives. It is the subject of this book to 
sing and problematise the body cooperative – ridden with ambiguities. 
The narrative and argumentation is structured as follows.
The dynamics of divisions and contradictions in cooperatives are his-
torical: the genealogy of Sicilian agrarian cooperativism was framed by 
tensions between peasant mobilisation, the anti-mafia movement, mafia 
and the state (chapter 3). The analysis first indicates the emergence of 
divisions in anti-mafia cooperatives, wherein administrators identified 
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more strongly with the ideological flair of food and anti-mafia activism 
than local workers did (chapter 4). The co-ops’ two-tiered system had been 
instigated via two incompatible spheres of recruitment: an ideological 
preference to staffing through political networks and the actuality of kin-
ship patronage as well as the reality of forming anti-mafia families (chap-
ter 5). I then show that, just as with the moralising discourses of activism, 
co-op administrators appropriated local gossip in order to demarcate 
moral borders around their own, and ‘their’ cooperatives’, reputation 
in Spicco Vallata (chapter 6). What is more, the ethnography shows that 
workers’ livelihoods outside the cooperatives continued to be entangled 
with informal local practices, some of which were, ironically, reinforced 
by anti-mafia cooperativism’s promotion of waged employment (chap-
ter 7). Claims to community was another ideological realm at play as it 
formed contrasting trajectories within cooperatives, most importantly 
influenced by outside agents, including mafia (chapter 8). This influence, 
as well as the neighbourhood with mafiosi, instigated further disagree-
ments on how to approach mafiosi. In addition to this, attitudes towards 
the confiscated land also led to significant rifts in the co-ops, resulting 
in uncomfortable social arrangements between neighbouring land plots 
(chapter 9).
NOTES
1. The choice of the past tense of verbs throughout this book admittedly takes 
away some of the charm of the narrative. For this reason, I use the past tense 
throughout the book to mark that the events described should be contextual-
ised in terms of social life in Spicco Vallata throughout 2008 and 2009, in the 
inter-subjective ways I experienced and came to analyse it.
2. The fieldwork took place as part of my doctoral project while working in 
Goldsmiths, University of London.
3. Barbeto was the main mafia figure in San Giovanni during the 1980s and 1990s, 
notorious in Italy, for his spectacular car bomb assassination of the popular 
anti-mafia magistrate Giovanni Falcone in 1992 (not to mention the other 
150–200 murders he admitted). He will be coming back in this narrative a few 
times. Falcone worked with Paolo Borsellino (also assassinated soon after), and 
with other magistrates, in the anti-mafia pool and was central in the state’s 
struggle against Cosa Nostra. 
4. ‘Anti-mafia’ is an established term in institutional and grounded life in Italy, 
adopted by authors as diverse as Jamieson (2000), Schneider and Schneider 
(2003) and Dickie (2004). I call the agrarian cooperatives that work on land 
confiscated from the mafia ‘anti-mafia cooperatives’, the emic term most often 
used in the village to describe them. The term in this form implies an ideology 
of opposing the mafia.
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5. While I have anonymised all names of individuals, toponyms and local asso-
ciations, this is not the case with widely known organisations that would be, 
in any case, easily identifiable in Italy. I have also not anonymised mafiosi who 
have been imprisoned for life, like Giovanni Barbeto, although I have otherwise 
changed the names of mafiosi (most of whom were released after spending 
three years, the minimum time for being a member of the mafia, in prison). 
The mafiosi I have encountered in San Giovanni were men who had been in 
prison for a while.
6. The major differentiation in agrarian cooperatives is between work-based 
co-ops, such as the anti-mafia cooperatives, and production-based co-ops, 
whose members are producers (Sapelli 1981). The former, composed of waged 
members-labourers, are work organisations with shared capital between 
 members – in this case, the usufruct of land. The latter are composed of 
independent producers who sell their produce to a co-owned winery, which 
processes and distributes their produce (more on this in chapter 3, from a 
historical perspective). In the case of Spicco Vallata, the Santoleone co-op-winery 
catered for around eight hundred producer-members who sold their grapes for 
vinification and bottling.
7. Throughout my fieldwork stay I have encountered journalists visiting San 
Giovanni from as far away as Japan. 
8. A bracciante is a person who works as a field hand, a daily land worker making a 
living through daily wage labour in an agrarian context. Although not specific 
to Sicily, historically, braccianti refers to landless peasants. These agrarian pro-
letarians (Schneider and Schneider 1976; see also Roseberry 1978), were – and 
still are – people whose only means of livelihood were their braccia, their arms. 
The cooperatives’ daily workers called themselves braccianti. It is a widely used 
term in Sicily, akin to the bracero notion (Kearney 2004).
9. I use this term to encapsulate people’s evaluations of situations as ethically 
acceptable according to their standards and within their social situatedness; as 
the ethnography will show, definitions were dynamic and always contextual to 
people’s experience.
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Chapter 1 
░ Problems with Cooperatives
Enclaves and Co-ops
A radical state-led initiative, the anti-mafia cooperatives of Sicily are 
hailed, throughout Italy, as symbols of the anti-mafia movement and 
are recognised as its most successful manifestation. Yet, while anti-mafia 
cooperativism1 unsettled the local labour market in positive ways, its 
achievements also led to contradictions, which are important to grasp 
in order to engage with the full meaning of anti-mafia social change 
in Sicily. A focus on this relationship between continuity and transfor-
mation (the bettering of people’s livelihoods and the incongruities that 
accompanied it), as well as on how this relationship was reflected in, and 
drew on, internal divisions of labour within the cooperatives, drive this 
book.
The ethnography explores the social processes of change enacted 
in San Giovanni and its surrounding area, the valley of Spicco Vallata, 
through a study of the activity of four work-based2 agrarian cooperatives. 
These organisations cultivate land plots that the Italian state confiscated 
from the powerful local mafia between the years 1996 and 2009, allowing 
local people direct access to land and work without the mediation of 
mafiosi. Focusing on this shift of access to resources (labour, land and rep-
utation) offered to the cooperatives’ members and the unintended reper-
cussions this entailed, this anthropological inquiry examines a politicised 
project of cooperativism that aimed to secure people’s livelihoods away 
from mafia’s influence. Some of these contradictions can be grasped in 
a phrase of Alberto Dalla Chiesa3 that anti-mafia activists repeatedly told 
me and had become a mantra of anti-mafia cooperativism: ‘The state 
gives as a right what the mafia offers as a gift’.
Cooperatives, Smaller than Life: The Untold Story
Cooperatives, like most institutions, often profess to do a lot. Their rep-
resentatives claim social change, or egalitarianism of all kinds, or com-
munity economics as their dreamt aim or indeed achieved goal. Like all 
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ideologies, cooperativism then appears larger than life; this is odd, as 
cooperativism has been seen as the end of -isms, as lived socialist practice 
(e.g., Whyte 1999; Zamagni and Zamagni 2010; Restakis 2010). Sociologists 
and anthropologists of cooperation and cooperativisation have often crit-
icised cooperatives for not living up to what they profess (e.g, Kasmir 
1996; Narotzky 2007; or MacPherson 2008, Errasti et al 2016). It is an accu-
sation that this book is sympathetic to – and that comes from a slightly 
Marxian lineage. In this line, the general backdrop against which this 
book develops is to show how, through the prism of ethnography, coop-
eratives appear to be smaller than their representatives claim to be.
However, this critique, centred on labour and exploitation, or struggles 
against neoliberalism, would leave a lot behind4. While some (see, e.g., 
Checker and Hogeland 2004) note that removing co-ops from local con-
text to strive for social change is problematic, if not redundant, not much 
has been said about that ‘local context’. This is why the anthropological 
eye of this ethnography is set on how co-ops are more fully engaged in 
the complexities of local life than often admitted. This engagement is 
done in silent and unseen ways that can fly in the face of the specific 
ideology on which cooperatives develop (in this case, the anti-mafia). The 
social fodder that cooperatives are embedded in comprises life outside 
the co-op work and within kinship networks, flows of reputation, neigh-
bourhood issues and household organisation. The book thus discusses 
what has not been touched upon by critiques to cooperativism: the ‘local’ 
context, in the sense of co-op members’ lives, and hence in a framework 
that includes relationships beyond waged employment within them,en-
trenched as members’ lives are in a series of obligations around coopera-
tive work. That around, I argue, is what determines the inside, the private 
life of cooperativism.
The book centres on exploring how cooperatives constituted them-
selves as enclaves of good practice and how this enclaving ideology 
regarding land and labour (Clemmer 2009) was met with attempts by 
workers to unwittingly embed the co-ops in local life. Examining the 
tension between enclaving and embedding mobilises issues central to 
economic anthropology today, as the Sicilian material offers a lens to 
questions concerning the social life of cooperatives. Like other junctures 
of co-ops and state, Sicily’s historically complex relationship with the 
Italian state is central: the legal confiscation of mafia land was intended 
to curb local mafiosi power and promote values of legality and transpar-
ency. In this juncture, state, mafia and cooperativism converge and clash. 
The co-op concern thus springs organically from a scrutiny of the grey 
zone of this stage, where my interlocutors lives unfold.
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How the cooperative ideology of legality is embedded locally becomes 
then the core of our investigation – and it is through tracing co-op peo-
ple’s lives in their community outside the time they dedicate to the 
co-op that this can be studied. Drawing on the idea of embeddedness 
(Polanyi 2001) of economic activity in social life (and the values associated 
with people’s grounded experience) can capture the distinct, and even 
contradictory, social realities sheltered under the same work coopera-
tives. This is especially so when we see resources as also embedded in 
socially arranged relationships (like land, as in Hann 1998b; 2007; 2009a). 
Attention is needed, though: embeddedness does not operate outside con-
text (Peters 2009; de Sardan 2013). In cases of politicised cooperatives, like 
the Sicilian anti-mafia, it is even explicitly poised against a dis-embedding 
idea of forming enclave-like structures, sealed out from local life’s vices.
Cooperatives’ resources (labour, land and such) are not ‘embedded’ 
uniformly but across different contexts and different people encompassed 
in a cooperative. Despite tensions, the ‘informal’ aspects of their live-
lihoods, embedded in morals about land (Abramson 2000), mediated 
kinship (Carsten 1995), reputation (Schneider and Schneider 1996) and 
‘mutual aid’ develop alongside rather than against anti-mafia cooperative 
(legality-oriented) activity. Rather than reifying ‘cooperatives’ as bounded 
units of analysis, the focus here is on their members and daily workers and 
their contradictory circumstances, as they bring different values into the 
organisations they compose. These are translated into diverse practices 
outside the co-op framework and different ideas on how this framework 
(should) operate. They are conditioned by the real live circumstances of 
people participating in them.
After all, the Polanyian embeddedness notion, convergent with the 
Maussian idea of institutions as total social facts, makes law a noneco-
nomic institution that serves to incorporate economic life into society 
(Catanzariti 2015: 222). The very term ‘embeddedness’ is rarely used by 
Polanyi himself (Resta 2015: 10). It is often presented as a binary oppo-
sition between cases where material life is embedded and others where 
the market forces disembed it from the economy (Gudeman 2011: 17). The 
notion has been transformed (Beckert 2011: 40–44) and is here applied 
to trace how cooperative life, rooted in a sense and an ideology of mate-
rial change, interacts with the lifeworlds of the people constituting 
cooperatives.
This is not a series of personal or ‘household’ strategies, simply; this 
exegesis would reduce the fullness of Sicilian life, with its plethora of 
grey areas (Rakopoulos 2017c) to rational maximisation, which is pre-
cisely what Polanyi would not argue (Robotham 2011: 273). Cooperatives’, 
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like ‘livelihoods’ (and, again, Polanyian meditations are in order here, as 
per Polanyi 1957 and Graeber 2011) are influenced by values coming from 
their members’ experiences in their broader social milieux (including 
kinship, the informal economy and local codes and idioms), often dif-
ferent from, or indeed contradictory to, those claimed by their political 
principles. Some of these relationships, in the case of Spicco Vallata, are 
deemed to belong to a problematic ‘tradition’, which the cooperatives 
strive, in principle, to supersede. For example, kinship relations are seen 
by cooperativist ideologues as highly suspect because the loyalties they 
generate are seen to contradict the ideals of legality and meritocracy (see 
chapter 5), sidelined by promoting activism based on ethical food-produc-
tion principles (chapter 4). But family is in fact constitutive of cooperatives 
in practice, giving meanings to the experience of workers’ participation 
in them – in terms of anti-mafia families (Rakopoulos 2017a).
I am not putting forward the idea that my interlocutors are slalom-
ing across two opposed pillars, two different moral worlds, mafia and 
anti-mafia, and benefitting from both. Rather, their lives are caught in 
that zone where moral disinterestedness and a morality disassociated 
from the silences and speeches pertaining in Sicilian life are impossible 
(Di Bella 2011). It is thus the grounded cooperative life of Sicilians that elu-
cidates our understandings of co-ops as egalitarian institutions and their 
contradictions (Kapferer 2003). Their actual, non-normative human econ-
omy (Hart 2015), beyond -isms, pertains to kinship, moralities over land, 
gossip and the richness of Sicilian lifeworlds, where mafia is a constant 
condition of local sociality. This is a lifeworld where law is often bypassed 
but also adhered to in a generic way (Blok 2010). My interlocutors navi-
gate different situations that produce a grey zone, where knots of rela-
tions pertaining to mafia, anti-mafia and state both conflict and merge. 
The mafia is thus presented as a looming presence, a constant in people’s 
lives. People see it as a constellation of people with agrarian livelihoods 
– but not as a structural domain, as it is most often discussed (see, e.g., 
Gambetta 2009; Varese 2011; Travaglio 2014). ‘Its’ sociological construc-
tion, while analytically needed, urgently needs ethnographic backing, 
where real people do real things – and this book partly serves this aim.
Having said that, this work aspires to be the first ethnography of 
the anti-mafia movement that pays attention to livelihoods and produc-
tion processes rather than civil society mobilisation (see Schneider and 
Schneider 2002b; 2008). This way, it contributes to the ongoing query 
into Italian neoliberalisms, in terms of work regimes, civic politics, and 
their moralities (Yanagisako 2002, as well as 2013). The politics of moral-
ity have been under constant scrutiny in current anthropology (from 
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Osella and Osella 2011 to Zigon and Throop 2014), and an attention to 
the situatedness of ethical concerns is at play (see Fassin 2004). There are 
even attempts at resuscitating discussion on the ‘moral economy’ outside 
the discipline, with an attention on how moral concerns are present in 
contemporary capitalism (Götz 2015). The strongly moralised world of 
anti-mafia activism meets, in Spicco Vallata, the moral lifeworlds of those 
working in the co-ops, with often mixed results. 
A burgeoning anthropological discussion among Italianists has brought 
about the intrinsic, everyday neoliberalism in divisive and unequally 
structured work relations (Molé 2012) and in the moralities of doing 
good and professing solidarity (Muehlebach 2012). The general trends of 
neoliberal cosmopolitanism (Harvey 2003; 2011) do acquire contradictory 
meanings on the ground. In the Sicilian case, mafia and anti-mafia can 
be two – granted, opposing – sides of an entrepreneurial coin, struggling 
over acquisitions of privileged access to markets and land management. 
In that process, access is negotiated through civic activism in times of 
austerity, a phenomenon also rampant in Italy, although livelihoods 
remain relatively in the shade of its scholarly discussion (Muehlebach 
2013; Palumbo 2016). When this activism is indeed associated with Italian 
livelihoods becoming marginalised, it is often an urban phenomenon 
(Herzfeld 2009). 
How this discussion can be sited in the specifics of nested structures of 
human cooperation, like work cooperatives, still requires critical inquiry, 
especially as such debate is often at some distance from livelihood con-
cerns. The materiality of how people engage with and in civil society 
has been set aside, as debate has very creatively focused on the intricate 
ideological makings of activist morality (Schneider and Schneider 2001). 
These moralities are contradictory, and these contradictions remain 
‘immaterial, but objective’ (to think in a Marxian sense), rooted in labour, 
in the widest sense of the term.
But cooperatives’ internal differentiation, their divisions of labour, are 
not simply the result of exposure to markets (Kasmir 2009). In fact, the 
workforce in these Sicilian cooperatives is composed of people embed-
ded in different, often irreconcilable, social relations and circumstances. 
In the political context of a project whose lynchpin is legality with its 
consciously ‘enclaving’ force, legal categories do not have meanings or 
values shared universally. Politically driven cooperatives are founded on 
normative principles, in this case the state ideology of legality as well as 
a moral understanding of food production and agrarian economy (see 
Luetchford and Pratt 2013). Diverging from perceptions of the term in the 
relevant sociology (Jamieson 2000; Sciarrone 2009; Armao 2009; see also 
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Pardo 2004), I nuance this idea of legality, suggesting that it is not neutral 
but socially ordered (and ordering), rooted in ideological perceptions of 
community (akin to reflections offered by Santino 2002). The ethnogra-
phy therefore provides an account of a radical political project that chal-
lenges the mafia but largely fails to grasp the local social arrangements 
within which it unfolds.
Of Guns and Grapes: Imagining a Post-mafia Sicily
Confiscations
Palermo in the 1980s had the highest rates of violent crime among 
European cities (Sterling 1991; Dickie 2004; 2014). The mafiosi, coordinated 
in the vertical structure of Cosa Nostra (Lodato 2001; cf. Tilly 1974), selec-
tively eliminated state bureaucrats, including investigating magistrates, 
who challenged their aims. The number of mafia victims, dubbed ‘excel-
lent cadavers’ (Stille 1996; see also Sant Cassia 2007), included members 
of parliament such as Pio La Torre, who had sponsored an anti-mafia law 
in 1982 (Rizzo 2003) that initiated the formation of anti-mafia confisca-
tions. His assassination that same year indicates just how important the 
law he had crafted actually was.5
The ‘Rognoni-La Torre’ Law (number 646/82, co-proposed with the 
Christian Democrat parlamentarian Virginio Rognoni) made two funda-
mental amendments to article 416 of the Italian Criminal Code. It intro-
duced the specific crime of ‘mafia’ association, distinct from ‘organised 
crime’. It also introduced the power of the courts to confiscate the assets 
of persons belonging to the mafia, as well as those of their relatives, part-
ners, and families who in the five years before a confiscation had acted as 
‘straw persons’.6 In criminal proceedings against a person ‘for mafia’ – i.e., 
for any type of criminal offence related to article 416 bis of the Criminal 
Code – his assets are sequestrated when he (unexceptionally, a man) is 
formally charged, despite the presumption of innocence. They are then 
confiscated if the defendant is convicted for mafia, if he cannot show 
they have an innocent origin. Since then, when the mafioso is charged 
(indicted), his assets are sequestered, while upon conviction the property 
would then be confiscated.
La Torre’s collaboration with Rognoni also shows the convergence 
of the two major parties, Democrazia Cristiana (DC) and Partito Comunista 
Italiano (PCI),7 en route to an anti-mafia political consensus (Lane 2010: 
34–36). La Torre belonged to the moderate faction of the PCI. The commu-
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nists promoted ‘an alliance of democratic forces’ against mafia violence, 
raising awareness of mafia intimidation of the peasant movement (Rizzo 
2003). Interestingly, as a trade unionist, La Torre had been imprisoned for 
his part in Spicco Vallata land occupations in 1948, an action aimed in 
part against mafia power. This shows how state policies on mafia shifted 
over time (Ginsborg 2003b: 205): by the mid-1990s, in response to intense 
mafia anti-state violence and civil society pressures, the state took a more 
active anti-mafia stance, and the confiscation law was a key intervention 
in this policy.
Anthropologists exploring the specific characteristics of Italian com-
munism have noted that its ‘escape from Leninism’ (Shore 1990) con-
solidated the party’s hegemonic success in most of the country, but not 
Sicily (Li Causi 1993). The PCI elaborated and posed the ‘moral issue’ (la 
questione morale) to politics, which was incorporated in contemporary 
Italian political discourse (Ginsborg 2005a). Focusing on the transparency 
of the public sphere, the moral issue entailed exposing the role of ambig-
uous political agents (like the mafia). The principle of ‘legalità’ invoked by 
left-wing legalistic agendas and endorsed by the anti-mafia cooperatives 
is currently used in ways that emulate and reproduce the ‘moral ques-
tion’ of the late 1970s (Rakopoulos 2014a: 25). It can be defined as a moral 
observation and an ethical appreciation of the law and the jural system 
morality.
New legal measures were introduced in the early 1990s when a series 
of mafia killings had provoked popular contempt for the organisation 
(Jamieson 2000: 127; Lavio 2014). These included the brazen assassina-
tions of the magistrates Falcone and Borsellino, as well as an escalation 
of violence against state officials, which even included terrorist threats. 
The law providing for the ‘social use of assets confiscated by the mafia’ 
eventually came into effect in 1996 (n. 109/96), passed in response to 
the activism of the NGO Libertà.8 One million signatures were gathered 
supporting the demand for ‘the mafia to restitute what was unjustly 
usurped’ (Libera 2008b).9 Therefore dubbed ‘a popular initiative legis-
lation’ (Pati 2010), the law introduced a procedure to ensure the ‘social 
use’ of the confiscated assets (Libera 2010). Once a mafioso is convicted, 
his assets, including property rights, are handed over to the Ministry for 
Internal Affairs.10 Having identified the territorial jurisdiction where the 
assets are located, the Ministry passes them to the relevant municipality. 
In the case of land, this includes ownership, usufruct and adjunct rights. 
When arrested, a person accused of mafia-related crimes is asked to 
prove the provenance of their assets; this undermines the presumption 
of innocence in Italian (and generally European) Criminal Law. This jural 
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process, as an  ‘extraordinary measure’, draws from legal theory of excep-
tional circumstances. Under normal criminal procedure, this fundamen-
tal democratic principle is undisputable. But here, ‘the realm of mafia is 
an “exceptio legalis”’, as the Palermitan magistrate Dr Rossio told me.11
An example will help clarify this process. Giovanni Torinese (a San 
Giovanni mafioso) owned a vineyard in the territory of Reale (a Spicco 
Vallata village), bought to launder drug money in the mid-1980s. The mafi-
oso was arrested in 1997; the land plot was confiscated in 1999 and passed 
into the property of the state; the Reale municipality then transferred its 
usufruct to an anti-mafia cooperative, under renewable lease contracts 
valid for twenty or thirty years. Therefore, the confiscated plots always 
belong to the state and are leased for free (comodato d’uso) to the co-ops, 
which never really retain full ownership over the confiscated land. These 
social agrarian cooperatives fall into the category of appropriate social 
use as they abide by the principles of Italian cooperativism and are not-
for-profit organisations, protected in the constitution (article 45). They 
are supported by the state and Libertà, which says that the land was 
allocated to the cooperatives ‘as they represented the community’ (Libera 
2008a) and founded ‘an economy of legality and solidarity’ (Libera 2009b). 
Libertà pushed for a legality-oriented discourse promoting the anti-mafia 
cooperatives.
Despite the cooperative movement’s 150-year-old history (Sapelli 1981), 
the Italian ‘social cooperatives’ are relatively new. The anti-mafia coop-
eratives specifically were created in response to the 109/96 law, and use 
confiscated land plots, machinery and other resources taken from mafia 
(tractors, harvesters and a winery called Cento12) and bestowed on the 
cooperatives between 1996 and 2006 to be ‘restituted back into produc-
tivity’ (Frigerio and Pati 2007: 3; Pati 2005). In 2012 there were eight such 
cooperatives in Italy (see figure 4.3, page 100), cultivating land hailed as 
‘liberated’ or ‘emancipated’ and presented as the result of grassroots 
mobilisations with state backing (Procino 2003). The fact that four of 
those eight cooperatives were located in the Spicco Vallata area of west-
ern Sicily made that the ideal site to study ‘anti-mafia change’. Libertà 
and many journalists alike claimed the area had been ‘liberated from 
the mafia’ and was an example for communities across southern Italy 
(Morelli 2003; Libera 2006: 2).
After the mid-1990s, when the relationship between the state and Cosa 
Nostra shifted from connivance to conflict, triggered by an escalation of 
mafia violence, the jailing of numerous Spicco Vallata mafiosi between 
1996 and 2000 (twelve clan13 leaders in San Giovanni alone) multiplied the 
number of landed properties in the hands of local municipalities. While 
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elsewhere in southern Italy the confiscated assets passed to other social 
structures (not necessary cooperatives), the co-op solution was deemed 
more appropriate for western Sicily – and proved more efficient. Mayors 
pushed for the formation of a specialist bureaucratic apparatus to admin-
ister the transfers of usufruct rights to local cooperatives, guarantee the 
‘social use’ and ‘associated’ use of the land and promote the cooperatives’ 
activity at large.
The mayors of five Spicco Vallata villages welcomed the creation of 
the Consortium Progress and Law in May 2000, which to this day over-
sees the cooperatives’ activity, ‘to administer the assets in associated use 
and for a social goal’ (Focus 2001: 1). Tasked with the transfer of confis-
cated land and other assets ‘from the clans to the state and the commu-
nity’ (Focus 2001: 12; Candito 2012), the Consortium imposed a model 
of anti-mafia cooperativism characterised by the pursuit of legality and 
values endorsed in legislation (‘work’, ‘property’), especially regarding 
the regulation of land and labour (Moroni 2010).
The Consortium, whose seat is in the San Giovanni municipality, has 
two branches: in one, led by the local mayors, personnel may change 
through the municipal elections that take place every four years. 
The other branch is a permanent team of four bureaucrats appointed by 
the Ministry of the Interior. The managing directorship of the Consortium 
is a permanent position chaired by Matteo Mandola, a young and incredi-
bly stylish – well-tailored suit, aviator glasses, long shiny hair – Palermitan 
lawyer with a PhD from the local law department. When I first asked 
him his views on the confiscations, he told me they were due to ‘a state 
of permanent legal emergency with mafia issues in our country’. The 
Consortium’s presidency rotates every year among the eight mayors. 
The municipalities that originally participated in 2000 were Tarini, Reale, 
Cembali, San Turiddu and San Giovanni. Three more villages joined three 
years later: Bocca, Fonte and Principe. The Consortium was promoted 
by the centre-left prefect of the Palermo province of the time, as well as 
by the leftist mayors of San Giovanni and Tarini. The guiding principles 
of the cooperatives were the interconnected notions of law and progress, 
as the Consortium’s name suggested; as Luca, the president of Falcone, 
told me, ‘There is no development without legality and no legality with-
out development; this is our mission here, to enact both’.
The NGO Libertà has played a key role: despite not having any adminis-
trative powers itself (not being a state organisation), the Consortium has 
delegated to the NGO full responsibility for the representation and mar-
keting of the cooperatives, in what Matteo Mandola described to me as ‘a 
joint venture of state and civil society against the mafia’. The NGO Arci14 
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also assisted in this, catering for Lavoro e Altro, the most openly left-wing 
cooperative among the four that I examined.
It is important to emphasise the local character of the restitution 
process. The cooperatives studied here cultivate land that had been con-
fiscated from significant Spicco Vallata mafiosi. Such mafia figures include 
Totò Riina and Giovanni Barbeto, today imprisoned for life, who con-
trolled Cosa Nostra’s heroin trafficking in the 1980s and 1990s, when 
the Sicilian mafia organised the largest share of the world’s circula-
tion of the drug (Camilleri and Lodato 2002). The Lavoro e Altro was 
located in Tarini, while the three others (Falcone, Borsellino and the 
much smaller Liberanima15) were in San Giovanni. Collectively, the land 
tracts these cooperatives managed amounted to almost six hundred hec-
tares; they include mainly organic vineyards and cereal farms (Libera 
2009a; Consorzio 2010). The cooperatives also had the usufruct of two 
beautiful nineteenth-century Spicco Vallata masserie (farm houses), both 
confiscated from Giovanni Barbeto and turned into agricultural tourism 
establishments (agriturismi). The fact that the majority of confiscations in 
Italy took place in the cradle of Cosa Nostra was highly symbolic.
The rhetoric of this redistribution of assets used by official agencies, 
such as the Consortium, presents a just state actively intervening to 
restore to an (idealised) community what had been ‘stolen’ from it. 
State documents explaining ‘whither to confiscate’ (Focus 2001) resem-
ble a Marxist analysis of primitive accumulation.16 These documents 
present mafiosi as having ‘usurped’ the agricultural land from what was 
allegedly in the common domain, available to all (Consorzio 2010). In 
fact (see chapter 3), there had been only one short-lived historical case 
of collectively owned land in Spicco Vallata, related to the 1946 peasant 
land occupations. The confiscated land, as the state apparatuses and 
the NGO claim (in texts co-authored by their representatives), symbol-
ises ‘a resource for the area, an opportunity for development and civil 
growth’ (Frigerio and Pati 2007: 5). Following this line of argument, the 
authors envision newly created cooperatives as horizontal work organ-
isations (all members being equal in pay and work tasks). Their aim, 
associated with ideas on ‘community’ (as explored in chapter 8), is to 
 ‘democratically accommodate the land that returned to the community, 
after the mafia had unlawfully usurped it’ (Frigerio and Pati 2007: 37, 
emphasis added) and to guarantee the ‘community’s participation in the 
social use of the confiscated assets’ (Frigerio and Pati 2007: 67; Libera 
2008b, emphasis added). The state confiscations project is still ongo-
ing at the time of this book’s publication, almost twenty years after 
its inception.
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The first land plot to be restituted – i.e., allocated to a social  cooperative – 
was a vineyard in Tarini, of Totò ‘The Beast’ Riina, confiscated in 1999 
and bestowed on the Lavoro e Altro cooperative. (As mentioned, the 
municipalities retain legal ownership of the confiscated assets, and the 
cooperatives only hold the usufruct). As the Consortium was driven by an 
ideology of communalism and ‘justice’, a key element for its practice was 
replacing the mafia as patron by ‘reconstituting the presence of the state 
in the area’ (Libera 2006).
The public competitions resulted in the hiring of the core workforce 
and the establishment of the cooperatives I have studied most closely: 
the Giovanni Falcone (2001) and the Paolo Borsellino (2006).17 The fifteen 
original members of each were selected by the Consortium and Libera. 
The positions were publicly advertised, and the meritocracy-oriented 
selection process involved detailed scrutiny of the applicants’ abilities, 
anti-mafia commitment, kinship connections and social contacts. Their 
ability to demonstrate proved ‘absence of’ kinship connections and social 
contacts ‘with the mafia’ was a prerequisite to people’s recruitment. The 
cooperatives were not allowed to employ anyone who had any mafioso 
in their ‘social circle’, including kin (up to the third degree, inclusive), 
friends and affines (Bando 2001). Most of my informants were therefore 
either people selected in that process or others who joined later, replac-
ing members who had left; they were recruited through connections they 
had among the existing cooperative workforce. In addition, there were 
workers on short-term contracts of seasonal employment, paid by the day 
(‘daily workers’). By 2009, the number of people making a living directly 
through these two cooperatives was more than double the original thirty. 
By 2016, there were more than 50 members and 60 employees in 9 such 
cooperatives around the country.
Inherent in the original public competitions was a differentiated val-
uation according to skill and capability that would have a serious effect 
eventually on deep divisions between members’ teams (see chapter 4). 
The two-tiered organisation of the co-ops is a leitmotif to which we shall 
return several times through the book’s narrative, wherein differences 
between social class, urban and rural, household composition and gender 
would prove to be crucial in the social life of cooperatives and the very 
constitution of the anti-mafia at large.
‘800 Barbetos’
San Giovanni was the ideal site for fieldwork: the most successful project 
of confiscation and redistribution of mafia land in Italy had taken place 
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there. It was also, as mentioned, the birthplace of Giovanni Barbeto, and 
still has a reputation for being one of the most mafia-influenced villages 
in Italy.18 In a widely discussed and overquoted newspaper article, pub-
lished right after Barbeto’s arrest, a leading anti-mafia journalist called 
San Giovanni ‘the village of the 800 Barbetos’ (Fava 1996), meaning that 
Giovanni ‘The Pig’ Barbeto, a mafioso who, by his own account, had killed 
‘around 150 to 200 people’ (Lodato 2006: 3), was the tip of the iceberg in a 
sea of social consensus and kinship links: the ‘tradition’ of San Giovanni 
was mafia connivance. ‘It is not easy to construct normality in a village 
bloodied up by hatred,’ claimed another article (Corrado 1997). Later, 
the same newspaper, Corriere della Sera, conducted a survey, in which 
allegedly 60 per cent of sangiovannari19 said the mafia was ‘a great thing’ 
(Mignosi 1999).
That San Giovanni – a place with such heavily charged history – was 
targeted for ‘anti-mafia change’ had obviously considerable symbolic 
weight. The subsequent portrayal of how the ‘village of the 800 Barbetos’, 
virtually the epitome of mafia consensus, converted to become a village of 
‘anti-mafia heaven’, as Libertà members claimed, was salient – especially 
given the cooperatives’ recruitment policy for locals of excluding anyone 
who had even remote kinship, affinity or friendship links to mafia.
The mafia is not just an ‘agent’ or a ‘structure’ in the island; neither is 
it linked only to local traditions and popular imagination (Breschi 1986). 
In fact, this tradition is put to test by the anti-mafia: Spicco Vallata, and 
specifically San Giovanni, are cases where tradition is considered decid-
edly problematic. Often, in situations anthropologists study, ‘tradition’ 
is either treasured and change is seen as desirable in some ways but dis-
ruptive (of culture and social structure) or the anthropologist insists that 
traditions being abandoned have some value. In the case of a place where 
‘tradition’ is so deeply associated with violence and criminality, this sit-
uation becomes almost impossible and actually creates an unusual, if 
uncomfortable ethnographic setting (see Gilsenan 1996; Herzfeld 1985; 
Taussig 2005, although in Sicily, violence was not salient anymore). Yet 
since the mafia is ‘cultural’ or ‘social structural’ in certain received ethno-
graphic senses (see, e.g., Gambetta 2009; Pine 2012; Santino 2012), taking 
down ‘its’ economic power provoked a series of interesting implications 
that not only dispute a political economy framework but also challenge 
established ethnographic sensibilities regarding tradition.
This is also true for lay perceptions of the mafia phenomenon, in my 
experience. When I returned from the field, and throughout my develop-
ment in the discipline, people I described my work to asked me whether 
the mafia was still strong in Sicily. People’s interest revolved around 
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a thematic core, the island being the locus classicus of mafia, the ‘heart’ 
of the mafia ‘problem’ (Lane 2010). Not surprisingly, the film industry 
informed most people’s views: many inquired whether I was a mafia 
movie enthusiast or how close movies’ depictions of ‘the mafia’ were to 
reality.
Getting back from the field to London was telling: when I explained 
to acquaintances (including Italians) that my research was on ‘the anti- 
mafia’, not the mafia, most reacted with mixed feelings of disappoint-
ment and enthusiasm. For many, this sounded more intriguing than the 
mafia itself, connoting heroism and commitment for the people involved. 
Interestingly, gendered frameworks often informed these discussions. 
Many assumed that anti-mafia activists were ‘brave men’ and asked me 
about how successful ‘the anti-mafia’ had been. However, rather than 
uncritically accept the claim that ‘anti-mafia’ equals ‘change’, I examine 
how activities of people involved in the cooperatives transform meanings 
of land, labour and discourse, while at the same time reproducing estab-
lished practices and allowing for continuations with past relationships 
(Sorge 2015).
My research took place throughout the whole of 2009. A pre-doctoral 
research stay in Sicily lasted six months, from January to July 2007. 
Confiscations appeared as the only type of instance where an initiative 
against the mafia had produced changes in Sicilians’ livelihoods and 
anti-mafia activism yielded income. Having interviewed journalists, 
judges, police officers and NGO activists, I came to the provisional con-
clusion that mobilisation around anti-mafia initiatives was manifested as 
a ‘sense of civic duty’. Different research interlocutors20 answered both 
‘Why take action against the mafia?’ and ‘What changes has opposing 
the mafia instigated to your life?’ by stating, ‘Being a good citizen’.21 
Most thought an ‘anti-mafia San Giovanni’ was a laughable image, due 
precisely to the village’s reputation as a ‘traditionally mafia’ place; it was 
for this reason that San Giovanni cooperatives appeared as the ideal site 
for participant observation around people actively contesting the mafia 
while making a living.
San Giovanni was hailed by Libertà agents I spoke with as a village 
whose land was ‘liberated from the mafia’, an idea also promoted by the 
Consortium (Focus 2012). During harvest, volunteers from northern Italy 
visited San Giovanni through Libertà-organised summer camps to help 
the cooperatives with agricultural work; the public image the place had 
acquired made it all the more appealing. After I visited the village a few 
times and contacted people from the cooperatives, I decided to move 
to San Giovanni. Although many cooperative members (the administra-
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tors) hailed from Palermo and lived in the city, commuting  thirty-one 
 kilometres to San Giovanni to work, it was in San Giovanni where mass 
confiscations of mafia leaders’ landed property had taken place and 
where the seat of the Consortium was located.
I asked Checco, the Falcone cooperative’s ‘PR’, to help me move to the 
village. He explained that several journalists from Italy and abroad had 
visited to write about the anti-mafia experience there.22 A journalist him-
self, he admitted he could not understand why I had to spend a year there 
to get a grasp of the situation. Nevertheless, he introduced me to signor 
Pippo Pitrè, then a fifty-eight-year-old day worker from the Falcone and 
ex-member of the Borsellino cooperative, and asked him to help me out. 
I took up permanent residence in Pippo’s empty apartment in the village, 
paying him rent, and he became a key informant. He and his family had 
moved to another house, two kilometres outside the village, in 2007.
The official population of San Giovanni is 8,349 people (ISTAT 2011), 
although most locals insisted that the number of permanent residents 
was four thousand at best. The village was founded as San Giovanni dei 
Mortilli at the foot of the Mato Hill in 1779, built according to the needs 
of the historical specifics of the land tenure system at the time (lati-
fundism24), hosting the largest number of people in the smallest possible 
space. Anthropologists have described the inland Sicilian ‘agrotown’ as 
a technology of densely populated settlement that reflected the needs of 
Illustration 1.1: The view from the balcony of my apartment: via Porta Palermo.
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the latifundist system (Schneider and Schneider 1976: 34; Blok 1974: 47). 
Blok argues these ‘peasant agglomerations’ are characteristic of southern 
Italy generally (1969; also in 2000: 136–54).
Interestingly, San Giovanni’s history was born out of a confiscation: 
the valley’s feudi belonged to the Jesuit College of Trapani (Belli 1934) 
(their names still demarcate land territories today: Dammusi, Mortilli, 
Signora). In 1776, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies ordered the expulsion 
of the Jesuits, and the Marquis of Sambuca, a member of the Sicilian 
nobility, acquired their land (Comune di San Giuseppe Jato 2008). He was 
issued a license to build a settlement for the agrarian workforce of his 
latifundio. The nobleman’s settlement attracted braccianti (agrarian work-
ers) from neighbouring villages; the site’s position on a route between 
southern Sicily and Palermo led to its rapid development (Comune 2009). 
In 1820, the village population was more than five thousand. A part of the 
hill collapsed in 1838, prompting a reshuffling in settlement and the con-
struction of the adjunct village of San Turiddu (today’s official population: 
5,016, [ISTAT 2011]), built to house San Giovanni’s homeless population.
Locals called San Giovanni ‘un paese’, a village – although the term 
could also be translated as small town. There were hardly any public 
spaces; the villetta, however – a widening of the vibrant Palermo road (via 
Palermo) – formed an unofficial square; its five bar (cafés) were packed 
with teenagers on weekend evenings. The building where I lived was well 
situated in the thick of things, close to the villetta. Opposite the apart-
ment was the Billiards café, which, I soon noticed, was popular with mafi-
osi. The balcony looked out onto a panorama of the Mato Valley: vineyards 
as far as the eye could see. The size of the apartment was inconvenient 
(two hundred square metres, when I only used a couple of rooms), but, as 
it was very close to the village centre and the cooperatives’ offices, I found 
it ideal from the start.
The Falcone and Borsellino anti-mafia cooperatives shared the same 
offices; after Marafusa (the giant winemaker of the area), they were the 
most widely advertised enterprises of the village. Yet, their offices were 
difficult to find. On via Palermo westwards towards the bar Virilia, located 
at the edge of the village, the cooperatives’ offices are ungracefully 
located behind a petrol station. This was where the cooperative admin-
istrators worked, mostly young Palermitans. They were unimpressed by 
San Giovanni. Overlooking the Mato Valley, the village’s panoramas were 
charming, but cooperative members almost unanimously felt the vil-
lage itself was dreadful. Every morning they had to travel the thirty-one 
kilometres from Palermo along a highway they described as a dire con-
struction financed by a 1980s money-laundering scheme for the profits 
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of international heroin trafficking in which San Giovanni mafiosi were 
central players.
There were many signs of local mafia presence, which Palermitan 
administrators complained about. For lack of plaster, the building where 
I stayed, as well as most of the surrounding apartment blocks, showed 
bare red brick. Neighbours were proud to emphasise that ‘in a peasant 
community like ours, there is not much need for comfort’. Some argued 
that the unattractive brickwork facing the main streets of the village 
indicated ‘what it meant to be a peasant’ and, indeed, to come ‘from a 
village with a mafia past’. I associated the shabbiness with the mafia’s 
logic of contempt for conspicuous consumption (Arlacchi 1986: 23). When 
Illustration 1.2: Detail of the viletta: a monument.
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Illustration 1.4: The entrance to the shared offices of the Falcone and 
Borsellino cooperatives. Notice the humble buildings; the red door is a 
warehouse; the cooperatives’ offices were on the first floor; notice the red 
banner welcoming the ‘E!state liberi’ of volunteer labourers in the confiscated 
fields. The banner made the offices quite conspicuous, unlike most of the year.
Illustration 1.3: The mayor of a local village alongside two members of Lavoro 
e Altro, in a confiscated winery. 
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Illustration 1.5: The highway, with San Giovanni on the right; above the 
village, notice the Mato Hill.
Illustration 1.6: Member-workers (the four men in the foreground) and 
volunteers (the younger people in the background) of the Borsellino during 
lunch break in the vineyards of Castello, during harvest, in August. At the front: 
Niki, Peppe, Ciccio and Donato. Photo by Francisco Calafate.
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I started visiting local homes, invited by friends, housewives were happy 
to show off shiny new pieces of cutlery or furniture but shrugged when 
questioned about the lack of plaster on their house’s outfacing walls, 
often responding, ‘It is better to enjoy some luxury without people know-
ing your riches’, or, ‘Better to show you are a pauper while you actually 
reign’. A neighbour told me a local adage popularised by mafiosi to explain 
the apparently anti-consumerist local ethos: megghiu cummannari chi futtiri 
(it’s better to command than to fuck).25
Among the Anti-mafia
Research among people struggling against the mafia posed a number of 
ethical issues before, during and after fieldwork. I originally handed a 
personal declaration to the three cooperatives’ presidents, stating that all 
information gathered was to be totally confidential, masked behind careful 
layers of anonymity in my book and in any articles that would stem from 
my research. To the best of my abilities, I gave the same assurance, orally, 
Illustration 1.7: Members of the Lavoro e Altro co-op during a lunch break, 
while they set up the co-op’s agriturismo. The two workers at the front are 
wearing caps of the CGIL union. Photo by Diego Orlando.
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the first time I came in contact with someone I interviewed. My emphasis 
on how I had to change all names of people, places and organisations, 
however, provoked curiosity rather than ease among many interlocutors.
In fact, it was in relation to confidentiality that I first glimpsed how the 
two-tiered organisation of the cooperatives reflected differentiated ethics 
and moralities. Seeking to organise my methodology to accommodate 
the intricacies of the cooperatives’ division of labour in terms of ethics 
required some telling manoeuvres. Methods and argumentation converge 
in anthropological endeavour, where theory stems directly from the para-
digms of the people one works with. The administration members could 
not grasp why I wanted to be so ‘secretive’ when their remit was all about 
publicity and transparency. Some explained to me that not anonymising 
posed no dangers to them, as they had already been exposed quite exten-
sively to the local society, and even on a national scale. In fact, some saw 
my research as another channel of publicity. For them, publicly ‘naming’ 
mafiosi as well as publicising names of anti-mafia activists was part of 
their anti-mafia activism.
The co-ops’ manual workforce, on the other hand, living in Spicco 
Vallata, took a different stance. They were careful to remind me that what 
they shared with me could be publicised ‘anywhere I wanted but Sicily’. 
Tano, for instance, told me that ‘as long as it remains in the limits of my 
village and my island, I want you to be cautious’. I followed this advice 
and managed to act according to the needs of different informants. These 
contradictions posed severe ethical issues for my research but I followed 
the confidentiality protocols suggested for anthropological fieldwork, not 
revealing interlocutors’ identities and protecting them from each other 
(Caplan 2003; Edel and Edel 2000). This was particularly significant, given 
that I met a few mafiosi while doing fieldwork whose names I also altered 
for the book.
People’s ideas on safety thus echoed the cooperatives’ internal division 
between the administration/office-based/Palermitan team and the agri-
cultural/fields-based/local team. As I was not a local, most villagers who 
were not connected to the cooperatives thought I was a new member of 
a cooperative’s administration team. My first impression was that this 
could entail risks. Initially, feeling in danger was a prominent emotional 
state for me: I spent the first months of fieldwork worrying about mafia 
intimidation, always carrying with me a USB with all my notes, naively 
fearing that someone would break into my house.
As with confidentiality, and in relation to it, I initially projected ideas 
of safety onto my relationships with locals. After I had spent a few months 
getting into the fieldwork process, the more I acknowledged how ‘mafia’ 
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and anti-mafia were interwoven in San Giovanni, the more I realised that 
my disquiet was groundless: there was no reason to believe that local 
mafiosi wished to harm me, and it was safe to assume they had no real 
strategic interest to harm my interlocutors. Apart from alleged arsons in 
an olive tree grove and a wheat field, there had been hardly any violent 
or threatening activities against cooperative members.
The effects of certain reflexivities, triggered by my interaction with 
locals, touched on issues of research positionality. The much-discussed 
issue of the anthropological researcher’s ‘privileged’ position vis-à-vis 
their research participants only partly applied to my case. My physical 
features, knowledge of Italian popular culture and literature,26 non-sug-
gestive accent and relative experience in agrarian work even led many 
locals, when meeting me for the first time, to treat me as a Sicilian 
visitor to the area. My acquired capacity in the Sicilian dialect, dubbed 
a language in itself by most locals, was also an asset – although when 
a conversation moved from Italian to Sicilian, new interlocutors would 
immediately realise I was not from the island, which then often became 
the object of jokes and sarcasm.27 My degree of familiarity shaped most 
of my initial interactions with interlocutors, including cases where some 
informants joked that I must have Sicilian origins and even felt that my 
being Greek confirmed this. While appreciating my facility in relevant 
matters, interlocutors eagerly insisted on the uniqueness of Sicily as a 
cultural hybrid formed of centuries-old distillations of cultures. However, 
for most, ‘the Hellenic aspect’ shone above other facets: Sicilians were 
‘Greeks who had become Italians’ one woman told me.
These (perhaps essentialist) accounts worked in most cases to my ben-
efit, as I gained people’s trust, which allowed me access to their lived 
spaces. Many locals were intrigued by the presence of ‘the Greek’ among 
them, and some identified similarities between Sicily and Greece: the two 
regions were, allegedly, ‘insular’, relatively impoverished and ‘corrupt’ 
peripheries of a nonetheless historically rich European ‘South’. Although 
the premises of this relationship were slippery and sometimes uncom-
fortable, partially accepting these labels won the trust of many people, 
as they saw in me someone from a background no more privileged than 
theirs, especially when I explained that I was raised in a rural area where 
viticulure28 was the way most people made their living. During partici-
pant observation in the vineyards, this personal background was particu-
larly appreciated by co-workers.
The gendered aspect of this assimilation, however, had counter-pro-
ductive effects; despite (or possibly because) I looked like many locals, 
my status as an unmarried young man in the village did not help in 
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 gaining access to households where young women lived. This problem 
was somewhat alleviated with time, especially when a female friend vis-
ited me in the field. This gave me the reputation of being engaged, which 
I often did not refute when asked. Nevertheless, I did not manage to enter 
the homes of all my interlocutors. This biased my research, as the data 
gathered from spending time with female research participants, usually 
housewives, could have been richer and wider otherwise.29
These issues also conditioned my ways of reciprocating towards my 
research participants, to bring back to them a sense of the research 
achievements and returning some of their trust. Cigarettes and distilled 
liquor from Greece became popular among agrarian workers of the coop-
eratives. When I had to meet people outside the work context but, for 
reasons mentioned above, not in their homes, I made sure I treated them 
to drinks or a meal, although this proved, in a couple of cases, to violate 
their own principles of hospitality, which I eventually opted to prioritise. 
Another contribution I managed to offer was English lessons to some 
co-op members, particularly the president of the Falcone cooperative, 
Luca. He enthusiastically asked me to help him, as he thought English 
skills were valuable for the cooperative’s development now that they had 
started, in a modest way, to export to niche markets in Germany. These 
intensive language classes helped create a bond early on. Some cooper-
ative members commented that, while as a researcher, I aimed to being 
‘taught’ by Luca, I ended up teaching him: this reciprocity reinforced the 
inter-subjectivity of the ethnographic experience.
It is important to note that most interlocutors saw my presence in 
the village as a ‘success of the anti-mafia’. Fifteen years before the time 
of fieldwork, I was told, this research would have been impossible, as I 
probably would have been assassinated. I am aware that this was proof, 
for many people, of the change the cooperatives had brought about. In 
this respect at least, intentions and outcomes of action were identical 
– like an unwitted personal becoming. Peppe, a young research inter-
locutor, insightfully remarked that ‘you are the answer to your research 
question,’ meaning that my very safe presence in the field was already 
proof that Sicily had changed immensely. This book describes, analyses 
and  problematises this change.
NOTES
 1. The terms ‘cooperationism’ and ‘cooperatism’ are also used; see for instance 
Fournier’s biography of Mauss as a ‘co-operator’ (2006: 107–10). I use the term 
‘cooperativism’ to denote a set of principles that cooperative members follow.
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 2. As discussed later, cooperativism is either producer-based, where autonomous 
peasants cooperate, or worker-based, where people co-own land or cultivate 
land owned by the state, as in the anti-mafia cooperatives. A ‘cooperative’ is 
thus an association around which production and work is organised as the 
co-op law implies: all working participants are equal members, with a vote in 
the annual General Assembly; profits are reinvested within the activities of 
the association, income generated for members is relatively horizontal, and 
divisions of labour are aimed to be set at a minimum. Co-ops in Italy, like in 
many other countries, are integrated in cooperative banking schemes, where 
they derive favorable credit. An agricultural cooperative is defined under the 
Italian land reform laws as having at least nine members.
 3. General Alberto Dalla Chiesa was a prefetto in Palermo, in effect the general 
officer of the Carabinieri (the military police, one of the three police forces 
of Italy, and active in hunting mafiosi) in Sicily. The prefetto coordinates the 
administrative actions of the state in the territory; he has special powers on 
police, Carabinieri and other state forces, and he coordinates them in particu-
lar problematic situations, during natural disasters, and in matters concerning 
the public order and ‘civil protection’. Dalla Chiesa, who was general of the 
Carabinieri and had been successful in the struggle against terrorism, was sent 
for this reason to Sicily as prefetto, to coordinate the struggle against mafia. 
Shortly before his assassination he had been appointed as a ‘super-prefect’ to 
lead all of the police and military anti-mafia efforts in Sicily. Dalla Chiesa was 
killed in Palermo in 1982, only one hundred days after he had taken office; his 
legacy is still debated in Italy, partly because he had played a key role in curbing 
the Red Brigades in the north, when he served as Carabiniere general in Torino, 
yet failed to crush Cosa Nostra (N. Dalla Chiesa 2007; Stille 1995: 61). Dalla Chiesa 
is revered by people in the anti-mafia cooperatives, who often quote him.
 4. For a start, current scholarship of work often omits a discussion of co- 
operatives altogether. In the SAGE handbook of work and employment (2015) 
there is no chapter dedicated to co-ops, in 530 pages. 
 5. It has been said that ‘the mafia kills in the way a state does; it does not 
murder; it executes’ (Dickie 2004: 97).
 6. Legally, a ‘straw person’ (prestanome) is a person who does not intend to have 
a genuine beneficial interest in a property but to whom such property is 
nevertheless conveyed, in order to facilitate a more complicated transaction 
at law (in this case, retaining the plots’ ownership). In Spicco Vallata, such 
people were often victims of mafia intimidation but equally often were mafia 
affiliates. The issue of nominal landownership is complex, as it regards the 
visibility of mafiosi vis-à-vis the state. In terms of criminal procedure, once an 
asset is proved to be directly or indirectly controlled by a mafioso, it becomes 
confiscated, despite its nominal status. This is not to be confused, however, 
with the practice of registering wives as nominal landowners (explored in 
chapter 7) or mafiosi wives actually owning plots acquired from inheritance; 
in cases such as these, the plots are legally glossed as familiari and are not 
confiscated (chapter 9).
 7. The PCI (Communist Party) became, at the time of La Torre, the largest 
Western communist party (Shore 1990). The DC (Christian Democracy) was 
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the historical centre-right party of Italy, which single-handedly governed the 
country from the mid-1940s to the mid-1980s (regarding party politics of the 
period, see Ginsborg 2003a: 141–85).
 8. Libertà is an ‘umbrella NGO’, the largest in Italy, to which 1,500 organisa-
tions adhere. There is a Libertà branch in fifty Italian cities. It caters for ‘the 
anti-mafia struggle’, promoting ‘the restitution of land’ (Cooperare 2009) and 
‘the eradication of mafias from Italian social life’ (Libera 2009a: 12). 
 9. Presenting the views of state institutions and Libertà, in order to elucidate the 
reasoning behind confiscations and cooperatives, I quote from a few selected 
sources (as the available material is enormous), including websites, leaflets, 
posters, booklets, press releases and conference papers on ‘the anti-mafia’ 
that I followed. I focus on three main sources: a collaborative book of the 
Ministry of Interior, called L’uso sociale dei beni confiscati (The social use of con-
fiscated assets), edited by two key Libertà administrators (Frigerio and Pati 
2006)); the website of the Consortium, the state apparatus responsible for the 
allocation of assets to cooperatives in Spicco Vallata, discussed later in this 
chapter (Focus 2001) as well as its publication Focus; and finally, Libertà’s leaf-
lets, newsletters, the magazine bearing its name and its website (Libera: 2009, 
as these unsigned documents represent the NGO at large). All of the above are 
cited as primary sources.
10. Specifically the Agenzia Nazionale per L’Amministrazione e La Destinazione Dei Beni 
Sequestrati e Confiscati alla Criminalità Organizzata (National Agency for Assets 
Seized and Confiscated from Organised Crime).
11. These ideas reflect broader tendencies in legal theory in Italy and can be seen in 
the light of Carl Schmitt’s jural theory of the ‘state of exception’, according to 
which the sovereign is ‘he’ who decides in exceptional situations (2008). Hence 
the Italian state justifies its toughened criminal procedure (Ingroia 2009) as 
‘extraordinary measures’ required counteracting the de- legitimisation of the 
state’s monopoly of violence by the mafia, even incorporating values bordering 
on being undemocratic and in potential violation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, chapter 6. Current Italian theorists who find kinship with 
Schmitt’s theorem include Giorgio Agamben (2005): his figure of the ‘homo 
sacer’, set inside/outside the conventional realm of the law in a permanent 
state of exception, has been dominant in recent social science, impacting on 
anthropology as well. Schneider and Schneider (2002a) also discuss aspects of 
this problematic of ‘emergency’ in anti-mafia legislation.
12. The means of production (land and machinery) of the anti-mafia cooperatives 
are owned by the state: this also refers to the confiscated Cento winery where 
vinification and bottling takes place. Part of the funding for the renovation 
of the Cento came from the European Union’s PON-5 programme to assist 
development and security against illegality. The cooperatives retain the total 
control of the use-value (legally: usufruct) of the assets nevertheless.
13. It should be noted that in this work the idea of clanship is emic to Sicily. 
For Morgan and Engels, before the introduction of private property and the 
construction of the familial unit around it, the basic structure of kinship 
was the matrilineal clan. The work of Goody (1976; 1983; 2000) and Tillion 
(1983) informs my own argument on ‘clan’ land tenure and the state policy 
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to tackle it, as it forms analogies with mafia and the anti-mafia confiscations. 
Clanship has a different meaning in Goody’s discussion of landed property 
and family (1983). In Spicco Vallata, it is dramatically different, linked to 
mafia. Conversely, ‘family’, a unit based around the household, is linked 
with transmission of property matrilineally or directly to women, through 
the process Goody called diverging devolution (1983). Blok notes how blood 
imagery is evoked in Sicily to constitute mafia, whose main unit is ‘the 
family’ (2000: 87–89). In my ethnography, ‘clan’ rather than ‘family’ is the 
state and mass-media kinship metaphor to identify a mafia coalition.
14. Arci, an openly leftist association, is the largest politicised association in Italy. 
The cooperative Lavoro e Altro was intricately linked with the Arci branch of 
Palermo, which was particularly active in the ‘anti-mafia struggle’, as well as 
in issues of anti-racism, anti-sexism and environmental activism. Arci was 
openly critical of Libertà’s non-political view of the anti-mafia movement. 
15. The Falcone, Borsellino and Liberanima cooperatives were guided by Libertà’s 
Palermo. There were Libertà members in the administration teams of both 
cooperatives. 
16. Marx’s ideas on primitive accumulation are enlightening in terms of his 
critique of property in Capital (1990: 877–879) as a hub of historical social rela-
tions obscuring processes of violence: state or private force. Arlacchi argues 
extensively on the theme of ‘mafia primitive capital accumulation’ (Arlacchi 
1986; Cacciola 1984).
17. Giovanni Falcone was the magistrate/anti-mafia expert who prosecuted Cosa 
Nostra for a decade until the Spicco Vallata mafia executed him in 1992. Paolo 
Borsellino died in a mafia-caused explosion one hundred days later. 
18. As mentioned earlier, in 1992, Barbeto killed Giovanni Falcone, amongst 150–
200 other people. In 1995, he also strangled and melted in acid Giovanni Di 
Matteo, a thirteen-year-old child, the son of a rival mafioso (Lodato 1999). These 
atrocities gave the place its bad reputation. Barbeto lived almost all his life 
in San Giovanni. His nicknames speak for his fierce activity: ‘u verru’ (the pig) 
and ‘u scanacristiani’ (the strangler).
19. This colloquial word is the demonym used for people from San Giovanni.
20. I shall use the terms ‘informants’, ‘interlocutors’ and ‘research participants’ 
interchangeably. My preferred term is the latter but it was not applicable in 
all instances. Especially people close to mafia would adamantly refuse the 
idea that they were ‘interlocuting’ with me, so I am respecting their idea by 
opting for ‘informants’, a term whose uni-directness might be more appropri-
ate in their case. 
21. Di Maggio (2009) traces this through organised questionnaires, using catego-
ries such as ‘anti-mafia commitment’, ‘liberation’, and ‘change’ in order to 
map what motivated people to apply for a job in the cooperatives. 
22. During fieldwork I witnessed visits by journalists from across the board and 
around the world who wanted to interview anti-mafia cooperative mem-
bers: the Italian National Geographic, a glossy magazine from Germany, the 
Guardian, and even a culinary review from Japan. Titles they published 
describing the case included words such as ‘revolution’, ‘heroes’ and ‘change’. 
Some  reporters expressed distress, such as the Daily Telegraph’s envoy: ‘It was 
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heart-warming to see this brave soul so commemorated, but as we wandered 
the vines and [Checco] spoke of ‘localism’ and the measures necessary to 
prevent the Mafia themselves penetrating the committees set up to manage 
the confiscated land, I couldn’t help partaking of that fatalism which so many 
have seen as intrinsic to the Sicilian character . . .’ (Self 2009). The Guardian 
underlines continuities in the anti-mafia movement: ‘The estate is run by 
the Borsellino co-operative . . . “So many courageous men lost their lives in 
the fight against Cosa Nostra,” said [Checco] as we walked through the fields. 
“Now, we, the new generation, are finally able to finish the work that they so 
bravely began”’ (Rafanelli 2008).
23. All photos, unless otherwise stated, are by the author.
24. Latifundism, a capitalist type of estate-based agrarian political economy 
(Schneider and Schneider 1976: 7; see also Petrusewicz 1996). 
25. The adage implies that pleasure comes from controlling people, rather than 
enjoying material luxuries. Arlacchi also notes the lack of conspicuous con-
sumption among Sicilian mafiosi, unlike, for example, Neapolitan cammoristi 
(1986; 1993; 2010).
26. My stay as an Erasmus exchange student during 2002 and previous visits to 
Sicily had familiarised me with such particularities of life, ranging from local 
trattorie to names of mafia clans, while my engagement with translations of 
contemporary Italian poetry added an insight into a field many people appre-
ciated. Villagers were often eager to discuss anything from D’Annunzio’s 
verse to perceptions of Berlusconi abroad.
27. It is worth noting that the bilingual environment of my research implied 
different, class-informed registers of language: the Palermitan administra-
tors spoke ‘proper’ Italian, whilst the local workers often spoke in dialect. I 
acknowledge this in my translations, opting for colloquial words to transmit 
some of the ‘colour’ of Sicilian and also to underline how language reflects 
class in cooperatives. 
28. The term viticulture will be used throughout this book to describe agricul-
tural based on vineyards.
29. Women, in San Giovanni and Spicco Vallata at large, rarely work outside the 
household, and most definitely never in the fields, as I discuss in chapters 6 
and 7. Gendered issues defined the local political economy in and around the 
cooperatives; drawing from the often gender-informed data, I aim to eluci-
date this facet of people’s livelihoods in the ethnography.
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░ The Anthropology of Co-ops, 
the Mafia and the Sicilian Lens
The anti-mafia cooperatives have emerged in a very specific configuration 
of tensions between state and mafia power. The Sicilian material provides 
a lens for a scholarly inquiry of cooperatives due to the specific inherent 
contradictions of the anti-mafia experience on the basis of which Sicilian 
co-ops have been established. This is a case that underscores more tan-
gibly broader tensions felt across the board in cooperative endeavours 
almost everywhere. In Sicily, the enclave format that co-ops acquire is evi-
dent: cooperatives operate as protective and protected shells in a shared 
environment with a number of local obligations. They are in principle 
withdrawn but in actual fact present in that ambience, and the mafia is 
not unrelated to some of the social commitments of co-op members.
The next chapter will locate the historical specificity of the anti-mafia 
cooperatives’ rise in terms of the shift in state policy towards radical 
anti-mafia intervention in the early to mid-1990s, which underlies the 
specifics of this unique cooperativist endeavour. For now – albeit through 
a somewhat oblique approach – I shall try to elucidate the development 
of mafia and the political counter-responses to it, which have taken a 
variety of forms, including, but by no means limited to, the burst of 
anti-mafia activism in the 1990s. But before I enter that debate, a note on 
the mafia is due.
A History of Relations: Mafia, Silence and Violence
Mafia, Sicily’s ‘most enduring problem’ (Turone 2008: 36), has provided a 
sociological analogy for organised crime elsewhere, in places as diverse 
as Russia or Hong Kong or Korea (Volkov 2002; Glenny 2009; Varese 2011; 
cf Schneider 2002). Mafia and Sicily, by extension, provided a metaphoric 
stage for the exploration of what has been seen as offshoot phenomena 
(Sciascia 1979), such as criminal brotherhoods (Dickie 2013). This is an 
interesting analytical oxymoron: on the one hand, there is a good deal 
of exoticism built into this picture in terms of blood metaphors and the 
associated binding relations at home (Sicily) that positions the island in 
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the grand  narrative of passé honour and shame exegeses. On the other, 
there is the problem of rushing to apply codes and a history of political 
economy to places immensely different from Sicily. While addressing the 
latter problem would extend beyond the scope of this book, the former 
can be tackled by spending some time to scrutinise what in my view are 
some of the most stimulating ideas on contemporary Sicily.
The rigidity of analyses viewing mafia as ‘blood familism’ in an array 
of kinship metaphors is still part of the scholarly routine partly because 
the regional familialist discussion has been at the centre of certain anal-
yses of mafia, including those of anti-mafia magistrates (Falcone 1993). 
A Siculo-pessimism, to coin a term recalling Afro-pessimism, echoes the 
fatalistic views of many native authors. Classic Sicilian authors present 
fatalistic, albeit complex, views of the island population’s attitudes to 
legality and organised crime. Giovanni Falcone, the significant state pros-
ecutor of the mafia, felt he was ‘an instrument of the State in a terra infi-
delium’ (1993: 9), adding that ‘the culture of death does not solely belong 
to the mafia: all of Sicily is impregnated with it’ (1993: 73). Literary works 
also associate Sicily with impeded social change and inertia, often resort-
ing to essentialisms. Sciascia (1996) saw the playwright Pirandello’s sense 
of the material world as a pseudoreality obfuscating true relations (an 
idea commonly known as ‘pirandelism’), and ‘pirandelism’ as a metaphor 
for Sicily.
Fighting against a straw man of static ‘familism’ to promote civic 
trust as a replacement for familial loyalty (and, almost by immediate 
association, mafia) has dominated much of the literature on Italy, and 
indeed Sicily, and its mafia issue (Gambetta 1996; Gunnarson 2008). 
Italian sociologists have even suggested the ‘return of amoral familism’ 
in Sicily (Principato and Dino 1997). State agents also employ ideas about 
‘the mafia mentality “inside” the [southern Italian] family’ (Jamieson 
2000: 156–57). Historians, in accounting for change, have challenged 
(Bell 2007) the ‘honour’ idea as a distinctive mafia tradition (Calderone 
and Arlacchi 1993; Gilmore 1987). And, of course, related to the critique 
of assumptions about the persistence of an immobile, change-resistant 
world of ‘tradition’, anthropologists have also questioned the essentiali-
sation of Sicily and the South in much debate (Blim 1998; Saunders 1998; 
cf. Whyte 1944).
In Sicily, life with and around the mafia is, for many, an everyday 
reality; mafia’s omertà is fused and shared in wider settings than the Cosa 
Nostra echelons (Di Bella 2011). While secrecy binds together other kinds 
of brotherhoods in the Italian and European context at large (Mamhood 
2013), the specifics of omertà have a particular history and are indeed 
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associated with a sense of personhood that is at the root of our anthro-
pological priorities in terms of mafia (Rakopoulos 2017c). The intellectual 
project of unpacking the mafia’s mystique can be traced to the history 
of the first serious anthropological studies on the phenomenon, notably 
the ethnographic work of Anton Blok and, although in passing, Jane and 
Peter Schneider. Both approaches, parallel but also inter-complementary, 
have proposed dynamic historical explanatory schemes that account for 
continuity and change in ways that re-situate perceived ideas of tradi-
tion. Blok (1974) focused attention on configurations of different levels of 
power, while Schneider and Schneider called upon world-systems theory 
to understand the mafia as itself undergoing a constant ‘transforma-
tive experience’ (Schneider and Schneider 1976; 1999; cf Dino 2002 and 
Wallerstein 1974). They meanwhile focused on ‘cultural codes’ where the 
meaning of change is figured in relation to (not temporal but social) con-
tinuities in values (1976: 81). In this way, these approaches have formed 
a sort of intellectual diarchy, one approach drawing on the political and 
power side of things, while the other more attentive to political economy 
processes. I draw on both these paradigms due to their enduring rele-
vance, as well as on some Italian sociologists and historians’ work. The 
anthropology of the mafia, though much smaller in scope than sociolog-
ical accounts (Santoro 2011), is revealing for the precious socio-cultural 
nuances needed to conceptualise the phenomenon, evident in this eth-
nography as well.
For instance, I take up Schneider and Schneider’s cultural codes idea 
not only to denote continuities of local codes with anti-mafia rather than 
mafia values but also to position certain local practices in the context 
of dynamic activities. I also build on the Schneiders’ use of the notion 
of ‘broker capitalism’ (1976: 160) to explore the dual position of Spicco 
Vallata mafiosi as longstanding patrons and subsequently brokers in 
Sicilian cooperativism. As it has been recently pointed out, both Blok and 
the Schneiders saw mafia not as ‘a state of exception [but] as a normalised 
system of violent capitalist accumulation’ (Watts 2016: 76n15).
In this vein, historians and anthropologists have also argued that the 
mafia rose through Sicily’s dislocated route towards modernisation (Li 
Causi 1985; Blok 2000; Schneider and Schneider 2003; Dickie 2004; Lupo 
1993; 2011; 2015). This stance positions the organisation in a broader, 
global network of power, deterritorialising it, in a sense. Its entrepre-
neurial spirit should not be understood as a break with ‘tradition’ and 
local codes that vary from place to place; indeed, who negotiates and 
promotes ‘tradition’ can be surprising (cf Sorge 2008). While racket-
eering is mafia’s main source of income in Palermo, where an esti-
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mated 80 per cent of small businesses pay the organisation a monthly 
pizzo, San Giovanni’s local mafiosi had never really imposed a full-on 
 racketeering strategy. (Controlling local territory in San Giovanni, as 
evidenced in this book, has drawn more on interpersonal dependencies 
of local power.) In the same time, the insight on mafia and modernisa-
tion continues to be a useful conceptual framework in the context of 
the island’s ongoing experience of continual change under anti-mafia 
and post-mafia influence (Davis 1996; Schneider and Schneider 2006; 
Rakopoulos 2014a).
We should note the consistency of the mafia’s power project with 
broader workings of capitalism at large, further decolonising the mafia 
(Schneider and Schneider 2011). The Schneiders’ long-standing engage-
ment with Sicily and mafia has evolved from an initial Hobsbawmian 
rebel-focusing idea to one that, to an extent, adds nuances to political 
economists’ ideas on mafias as
‘industries of protection.’ Although this position remains open to debate, 
particularly with regard to the interplay of political and economic ele-
ments, it opens the door to conceptualising the mafia as a normal facet of 
capitalism, no more outside its political economy than the other capital-
isms to which we add such qualifiers as ‘merchant,’ ‘industrial,’ ‘finance,’ 
‘proto,’ or ‘crony.’ (Schneider and Schneider 2004: 18)
In this move, the scholarly stance towards mafiosi gradually shifted 
overall. The mafia were considered primitive rural rebels in the 1960s 
(Hobsbawm 1963: 30–56), an idea that interlocks with Eric Wolf’s writ-
ings on irregular peasant revolts (1969). The intellectual inquiry changed 
since, but when this exact ‘shift’ took place on the ground would be 
harder to define. Indeed, it is debatable if there was ever a real shift into 
a ‘mafia spirit of capitalism’ (Arlacchi 1982) on the ground, in terms of 
the actual mafia doings, amidst the opaque ocean of the mysterious ways 
of the ‘logic of capital1’ (cf. Harvey 2011). The 1980s’ escalation of heroin 
trafficking and violent feuds might provide a starting point to what is 
now understood as the emerging paradigm of seeing mafia and capital-
ism together. But what we do know for sure is that the mafia’s past is not 
pre-modern and archaic. The mafia has been part of modernisation, not a 
hindrance to it, investing capital, capitalising and indeed influencing, for 
instance, regional policies and institutional changes, such as the 1950s 
agrarian reform (see chapter 3; an interesting comparative exercise is to 
think back to the Mexican reform, as per Gledhill 1991; Nuijten 2003).
The historian Salvatore Lupo disagrees with Arlacchi’s emphasis on 
a sudden mafia modernisation, noting that mafiosi were active members 
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of the Sicilian bourgeoisie, leading cosmopolitan lifestyles. Telling is the 
story of Don Calò Vizzini, who reportedly took part in international 
meetings of the sulphur mine owners’ association in London in the 1920s 
(Lupo 2011: 8), while mafiosi
were organisers of cooperatives and won much of their power base by 
serving as intermediaries in the transfer of land from the large landowners 
to the peasants and therefore by placing themselves firmly astride the col-
lective movements precisely in the post-war years following the first and 
second world war. . . . They played a role that could not be imagined outside 
of the great political and social modernisation processes of the twentieth 
century. (2011: 9)
The mafia is modern, flexible and even aware of cooperativist paths to 
development (Rakopoulos 2017b). Santino tackles what he characterises 
the ‘pseudo-dilemma’ of Cosa Nostra’s ‘unicity’ or ‘plurality’ (whether 
it is a monolithic organisation or a network), seeing these as integrated 
concepts (2007: 13). Movement of capital, resources and people constructs 
this integration across organisations and borders, as the mafia’s internal 
centralisation and external fluidity is a relational networking system 
(Armao 2009: 47). Precisely seeing it as relational helps to demystify its 
allure and to grasp it beyond stereotypes of ancestral violence (Dickie 
1999; Mangiameli 2000; cf. Gilsenan 1996).
Having said that, entrepreneurship thoroughly positions the organi-
sation within the workings of modern phenomena. Many contemporary 
authors, then, refuse the depiction of mafia as a symptomatic survival 
of a ‘traditional’ past, proposing, rather, that the mafia bourgeoisie inte-
grated Sicilian capitalism into world markets – for example, the rich 
Conca d’Oro was the mafia’s cradle in the late nineteenth century (Dickie 
2004: 102–6; Santino 1995; 2007). Lupo goes further, dissociating his posi-
tion from that of Arlacchi to reject the ‘archaic/entrepreneurial’, old 
mafia/new mafia divide itself as a
naïve, all-inclusive model of modernisation [that] relegates culture, clien-
tele and blood family ties to the traditional world, placing in the world 
of the present ‘impersonal organisation’, while instead the problem lies 
in understanding the complex interactions that exist, past and present, 
between the former elements and the latter institution. (2011: 23)
Following this idea, the anthropological concern of this book shows how 
kinship codes and strategies, for instance, can lock horns with novel 
cooperative institutions or with land property, with contradictory results 
in mafia and anti-mafia settings. By most accounts today, therefore, 
the organisation, due to the internal shifts of power and recurrence 
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to violence, has been gradually repositioned in the context of intricate 
 capitalist processes, where territorial control remains central (like else-
where in southern Italy, as per Pine 2012). I treat this stance as a vantage 
point from which we can appreciate the workings of mafia around the 
anti-mafia cooperatives and in Sicilian society at large. Alongside it, the 
anthropological encounter would treat the term ‘mafia’ as descriptive 
of both a structured organisation and of a hub of networks that pursues 
intimidatory activity by controlling a territory, in other words drawing 
on a degree of social consensus in a specific locality. Beyond the essential-
isms of the ‘800 Barbetos’, San Giovanni provides an excellent example of 
that form of actual territorial control (controllo di territorio, Santino 2007), 
a central notion of mafia dominance, often expressed through racket-
eering and intimidation. In San Giovanni, however, it meant a very low 
presence of racketeeting in a tightly knit community of shared interests 
between mafia and non-mafia individuals. It also meant historical fluctu-
ations in terms of the mafia’s strategic use of violence.
Two Points on Violence and Change
Max Gluckman’s anthropological project conceived of anthropology as 
the disciplinary study of modernity through the attention it pays to social 
crises and change (Kapferer 2005:86). The contemporary mafia’s conduct 
(and the anti-mafia response) calls for attention to change. We would be 
doing the discipline a favor by not shying away from exploring the inter-
play of modernist interactions between the mafia and a set of relations, 
customs and institutions that constantly recompose it. To that avail, I 
would add two more points on this brief undusting of our mafia books, in 
the light of appreciating the mafia as a modern and modernist phenome-
non, which is my main argument here.
The first point has to do with violence. Remaining fixed in a position 
that focuses upon the violence of the mafia as its only characteristic 
might be rooted in an episteme of discussing the mafia in terms of pre- 
modernity. Namely, underscoring violence as the quintessential mafia 
characteristic might not allow us to appreciate how mafia organisations 
can correspond with lawful and egalitarian forms. This analysis implic-
itly presents the mafia as a strictly unequal and hierarchical structure 
(Dino 2006), it posits the mafia outside the workings of Sicilian society, 
and remains oblivious to its protean nature, constantly undergoing muta-
menti – transformations (Paoli 2001). In fact, the mafia’s violence itself is 
ultramodern, indeed biopolitical, and fused with institutions of care in 
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Sicily, as in the case of a local hospital that Palumbo discusses (2009). The 
data discussed here takes consent, or at least coexistence, into account in 
order to understand how the mafia can tap into peasant struggles or even 
tolerate anti-mafia cooperativisation.
If given the opportunity, Sicilian anti-mafia co-op activists would 
spend hours narrating stories of violent mafia crime committed against 
innocents in Sicily. Undeniably, violence cannot be underestimated when 
analysing the mafia. The use of force is done strategically and is carefully 
invested since the mafia is a ‘violence industry’ (Santino 2007: xx; Dickie 
2004: 47–54). Despite the fact that in the last twenty years mafia assas-
sinations have been dramatically diminished, the lingering element in 
understanding (and fighting) the mafia is still omertà and the threat of 
violence (Coco 2013). Yet, the act of open violence is a strategy the organ-
isation has moved away from (albeit it persists as the main way to solve 
inner tensions among different clans within it). While I was in the field, 
in 2009, ‘only’ two assassinations took place in San Giovanni. The man 
responsible, Peppe ‘The Buffalo’ Barbeto, seventy-eight years old, was 
arrested for the murder of two young burglars who defied the mafia’s 
order and control over petty crime and attempted to break into rural 
houses. That same year in the neighbouring Consortium village Fonte, 
Domenico ‘The Vet’ Raccuglia, one of the five most important fugitives 
of Italy, was arrested in a year with no mafia violent crime in the area 
(Fagone 2009). This is in contrast to, for instance, 1995 when an estimated 
one hundred people died a violent death in that village alone, as I was 
told by locals.
The anti-mafia’s spectacularisation of the mafia’s violent past serves an 
ideological purpose. It provides a double reassurance: on the one hand, it 
presents the organisation as solely capable of hierarchical criminal acts; 
on the other, it leaves the population aside as victims of this process. It 
presents Sicilians as a silenced majority2 that rejects the mafia. The vio-
lent element here creates sharp differentiations; it acts as a distinction 
signifier, marking unequal relationships of victim and perpetrator, and 
postulating the mafia as a form of dominance. This view posits that the 
development of the mafia does not take place through consensual poli-
tics, and therefore no horizontal relationships were held between mafiosi 
and other citizens. It therefore obfuscates a history of intricate collisions 
and class alliances that bred the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and other violent 
organisations.
Informants often mentioned to me how Sicilians called San Giovanni 
‘Kabul’ or ‘Beirut’ during the mid-1990s: Giovanni Barbeto was still on 
the loose and even the army was stationed in the village to tackle the 
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mafia and imposing temporary curfews (Corrado 1998). With this recent 
backdrop in living historical memory for my research participants, by 
 comparison my fieldwork took place in a period of virtually no mafia 
violent crime and, indeed, no protection racketeering. The decline of 
violence, however, did not imply that cooperative members were not 
afraid of retaliation for the fact that they were cultivating confiscated 
property. Interestingly, the fear of violence was also inversely proportion-
ate to the degree of familiarity of a coop member with the local context. 
Specifically, administrators of the cooperatives were more sensitive to 
minor instances of mafia threats and, local workers argued, ‘used them’ 
to attract media attention to the anti-mafia cooperatives.
An example of this is how the Borsellino administrators reacted to 
a fire in their olive grove. Although the Carabinieri ruled out the possi-
bility of mafia arson, a rock concert was quickly arranged to provide 
moral and material support to the ‘co-op under threat’: organised locally, 
the concert took place within a month of the fire. It featured rock star 
Ligabue (the Italian equivalent of Bon Jovi) and successfully yielded a 
fifty-thousand-euro profit. The singer publicly proclaimed his solidarity 
with the co-op and symbolically planted a young olive tree in the grove, 
surrounded by journalists and Libertà activists. However, the gesture did 
not find unanimous support among Borsellino members at the time: ‘The 
point is to make money out of agriculture, not to make a fuss,’ Manto, a 
Borsellino worker told me.
At this point I should stress that I am not suggesting that violence is 
not a component of the mafia here – and indeed a violence fused with 
state power, exercised through or in lieu of state violence, or as a proxy of 
it (Rakopoulos 2014a: 22; Palumbo 2009). But violence marks difference, 
affirming as ‘it’ does historical power and social control over the vulnera-
ble in the midst of events thoroughly informed by stratification and poten-
tially typified in the bureaucratic realm (Graeber 2012). This violence is 
associated with the confusion and mishaps of organised apparatuses com-
mitted to arranging and separating people taxonomically – the way the 
colloquial mafioso separates people into ‘men’ and ‘sub-men’ (Sciascia 1998).
Exhausting our analytical potential on the dividing feature of out-
right violence would exclude the possibility of accounting for the unex-
pected and paradoxical egalitarianisms where the mafia finds a place 
(Rakopoulos 2017b): the liminal position it maintains between practices 
of hierarchy and claims to equality. Instead, we might benefit from 
exploring the other side of mafia dominance and influence in Sicily and 
beyond – that is, to recall a Gramscian reasoning, through the taking over 
of local hearts and minds.
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The second Gluckmanian, as it were, point has to do with the fascinat-
ing qualities of the mafia to transmogrify and render itself an organisa-
tion in a constant state of change. In order to appreciate this more fully, 
we need to comprehend the ambiguities of the mafia’s modernity as a 
historically dynamic institution (Sciarrone 2009: 45). This also includes 
the anti-mafia. The historical interrelationship of the mafia and anti-ma-
fia is as old as each of them, and Cosa Nostra has been incorporating 
and constantly undergoing mutational change (Paoli 2001). Equally, the 
historical relationship between legal forms of economic organisation and 
the mafia is significant to galvanise the point about state and mafia being 
interlocked systems in several cases in Sicilian history. The mafia’s pecu-
liar capacity for and power of intimidation (Turone 2008), distinct from 
that of organised crime, implies the enduring organisation of efficient 
capitalist entrepreneurship that mobilises local networks, as well as the 
exercise of coercion.
But while Mafia entrepreneurialism is linked with violent capital 
accumulation (Saviano 2007: 17), rather than the distinctions imposed 
from the use of violence that affirms and reproduces social distance, 
consensus is also central to forging and solidifying mafia power. It is in 
the hunt of social consensus that the Mafia constantly changes, and vio-
lence becomes instrumental to that endeavour. Change and mutation is 
intrinsic to the ambiguities and secrecies pertaining to the mafia, as well 
as its ability to influence or even assume cooperative, entrepreneurial, 
even unionist forms in protean metamorphoses (see Rakopoulos 2017b). 
However, neither fully encroaching equality nor fully distancing itself 
from hierarchical underpinnings, mafiosi’s engagement with the hori-
zontal arrangements of a cooperative takes us away from the conceptual 
binaries usually associated with egalitarianism and hierarchy. As follows 
from the above, the mafia is a thoroughly modern institution as well as 
a hub of networks that mobilises an array of relations in everyday life in 
Sicily and beyond.
It is in that context that it encounters the anti-mafia cooperative 
phenomenon, with a number of problems unfolding from their symbi-
otic and antagonistic relationship. In order to appreciate these issues, 
I would like to take a step back to see what it is we talk about when 
we talk about another modern institution that is at once localised and 
international: cooperativism. The idea and practice of cooperativism is 
not symptomatic to anti-mafia but indeed a central historical feature 
of it (see Rakopoulos 2014a). It is also, alongside anti-mafia, the other 
central tenet of this monograph, central to it’s interest in egalitarian 
systems.
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Cooperatives and Anthropology: Beyond Divisions and 
Enclaves
Modernity is laden with institutions committed to alleviating differ-
ence and solidifying sameness, and cooperatives are an exemplary case. 
Cooperatives in the modern sense of the term were born in England 
after the industrial revolution; the first was established in Rochdale in 
1844 (Webb 1912). The Rochdale paradigm distinguishes cooperativism 
from previous ventures that involved cooperation (Zangheri et al. 1987). 
It could only develop in an industrial division of labour (cooperation 
between differentiated tasks) and class differentiation (Durkheim 1997). 
In the midst of the industrial revolution; co-ops appeared as expressions 
of workers’ organisation seeking equity in the workplace and direct man-
agement of production.
Like the Sicilian anti-mafia case suggests, co-ops can often be traced 
back to political and social projects. The cooperative movement’s 
 equality-pursuing project was a reaction against the institutionalisation 
of charity in the form of the 1834 New Poor Law, famously criticised by 
Polanyi (2001: 82). The movement, drawing on mutuality and self-help, 
counteracted the idea of the ‘undeserving poor’, aimed to bridge class dif-
ferences and involved community participation in local economies, often 
as an alternative to the hierarchies of waged labour (Taylor 2011: 240; 
Nash et al. 1976). Workers’ management, mutuality among members, 
community participation and tackling the capital/labour dichotomy seem 
to be the main sociological characteristics of cooperatives.
In post-war Italy, the protection of cooperatives was enshrined in the 
Constitution (1947) as a ‘third way’ between liberalism and collectivism, and 
between state and market (Paolucci 1999). Indeed, when the Constitution 
was being created, the communists, a major force in Italian constituent 
politics at the time, suggested that cooperative property should be the 
only property form recognised (Sassoon 1997: 209–12). Cooperatives thus 
enjoyed a welcoming political atmosphere and were encouraged by affilia-
tions with mainstream political parties (Bonfante 1981). During the 1970s, 
cooperative representatives developed relationships with local authori-
ties, evident for instance in ‘communist-leaning’ Emilia.
That ‘Third Italy’s’ development scheme, a familial enterprise-based 
model,3 boosted the Italian economic miracle (Bagnasco 1984; Bagnasco and 
Sabel 1995). Emilia’s ‘red’ cooperativism (associated with the Communist 
Party’s institutions) has been seen as the adoption of political ideologies on 
(horizontal) organisation in production, counterposed to Veneto’s ‘Catholic 
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political culture’ and associated ‘white’ cooperativism (Trigilia 1986; 2002). 
The cooperative movement radically transformed local economies, weav-
ing community with economic practice (Thornley 1981; Oakeshott 1978; 
Thompson 1994) and achieving ‘worker control in action’ (Dow 2003: 
67–82). This condition modelled ‘industrial democracy’ according to inter-
nal horizontal work relations and solidified relations between community 
and workplace (Holmström 1989). Socialist ideologies inspired workers’ 
management, emphasising ‘solidarity’ and equity in work relations as 
cooperativism’s fundamental principle (Macpherson 2008).
Cooperative networks formed in central Italy involved policy-making 
and inter-cooperative cooperation (Bulgarelli and Viviani 2006: 96–100; 
Sapelli 2006). Admittedly, this was not without tensions: social solidar-
ity and market orientation have always been entangled in cooperativ-
ism (Degl’Innocenti 2003). Early on in the movement’s development, 
cooperativism’s main organisational issue was to maintain equality as 
a priority, while also being focused on growth (Bonfante 1981; Bartlett 
1993). Equally, the criss-crossing between subsidiary policies towards the 
cooperative system and the administration of ‘co-op-entrenched munic-
ipalities’ has been continuous since the 1970s (Pugliese and Rebeggiani 
2004). The institutionalisation of cooperatives and exposure to markets 
affected horizontal work relations.
This equality at work is a constant claim and pursuit for cooperativ-
ism. Like commercial enterprises, co-ops’ social life confirms how the 
Weberian separation of work and private/family life has been largely 
based on an empirical fiction (Yanagisako 2002: 19–22). Even more than 
corporations, though, co-ops occupy an odd position at the junction of 
kinship and work. They participate in both at once, despite normative 
ideas on contemporary cooperativism (Zamagni and Zamagni 2010). So 
if co-ops are a historical force to reckon with and possibly an interest-
ing phenomenon to think about, what would anthropologists hold in 
store for them?
Industrial Democracy ‘Experienced’: Anthropology and 
Co-ops
In the genealogy of social scientists that still resonate today, Marx is among 
the first who expressed interest in cooperatives. It might come as no sur-
prise that he criticised but did not condemn the cooperative movement. 
He saw, in its bridging of capital and labour, firstly, a  preliminary victory 
of the political economy of the latter over the former and, secondly, ‘the 
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husks of the old system and the seeds of the new’ (Bottomore 1991: 111). 
However, for that victory to be complete, political power and not localism 
was required. His interest in cooperativism was therefore underpinned 
by a dialectical relationship among state, society and market. For Marx, 
cooperatives are founded upon a historical contradiction:
The cooperative factories run by workers themselves are, within the old 
form, the first examples of the emergence of a new form, even though they 
naturally reproduce in all cases, all the defects of the existing system, and 
must reproduce them. But the opposition between capital and labour is 
abolished here, even if at first only in the form that the workers in associ-
ation become their own capitalist, i.e. they use the means of production to 
valorise their own labour. These factories show how, at a certain stage of 
development of the material forces of production, and of the social forms of 
production corresponding to them, a new form of production develops and 
is formed naturally out of the old. (Inaugural Address, MECW 6: 78, cited in 
Bottomore 1991: 571)
It is this bridge and suspension in between time frames that might 
explain why co-ops have been intriguing to anthropologists for long. 
In fact, anthropological interest in cooperatives has been in evidence 
since Mauss, who was actively involved in cooperativism and committed 
to ‘associationism’ and whose involvement in cooperative socialism is 
well documented by social anthropologists (Hart 2007: 5; Hart 2014: 35; 
Graeber 2001: 67).
Mauss’s appreciation for the cooperative movement, which marks the 
anthropological first engagement with this social phenomenon, presents 
a slightly different aspect than the Marxian case – and brings forward 
another sensitive anthropological issue: ‘experience’. While Marx saw 
in cooperatives the dialectics of present contradictions and the seed 
of future developments, a kind of future-present, Mauss insisted that 
cooperatives brought about ‘practical socialism’ (Fournier 2006: 125). 
Economic experiments were thus not imagined or planned but experi-
enced in radical cooperativism (as per the famous Mondragòn case, see 
below). Speaking before the First National and International Congress of 
Socialist Cooperatives (in July of 1900), Mauss stated,
We will educate him [the citizen] for his revolutionary task by giving him 
a sort of foretaste of all the advantages that the future society will be able 
to offer him. . . . We will create a veritable arsenal of socialist capital in the 
midst of bourgeois capital. (Cited in Graeber 2001: 151)
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With Marx, we can rethink that suspension of co-ops between time 
frames and categories, and with Mauss we can think through the 
 practical socialism of cooperation. Cooperatives defy modernist dichot-
omies as they stand, and oscillate between labour and capital (Whyte 
1999),  commodity production and patrimonial concern (Ferry 2005), and 
market orientation and community egalitarianism (Rakopoulos 2015b). 
Their ‘betwixt’ status begs for anthropological inquiry, especially regard-
ing their suspension between co-op work and the social life of workers 
outside it, including family, neighbourhood and politics.
With cooperatives, we are obviously reminded of the Durkheimian 
idea of cooperation and totality as it is stretched across the solidary distri-
bution of labour in modern institutions (Stedman Jones 2001). Durkheim 
himself, described as ‘a kind of guild socialist’ (Morris 2005; Thompson 
2012: 31), also shared similar views of practical solutions to everyday lives; 
rather than ideologising when it came to cooperation, seeing and sympa-
thising with cooperatives as associations striving for social justice.
The radical horizontalist kind of cooperative environment described 
by Mauss is conducive to liberation from waged work (encouraging, in 
turn, greater citizenship participation). Cooperation embraces and fath-
oms the worker in a larger realm than ‘work’. However, participating in 
a co-op does not take up the social existence of a member as a whole. 
Co-ops are, then, suspended in in-between notional spheres and social 
realms. Although they are not total institutions that would take over the 
whole life of the participant (like, say, monasteries), they are composed 
by more than the sum of their parts – incporporating not only the work-
time but also degrees of the social life and identity of their members.
In that way – blurring life with work, two realms conventionally 
divided in mainstream thought – politicised co-ops operate in a degree 
of contradiction, professing to express more than they can encompass. 
Incorporating its members’ work in an ideologically driven environment, 
a co-op is often not solely a workplace but also a social arrangement that 
invests resources and embeds people in activities beyond employment 
(see, e.g., Ferry 2005). Co-ops with a cause (like the Sicilian anti-mafia) 
often claim they assume the modernist separation of office from social 
life, but as processual institutions, they reject it in everyday praxis.
This basically calls for an anthropological inquiry into cooperatives, 
as the discipline can take these complexities into account, due to that 
‘life’ aspect that anthropologists study (containing anything from kin-
ship to politics). The noted associations of cooperation with a pluralistic 
‘human economy’ (Graeber 2009b) point to that direction, and so do 
earlier points on how cooperative principles are ‘experienced’, not encom-
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passed by  totalising systems. Co-op politics, as in the case of the Basque 
Mondragón, are born not of ideologues but rather of practitioners acting 
together in a collective fashion that does not call for overarching ideolo-
gies (Whyte 1999).
The widely discussed Basque cooperativist experiment in Mondragón 
initially positioned itself against totalising systems: it was ‘a reaction 
against -isms’, especially Taylorist specialisation and division of labour. 
Workers reportedly referred to Machado’s verse, ‘the path is made walk-
ing’ (‘se hace el camino al andar’), to convey their pragmatism (Whyte and 
Whyte 1991: 257). In that way, ‘cooperativism was true socialism – not just 
one way to achieve it’ (1991: 253). This is important, as, with the rise of 
a discussion on the solidarity economy (see, e.g., Laville 1998), co-ops are 
understood to form, as vibrant parts of new economies, an ‘actually-ex-
isting new world’ (Lieros 2012), or they become components of future-ori-
ented narratives of change (Rakopoulos 2015b).
However, there is still space to fill in the conceptual gap of ‘experience’. 
As it stands, we have serious scholarly work that scrutinises ethnograph-
ically what cooperatives do, how they operate and why they possibly fail 
to deliver what they claim. But what does the actual experiential aspect 
of cooperativism mean? We cannot see co-ops as units of analysis if we 
treat experience, without -isms, seriously: we have to refer to their mem-
bers’ lives. While some anthropologists have noted this experience’s co- 
articulations with gender (Ashwin 2014) or ethnicity (Kasmir 2002), the 
place of kinship, household and reputation still begs for more analysis. 
This analysis can help us move beyond a certain economism inherent 
in seeing co-ops as stand-alone structures of experienced socialism. Anti-
mafia Sicilian cooperatives produced a different conflict than, for instance, 
that across nationalistic or gender lines in the Basque country, where 
there is a schism between those who are expected to share a common 
interest with management and those who are not (Kasmir 1996: 198).
The ‘experience’ aspect has taken a slightly different investigative 
strain, towards the notion that the basic idea behind cooperatives was to 
benefit their members and ‘improve their living conditions by protecting 
them from the unbridled forces of the market’ (Vargas-Cetina 2009: 128), 
an idea that not only still holds currency in anthropology but also seems 
to be an underlining anthropological consensus. Such cooperativist cri-
tiques to neoliberal regimes of labour are ubiquitous (Macpherson 2008). 
This ideology of practice has been rooted in specifics, of which ‘commu-
nity’ has been the strongest (see critique in Rakopoulos 2015a).
In that stream of thought, cooperatives have been seen as posing against 
neoliberal market aggression on the one hand and state  corporatism on 
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the other. Co-ops first of all protect forms of members’ gendered self-
hood and the communal aspect of their lives. Stephen, for instance, pro-
poses that they form buffer zones of sociality to renounce neoliberalism’s 
aggressive individualisation (2005; see Ong 2006). They offer their mem-
bers a safe environment in the face of neoliberal globalisation, providing 
a scene for collective efforts, diverging away from individualisation and 
challenging existing class stratification (Stephen 2005: 254). These find-
ings are in line with the studies on workers’ management and participa-
tion (Nash et al. 1976), again in Latin American environments. Easing out 
the gendered feature in labour is also important here, because it appears 
less pronounced than in ‘commercial production’ (Stephen 2005: 258–61).
Accounting for new developments, such as cooperatives endorsing 
projects offering potentials for ‘postcapitalist politics’ (CEC 2001) or ‘com-
munity economies’ (Gibson-Graham 2006: 110–27; cf. Gibson-Graham 
2013), requires attention to the values co-op members and contractual 
workers endorse in their lives and livelihoods. This idea often dovetails 
with a rising trend in political theory and sociology, most often inspired 
from anarchist, post-anarchist and autonomist political affiliations, about 
forming enclaves of good practice within the capitalist continuum. These 
could be forming a protective nest over and around the liberated worker 
in a post-alienation process that attempts the Marxian Aufhebung, the 
transgression over from alienation into self- and community autonomy 
(Berardi 2009). They could be shaped in or as temporary autonomous 
zones (Bey 2008), emancipated areas that, little by little, are affecting the 
whole body capitalistic. Prefiguration and the art of doing, precisely a 
claim to experience rather than ideologies, is central to this (Maeckelberg 
2012).
These cracks, as celebrated by some neo-Marxist theorists, most noto-
riously by John Holloway, can contribute to the collapse of the capital-
ist apparatus (2002; 2010) – one works their way through but against 
the system, by forming inter-communicating cooperativist enclaves, as 
experiments in popular democracy (Wainwright 2009). This theoretical 
framework is definitely taken up by activist theorists of cooperativism 
(see Sitrin 2012) that abide by the idea of self-managing productive zones 
of workers’ liberation amidst a sea of capitalist exploitation and dispos-
session by the state. It is a fascinating idea surely, and one that Scott’s 
recent work, alluding to anarchist cooperativist thinking, might cheer 
to (2012). It is also an idea that does not often hold water when faced 
with certain economic factors of exposure to markets and the basic need 
for capital to run a cooperative, as indeed the Argentine case has shown 
(Azzelini 2015). It most specifically seems debatable when the livelihoods 
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of people are taken into account – imbued as they are in market and 
other relations outside the enclave – as this book shows.
In this community aspect there is a material salvage role towards land 
and labour, which co-ops are called in to play. This protectionism feature 
is twofold: towards external forces (‘the market’), they are salvaging 
local life; in terms of introvert processes, they protect their members 
and their means of production. They provide the enclave zones from 
which people can defend local configurations against the dispossessions 
that market and state enact on communities. Security of people, safety 
for work, protection of labour rights and the environment and relative 
decommodification of some co-op assets are the main aspects of this 
idea.
‘Protection’
It is for this reason why the anthropological literature, by and large, is 
committed to unpacking the idea that cooperatives unequivocally pro-
mote egalitarian values – and why anthropologists are overall sympa-
thetic to co-ops. Seeing cooperativism as promoting horizontal relations 
in the workplace, and doing away with capital/labour-related distinc-
tion through collective management of a sector by autonomous workers, 
marks a trend in the scholarship (cf. Berardi 2009; Scott 2012). Specifically, 
anthropological and sociological reckoning has positioned cooperatives 
in a defensive towards ‘forces’ of the market. In fact, they are mostly 
understood as shelters from such un-redeeming powers of globalised 
markets (as, e.g., per Stephen 2005; Vargas-Cetina 2005). They are seen as, 
simultaneously, a system of procurement of labour and a self-help ‘associ-
ationism’ social plan rooted in social relations, evolved from a set of ideas 
that recognised the conflict of capital and labour and aimed to bridge the 
unbridgeable – for Marxism (Curl 2009; Restakis 2010). Cooperativism has 
achieved relative autonomy from the state by guaranteeing protection 
of labour with co-ops: playing a ‘salvage’ role for jobs in transitions and 
crises (Sitrin 2012).
Scholarly attitudes often present co-ops as economic institutions that, 
uniquely, cater to notions of selfhood and community in the face of 
market aggression, providing pockets of resistance and safety from the 
commodification of labour and land – the Polanyian ‘man and nature’ 
(Polanyi 2001: 171–201).
More precisely, there are two aspects of Polanyian protection in this 
conceptualisation of co-ops as enclave protectionist zones here. The first 
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pole of this policy is the protection of labour. Labour here is understood in 
the wider sense to include notions of selfhood invested in and expressed 
through the labouring process. For instance, this applies to the transition 
from command to market economies, where co-ops have been seen as 
salvage belts for labour (Buechler and Buechler 2002), or as reinstigating 
a lost sense of collectivity in the interim restructuring of post-Soviet 
economies (Ashwin 1999). Earlier work from socialist Europe would have 
it that cooperativism was the plateau that offered exactly the measures to 
salvage positive means of individualisation within the labour experience 
in the USSR (Humphrey 1983; 1998).
In a similar way, but as the mirror image of Humphrey’s notes on how 
‘Marx went away but Karl stayed behind’, co-ops offered a zone of protec-
tion for individualism and against state forces, retaining individual agency 
where the totalising systems of socialism reigned supreme (Hollos 2001). 
In contexts of a more open market, workers’ co-ops have been understood 
as being committed to equality and industrial democracy (Holmström 
1993). Attached and related to this salvage-zone policy is that co-ops carry 
and enact a shared sense of local accountability to disaffected workers, 
being members of local social movements (Bryer 2011). Unlike their cor-
porate counterparts, they apportion their profits among shareholders 
and invest locally, while ‘capitalist’ corporations’ investment schemes lie 
outside the control of shareholders (Cetina-Vargas 2009).
The second pole to the salvage outline is the protective framework laid 
out for the means of production themselves; most importantly for agrarian 
co-ops: land. Co-op assets, their constant capital, acquire a protective 
framework and are set outside of the (more exploitative or alienating) 
wider frameworks of the market in ‘enclave settings’. This maintains a 
balance between making the most of the market and refraining from 
fully engaging with its most alienating aspects. For instance, agricultural 
co-ops have been seen to provide more democratic access to resources 
and marketing (Ulin 1988). Similarly, as hinted above, in Ferry’s Mexican 
ethnography members of the co-op use family and patrimony idioms to 
make sense of the silver deposits their co-op works on, safeguarding the 
asset’s sustainable future. Their language of inalienability, however, coex-
ists with the commodification of silver; when that enters commercial 
circulation, its exchangeability eventually triumphs over its inalienabil-
ity, and relations of exchange trump relations of production (Ferry 2002: 
342–3; see also Ferry 2011).
Elsewhere, co-ops are salvaging industrial forms of constant capi-
tal: recuperated factories in crisis, for instance. Ethnographically doc-
umented cases of protectionism where cooperatives played a ‘salvage’ 
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role for jobs also recall Sitrin’s findings on the Argentine crisis (2006) or 
narratives of East German cooperatives in the neoliberal 1990s (Buechler 
and Buechler 2002; Bauerkämper 2004) and post-Soviet collectives, where 
familial and gendered solidarity were reinforced by memories of a state 
sense of collectivity (Ashwin 1999).
This double bind of the enclave and the openness to exchange is cru-
cial. Specifically, the way we account for co-ops’ relation to  markets – 
and indeed global markets – is significant in terms of the ways idioms 
employed are transmogrified to accommodate market dependencies. It is 
admitted that cooperatives, in European settings for instance, have gradu-
ally moved away from a rhetoric of ‘solidarity’ as a principle (Rakopoulos 
2014a, c), giving way to ‘market mutuality’ as an organising discourse, as 
cooperatives sought to open up global markets (Kasmir 1996; Zamagni 
and Zamagni 2010).
Co-ops often emerge from struggles associated with neoliberal crises. 
However, to conceptualise them as if they act as means to provide 
defence barracks against neoliberal aggression would not do justice to 
the complexity of social life they express. Actually, it might not even 
fully account on how they intersect with broader concerns within these 
struggles. Enclave zones, for instance, operate with regulations premised 
on exclusionary effects – like clubs, based on an ideological premise (say, 
‘being anti-mafia’). But the social arrangement of their enclave feature 
locally becomes even more urgent to unpack.
Surely, conceptualising the social economy as an alternative route to 
development may not suffice, since its ‘social’ features imply that it is 
entangled with broader responses to neoliberalism – especially in the cur-
rent fiscally obsessed austerity climate in southern Europe (Rakopoulos 
2015b). Moreover, if they do operate sealing out their members from 
broader forces, what exclusionary processes are employed and deployed 
to achieve this aim?
Here rises a critique that needs to be voiced to the above argumen-
tations. The approach that reckons with co-ops as lived (‘experienced’) 
enclaves sealed out in protection from the perils of externalities does not 
fully hold. The Sicilian lens helps to account for internal divisions that 
crack the assumed horizontal unity of cooperation. More specifically, the 
enclave-protectionism notion is premised on ideas of separating cooper-
atives from the context of both their broader political economy and the 
wider fabric of social relations hegemonic in their localities. The debate, 
by and large, presents co-ops as entities with a social life of their own, 
developing outside the broader social structures within which they oper-
ate. This fissure further exacerbates the sense of tensions between what 
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goes on within co-ops and around them – and how these two social overlap-
ping spaces mirror each other on divisions of all sorts.
As it happens analytically, keeping the neat separation of community 
and economy (as in Gudeman’s early work, 1990), siding co-ops with the 
former or merging the two in cooperativism as ‘community economics’ 
can be skewed. This separation is premised on seeing ‘co-ops’ as units of 
analysis.
We would benefit, instead, from seeing them as peopled institutions 
entrenched in a series of institutional dependencies from which they 
cannot be disentangled. It is their members we should focus on, people 
whose lives are entangled in other relations and obligations too. Co-ops, 
it follows, cannot be disembedded from their members’ social obliga-
tions inside and outside cooperative frameworks. Paradoxically, the more 
we assume a distance between markets and co-ops, the more this affects 
our own clumsiness to reflect on the relationship between co-ops and 
wider society.
This is because seeing co-ops as protection enclaves dramatically unties 
them from the broader social relationships (and market dependencies) 
that they operate in. The state in contemporary Europe actively endorses 
commodification at all levels of the distribution of resources and services, 
using markets against reciprocity, the assumed premise for cooperativisa-
tion. So how important is the surrounding social life for co-ops?
(Beyond) Divisions of Labour
Cooperatives are mostly guided by horizontalism in organising labour but 
nonetheless operate with internal divisions. Accounting for the oft-noted 
shift of cooperatives from being orientated as horizontally organised 
work associations to acquiring hierarchised divisions of labour, authors 
identify two different but interrelated external influences coming from 
institutions: authoritative political (usually state) ideologies and/or com-
petitive markets.
While Holmström recommends a comparative approach, considering 
regional characteristics of community-based central Italian and Catalonian 
cooperativisms (1993; cf. Bartlett 1992, for another comparison), compari-
sons should be made with caution. As ethnographic accounts of Catalonia 
make evident, apart from competitive markets, autocratic regimes may 
have an impact on horizontal relations within cooperatives and on the 
ways cooperatives interact with the community in which they operate. In 
that context, what Narotzky calls ‘the political economy of affects’ (2004: 
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57–82) – claims to friendship, community idioms and family relations – 
served to sustain, but therefore maintain, workers in their precarious job 
situation (cf. Standing 2011). The ‘glue’ holding this set of work relations 
together was (also) a vision of cooperativism stemming from a conserv-
ative regime: ‘the Catalan way is workers’ cooperatives: an ‘imagined 
community’ of social relations of production, an ideology of harmony 
between capital and labour through national identity’ (Narotzky 1997: 
187). Catalonian regionalism instrumentalised cooperativism, identifying 
in the co-articulation of casa (the family unit) and cooperativa (the unit 
of labour) local expressions of the nation’s unity (Narotzky 1988). This 
corporatism deployed ‘a hegemonic cultural concept that consistently 
glosses over differentiation and conflict, and pictures a history of cooper-
ation, common objectives and non-existent class struggle’ (Narotzky 1997: 
119). Gavin Smith also identifies such tendencies: regulations governing 
Spanish cooperatives made an already informalised economy more infor-
mal4 (1999: 179).
These marked divergences from horizontalism (equal work relations as 
a principle of industrial democracy) are then rooted in processes wherein 
an idea (e.g., socialism) about the well-being of the community becomes 
the main priority of the common economic endeavour. Community is 
used as a sinister ideological premise. Divisions of labour inspired by mar-
ket-oriented specialisation and corporatist relations diverted the histori-
cal role of cooperativism away from tackling the Marxian labour/capital 
conflict (Smith 2006).
Economic sociologists have seen co-ops as ephemeral organisations 
(Burawoy 1991; Ferguson 1991) deeming them unable to withstand ten-
dencies towards bureaucratisation and hierarchies (but see Vargas-Cetina 
2005). Eventually, the idea that Mondragón’s cooperatives complex had 
to be ‘more closely integrated if it was to compete effectively in the 
European common market’ (1991: 201) led to the restructuring of the 
organisation of labour, imposing hierarchisations in lieu of horizontal 
relations. Sharryn Kasmir characterises these transformations as ‘middle 
class reforms’ (1996: 63–91). In that climate, a long history of interrelated-
ness between corporative subjects and cooperatives has been underlined 
(Vargas-Cetina 2009), with sociologists being even more explicit about 
this (Zamagni and Zamagni 2010). In Italy, co-ops are then considered ‘the 
result of what people consider “corporatist” ideas’ (Vargas-Cetina 2009: 
133). In the Sicilian case, these ideas have a long history of their own, 
interlinked with anti-mafia, as I shall discuss in the remainder of this 
chapter as well as in the next one.
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My take on these divisions moves away from the sociological focus 
on labour and the valuation of skill towards reconsidering Durkheim’s 
legacy of holism. I argue that cooperative organisation, drawing on rela-
tions between community and economy, often becomes a channel for 
experimentation inspired by regionalism and political ideologies, which 
become the source of such internal divisions. This book is particularly 
attentive to the respective moralities attached to these divisions.
We need, when accounting for how cooperatives move from hori-
zontal to hierarchical organisations, to engage with the differentiated 
viewpoints and practices within hierarchised cooperatives. Discussions 
of hierarchisation do not explain how opinions and practices are man-
ifested in (and informed by) cooperative members’ moralities (an issue over-
looked, in varying degrees, by many key writers: e.g., Kasmir 1996; Sapelli 
2006; Zamagni and Zamagni 2010; Holmström 1989; Macpherson 2008.) 
Moralities and ideologies operative among the workforce are especially 
significant for an anthropological approach that could lead from a focus 
on divisions of labour to labour-based divisions. This is a move beyond 
the overall problematic of enclave. It brings home the need to nuance 
the idea of hierarchisation by looking at the social life of co-op members 
outside co-op work. It would be simplistic to see the division of labour as 
(just) ‘management impositions’ within a cooperative’s structure; often, 
these internal differentiations are informed by aspects of members’ lives 
outside the cooperative framework.
This is a main point of this book. The sociological analysis of coopera-
tives is committed to showing how they become internally differentiated, 
without elucidating in detail where this differentiation is rooted and what 
it entails for co-op members. The diverse opinions and moral stances 
intertwined with their division of labour often remain undertheorised. 
My ethnography not only sheds light on these nuanced differentiations 
in terms of moralities but also argues that this division is often constructed 
by different life experiences, even lifeworlds among the workforce.
Zooming in on the Anti-mafia
Rooting divisions of labour in anti-mafia cooperative members’ subjective 
experience entails a differentiation from contexts described in the soci-
ological and anthropological literature. Sociologists underlining internal 
differentiations in cooperatives (Bartlett 1993) rarely  emphasise the role 
of moralities, codes and social relationships, some assuming a Simmelian 
perspective to stress the lack of ‘trust’ in cooperation (Gambetta 2000; 
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Cook et al. 2007). Drawing on the market’s drive for competitiveness, 
cooperatives are often prone to ‘restructuring’, diverging from their orig-
inal equity-orientated organisation of labour.
Instead of specialisation and division of labour arising because of 
 cooperatives’ exposure to competitive markets and conservative state 
ideologies (see below), Spicco Vallata, therefore, tells a different picture. 
There, it is rather a tension between the Consortium’s normative idea and 
participants’ different concepts of community (as well as their embedded-
ness in different social relations) that is the main axis for internal differ-
entiations. Cooperativism is contextual, shaped by the configurations 
of power at a given historical moment. In that respect it is also ‘mod-
ular’, in the way Benedict Anderson uses the term (2006). Namely, the 
principles of cooperativism, instilled in the context of mafia-controlled 
agrarian production, developed in very specific forms in Sicily as vectors 
of anti-mafia mobilisation. In the context of post-2000 Spicco Vallata, 
anti-mafia cooperativism came to entail a commitment to legality, which, 
as the ethnography will show, created tensions in its adaptations to mem-
bers’ local situatedness. Cooperative administrators set out to apply the 
principle of anti-mafia cooperativism – which eventually contributed to 
making (internally differentiated) anti-mafia cooperatives.
Sicily is somehow diverging from enclave protectionism, in that polit-
ical cooperativism inspired by the anti-mafia, far from abolishing agri-
cultural wage labour, has instead created it (albeit in a regulated form). 
Whether it created a form of labour protectionism is beyond doubt; how-
ever, looking beyond its enclave is the point here. The anti-mafia cooper-
atives created jobs in the absence of a viable labour market and indeed 
in the midst of neoliberal market fundamentalism. As alluded to in the 
vignette opening this book, although there was agrarian waged labour in 
Spicco Vallata before the cooperatives, it was always unregulated: rare 
and exploitative, part of the informal economy’s local networks and 
mostly controlled by the mafia. The cooperatives did not eliminate this 
but added regulated work to the setting. Cooperatives in this context, 
where mafia patrons have historically determined the labour market, are 
simultaneously viable alternatives to the paradigm of the ‘autonomy’ of 
the economy and manifestations of capitalism’s contradictions.
There are two notable features of workers’ cooperativism in Spicco 
Vallata; although they are not unique to the area, they are contingent on 
the specificities of the anti-mafia political project. Firstly, anti-mafia coop-
erativism arose not as an alternative to wage labour but from its absence: 
where agricultural jobs existed, they were subject to the harsh terms of 
mafia patronage and were never regulated by labour rights. Anti-mafia 
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cooperatives followed a very pragmatic strategy, offering employment to 
poor, petty producers. The priority was not to counter wage labour but to 
better conditions of production and remuneration. Indeed, the main link 
pulling the anti-mafia cooperatives together is wage labour. Secondly, 
the ‘capitalist’ in Spicco Vallata is the state, which grants access to the 
means of production (land, machinery), and through them to work to the 
members of social cooperatives. In Sicily, state rhetoric presented this 
process as the ‘restitution of land to the community’ (Frigerio and Pati 
2007: 2). Thus, the state, as owner and gatekeeper of ‘communal’ land, 
endows cooperatives with decommodified land, and crafts an ideological 
cooperativist model.
This land has been withdrawn from the market and has no exchange 
value, as it does not partake in commodified transactions. It is given to 
the cooperatives to safeguard it, remaining inalienable (Weiner 1992). 
Earmarked like a special-purpose resource (Zelizer 1997), land is endowed 
with a particular kind of political role, associated to the anti-mafia ideol-
ogy and movement. This political inalienability needs to be explored in 
tandem with analyses of cooperatives as institutions protecting resources. 
The safeguarding role anti-mafia co-ops retain for decommodified plots in 
Sicily is crucial.
I have already hinted how this feeds in an anthropological discus-
sion of cooperatives as custodians and protectors of assets and resources. 
Ferry, for instance, sees co-ops as guardians of an ‘inalienable’ asset, as 
they appear endorsing discourses of the commons, patrimony and inal-
ienable possessions (Ferry 2005). In Mexico, the co-op does not own the 
silver deposits it works on; its members are using a number of idioms, 
pertaining to family and patrimony, to defend the reproduction of the 
asset.
At the same time labour, the other main resource anti-mafia coopera-
tives allow locals to access, also changes form – wrested from the mafia as 
the state attempts to seize control over jobs. While there is a resemblance 
to classic state collectivism (Humphrey 1983), in Spicco Vallata this state-
driven project that decommodifies land and offers job protectionism is 
taking place in neoliberal contexts, in the face of broader deregulation 
and state roll-back (Castells 2011). The anti-mafia cooperatives maintain 
a position of salvaging land, but co-ops also appear as the safeguards of 
labour across their sociological spectrum.
We shall revisit this twofold problem regarding inalienable, decom-
modified land and protected, safeguarded labour in the ethnography 
proper, unfolding in the remainder of this book. For the moment, it lurks 
in the background as a reminder of the perceived role of co-ops as well as 
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the ideological ascriptions to their operation and their means of activity 
in much of the current state of play in the anthropology of cooperatives. 
After all, this monograph’s ethnographic narrative explores how locals’ 
experience of membership in anti-mafia cooperatives spilled over into 
other social fields, presenting continuities of cooperative members’ activ-
ity with local codes and moralities (gossip, registration of land to women, 
informal work, moral ownership of land). It shows that this interaction 
can take place within the same cooperative, and stems from the tensions 
between changes imposed by a political project and continuities of mem-
bers’ morals and practices with local codes that the project aims to tackle. 
In that way, divisions of labour to an extent reflect a distinction between 
state-driven cooperativism (a system of value codified in regularisation 
of resources) and the grounded meanings of experience of partaking in 
cooperatives. The tension between the legislated and the local denotes 
the pluralism of economy as different value arenas – different domains 
of value that interact (Gudeman 2001). What developed among mem-
bers within the cooperatives, however, rather than struggles over value 
(Graeber 2001: 115; De Angelis 2007), were clashes of values, registered in 
diverse social experiences among co-op members.
The Material Anti-mafia
My research contributes a study of cooperatives from below and within. In 
terms of its inquiry into the anti-mafia phenomenon, it also seeks to fulfil 
the need for a study of change in Sicily predicated on work provision and 
processes of access to material resources. This is not a parallel pursuit of 
the analyses of cooperativist dynamics. As much as it is a contribution 
on the studies of the mafia and anti-mafia, this nexus provides an entry 
point – a lens – for an anthropological scrutiny of cooperatives. This is 
a study of the lives of people, who positively engage with the state and 
whose livelihoods are linked to the struggle against mafia influence in 
Sicily. This way, moving from civil society to material concerns, I inquire 
into the transformative experience that cooperative involvement means 
for their livelihoods, examining a rearrangement of access to material 
resources on anti-mafia ideological bases.
Specifically, instead of moral reform, the ethnography examines a 
production-based anti-mafia mobilisation. This departs from a hegem-
onic focus on ‘civic education’ and ‘moral reform’ in current analyses 
of the ‘new’ anti-mafia movement. Schneider and Schneider’s mono-
graph, focused on late-1990s Palermo, follows the civil society mobilisa-
tion known as ‘the Palermitan spring’; ‘educating for legality’ in order 
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale. 
 The Anthropology of Co-ops 59
to design sound citizens became the anti-mafia movement’s major 
contribution to local civic life (Schneider and Schneider 2003: 260–90). 
Sociologists prioritised institutional change as the key input to drag soci-
ety away from mafia (Girolamo 2009), while popular mobilisations have 
been theorised as ways in which people manifested their ‘civic duty’ on 
the streets (Jamieson 2000). Recent culturalist approaches promote the 
idea that ‘the culture of the mafia’ can be eroded through educational 
reform (Gunnarson 2008). Exponents of the ‘new’ anti-mafia argue for 
positive engagements with the state, starkly differentiated from how the 
old braccianti saw state agents as allies with mafiosi (Arlacchi and Dalla 
Chiesa 1987). Some of these analyses take for granted the mainstream 
discourses on the separation between an ‘old’ and ‘new’ mafia, assuming 
a modernisation paradigm neatly separating tradition and change. This 
is not true of Schneider and Schneider’s more nuanced approach (1996; 
2003), which underlines the issue of class. It is not true of the movement 
from clans to co-ops either, as it does not suggest an a la Henry Maine, 
process towards contract (2008) but one of residues and inertia.
This unproblematised moral reform comes at a cost. Anti-mafia coop-
erativism, inspired by legality, aims to instigate a value system over 
resources (employment and property) that contradicted many local 
values. This formed a process amenable to hierarchisations, as members 
did not identify with anti-mafia in equal terms morally and practically. 
The anti-mafia, a way of life that stretched beyond the realm of the pos-
sible and acts as a vector of inegalitarianism, can show us, as a Sicilian 
lens, ways to appreciate cooperatives that take us beyond economics. 
The Spicco Vallata hierarchical situation was also informed, apart from 
divisions of labour, by the different ideas local co-op members themselves 
held about state, community, kinship and mafia itself. Anti-mafia coop-
erativism’s strict legalism, aiming to dissociate the cooperatives from 
certain aspects of local community and tradition, created contradictions 
on the ground that affected the cooperatives’ development.
People who are nominally committed to the anti-mafia have a pres-
ence of the mafia lato sensu in their everyday life. This situation has strat-
ifying effects on the anti-mafia cooperatives. The cosmologies of mafia 
and anti-mafia bear complexities that cannot be understood outside the 
broader workings of political economy and history, as the Schneiders 
have also pointed out from the origins of their anthropological project 
(1974). Mafia’s embeddedness in the local (economic and other) life actu-
ally calls for the presence of anti-mafia, which is historically linked to the 
material circumstances of people’s livelihoods (Rakopoulos 2014a). I shall 
debate the material basis of anti-mafia in the next chapter, providing a 
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historical backdrop for the local anti-mafia movement and cooperativism 
to locate the contemporary cooperatives in a history of tense relation-
ships between law, landownership and markets (chapter 3). The hard 
data, historical and ethnographic, discussed in that chapter provides a 
backdrop to locate the book in the relevant anthropological debates and 
situate its contribution in economic and political anthropology (chapter 
2). The discussion on resources and embeddedness reveals the different 
and often contradictory ideas and practices through which people of 
the cooperatives approached the resources available to them (land and 
work), establishing relationships between cooperatives and ideologies of 
activism (chapter 3), flows of reputation (chapter 4), kinship (chapter 5), 
informal income seeking (chapter 6), ideas of community (chapter 7) and 
social arrangements around land (chapter 8).
NOTES
1. Granted, capital is processual: value in process (Harvey 2010: 46-47); and the 
constant reinvestments of Cosa Nostra from the territory to the global mar-
kets, as well as the world-control of illegal commodities are enough to think 
of the organisation as a capitalist enterprise (Schneider and Schneider 2004). 
In that respect, oddly, the arcane character of the mafioso, an entrepreneur 
with no name or face, serves very well the idea and imagery of capital as a 
non-faced entity. This image does not contradict my take on mafia capitalism 
as thoroughly modern; indeed, it might add a post-modern allure to it. 
2. Gramsci’s take on the asymmetrical relation between state and society argues 
that consent operates within both fields, while coercion only in one. It would 
be helpful to recall the metaphor of the centaur that Gramsci uses, describing 
the dual nature of the state (and Mafia) here: coercion and consent and avoid 
dualisms. ‘The dualist analysis to which Gramsci’s notes typically tend does 
not permit an adequate treatment of economic constraints that act directly to 
enforce bourgeois class power: among others, the fear of unemployment or dis-
missal that can, in certain historical circumstances, produce a ‘silenced major-
ity’ of obedient citizens and pliable voters among the exploited’ (Anderson 
1976: 70n78). 
3. Anthropologists have cast doubt on this term (e.g., Yanagisako 2002; Ghezzi 
2007).
4. All this notwithstanding the local history of other cooperativism experiences, 
as per the Catalonian Republican industrial colonies (Terradas 1979), while 
anarchist cooperativism also developed earlier, in mid-1930s Andalusia (Mintz 
2004).
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░ Cooperatives and the Historical 
Anti-mafia Movement
The Anti-mafia Movement: a brief history
Enclaves or not, co-ops have histories, and cooperativism in Sicily has a 
fascinating history intertwined with the anti-mafia movement. This chap-
ter is therefore concerned with how the anti-mafia movement has been 
linked with cooperativism in rural western Sicily, looking at the pro-
cesses in which their actors have overlapped through time. Historicised, 
the relations between mafia, anti-mafia and cooperatives can be under-
stood by recognising continuities of practices and, equally, in grasping 
their transformations. The form this narrative takes is both historic and 
ethnographic, providing an explicatory overview of the rise and develop-
ment of the rural anti-mafia phenomenon.
The chapter’s aim is twofold: firstly, to identify the key moments of 
reference in the history of the anti-mafia movement for contemporary 
anti-mafia cooperative members, building a historiography from below 
and within my research participants’ paradigms. Secondly, it aspires 
to examine specific readings of history regarding these key moments 
by current anti-mafia actors, in order to assess the movement’s legacy 
and embed the contemporary cooperatives within a framework of ideas 
largely indigenous to Sicily – ideas that resonate today with both urban 
civil mobilisation and rural cooperativism (‘legality’ and ‘anti-mafia’ 
itself ). In this way, the chapter historically contextualises the dynamic 
interactions between peasant politics, state, mafia and anti-mafia as these 
emerged in Spicco Vallata.
The chapter therefore traces the historical points of reference for 
current actors of the anti-mafia movement of Sicily; aiming to explore 
the genealogy of the anti-mafia notion, it follows peasant mobilisations, 
assessing the impact of this tradition on current anti-mafia coopera-
tivism. The selective ways contemporary co-op participants reflect on 
the anti-mafia movement’s history, commemorating it and updating 
its meaning today, illuminate current meanings of ‘anti-mafia’ (Santino 
2006; Scolaro 2008).
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Cooperativism in Spicco Vallata has had varying meanings at different 
times. As discussed, a historical ethnography of cooperativism needs to 
give an account not only of its broad manifestations but also of its actors’ 
particular social relationships on the ground. Thus I see cooperativism as 
a notion that is contextualised locally and historically, possessing certain 
core characteristics but changing in form and content in relation to the 
specific contexts in which the ‘module’ is developed and deployed. In 
that way, cooperativism, like most notions, acquires the modularity that 
Benedict Anderson ascribes to nationalism, a cultural artefact that came 
into historical being in specific circumstances and
became ‘modular’, capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of 
self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be 
merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological 
constellations. (Anderson 2006: 4)
Cooperativism, similarly, is a general notion able of portability and 
distillation in new contexts. Contemporary Sicily, undergoing changes 
influenced by the ensemble of mobilisations dubbed ‘the anti-mafia 
movement’, is an ideal site to explore how cooperativism relates to social 
change (Fiume 2006). Locating this question in historical time helps 
explore how the interrelationship of mafia and peasant struggles has been 
negotiated in the context of the island’s ongoing experience of change. 
In this social change, the different meanings and practices of ‘anti-mafia’ 
are a major vector (Davis 1996; Schneider and Schneider 2006).
Earlier I mentioned how the Schneiders’ points on ‘cultural codes’ 
might still retain some relevance, in light of the overall tremendous 
contribution of these anthropologists to the island and the discipline. But 
accounting for social change would mean challenging the last remain-
ing assumptions about Sicilian tolerance for mafia values rooted in ‘cul-
tural codes’, as Michael Blim has suggested in a review of Schneider and 
Schneider’s older work (2006: 10). In their monograph on Sicilian demog-
raphy however (1996), the Schneiders had admittedly already traced and 
highlighted, mostly among artisans, a not necessarily ‘anti-mafia’ but 
certainly ‘alternative’ set of ‘enlightened’ social sensibilities (2006: 76). 
As they acknowledge in a self-reflective chapter, the importance of the 
movement escaped them in their first Sicilian fieldwork, situated in a 
rural community (2006: 75). Later fieldwork in Palermo produced a mon-
ograph where the anti-mafia movement is rigorously discussed as at once 
a prism, a vector and an outcome of social change in the island (2003). 
The researchers acknowledge the peasant roots of the movement (1997) 
and suggest its gradual transplantation from agrarian to urban settings 
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(2002b). In this direction, the work of Umberto Santino should also be 
considered, despite the analytical framework based on class relations 
that suggests an evolutionist prospective as well as a pessimistic political 
suggestion that the movement lost its historical significance when urban-
ised (2009).
These works, suggesting the move from rural to urban settings – and 
to an extent the corresponding stress on class configurations (and shifts 
in work and labour patterns, as per Cole 1997 and 2007) – grasp a sense 
of continuity alongside transformation (which serves as a grounding for 
the notion of modularity). They call also, however, for complimentary 
research on the material and symbolic legacy of the anti-mafia move-
ment’s roots in rural environments today, which can benefit by concep-
tualising the interrelationship of political commitment and relations of 
production in Sicily and Italy at large. After all, the problematics of social 
change facing long-standing structures of state bureaucracy and clien-
telism are an ongoing feature in research concerning Sicily (Palumbo 
2016). To this direction, reassessing the rural anti-mafia movement today 
relocates the historical, ideological meanings of legality from civil society 
into agrarian production and distribution, building on previous points on 
Sicily’s dynamic, plural cultures (Schneider and Schneider 2005).
Specific circumstances on the ground (mafia activity and the peasant 
movement’s anti-mafia responses) have rendered peasant cooperativism 
a practice both distinct in its Sicilian specificities and contextualised in 
two different moments in Spicco Vallata’s modern history. The first set 
of circumstances relates to communalist worker-based cooperativism in 
the 1940s; the second, to post-agrarian-reform producer-based coopera-
tivism, premised on small-proprietor viticulture. The cultural meaning of 
cooperativism in Sicily derives from circumstances in these two different 
periods, both of which were informed by anti-mafia commitment. In that 
respect, the chapter will explain how cooperativism became a model of 
economic organisation and a political ideal of organising to avoid the 
mafia, alongside exploitative landlords and distant urban markets. In the 
final section, I shall examine and analyse, via primary data gathered from 
ethnographic fieldwork, how this history has been ‘transplanted’ in the 
current configuration of anti-mafia cooperatives to form a third manifes-
tation of cooperativism.
This chapter then contributes to the regional scholarship of Sicily and 
specifically to the anti-mafia movement’s history in three ways: firstly, 
by elucidating how peasant movements in western Sicily were organ-
ised around anti-mafia in terms of cooperativist claims and practices; 
secondly, by framing the meanings of anti-mafia politics into peasant 
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mobilisation; and thirdly, by underlining interactions between gaining 
a livelihood and struggling against the mafia. These elements interacted 
with each other in various ways, to the point where in certain instances 
they became intertwined, producing ideological specificities unique to 
Sicily that still resonate with contemporary developments. Explicit or 
implied ‘anti-mafia’ policy is an aspect of peasant mobilisation particu-
lar to Sicily’s peasant cooperativist history and is central to assessing 
how moral economy elements in contemporary agrarian movements are 
rooted in specific readings of historical data (Edelman 2005). The lens 
through which I review this history and assess the ways it resonates with 
contemporary actors is by approaching anti-mafia peasant sensibilities 
and cooperative organisation as modular schemes guided by peasants 
themselves but framed in broader configurations of political economy 
that peasants can influnce only to an extent, as they are otherwise shaped 
by political institutions removed from rural Sicily (McMichael 2008).
The Fasci Movement (1892–1915): The Birth of the Anti-mafia
Our narrative begins with the Fasci Siciliani dei Lavoratori (Sicilian 
Workers Leagues, henceforth Fasci) of the 1890s peasant movement. This 
is for both historical and ethnographic reasons. The first is informed by 
the existing historiography of peasant mobilisation in Sicily; the second 
is based on my ethnographic observation of how people historicise the 
anti-mafia movement’s past today. On the one hand, the Fasci contributed 
to a seminal change in the way agrarian labour relations are legislated in 
Sicily and Italy, as well as to a reformulation of the island’s relationship to 
the nation, one generation after Unification. The ‘Corleone agreements’, 
the first trade-union collective contract in Italy and an outcome of this 
mobilisation, confirm the Fasci’s centrality in modern Italian history. The 
Fasci moment has moreover been hailed as ‘the birth of the anti-mafia 
movement’ (for instance, Santino 2009: 16; Scolaro 2008).
On the other hand, the choice to locate in the Fasci a ‘big bang’ of 
anti-mafia mobilisation relates to the opinions of my oldest informants 
in fieldwork, men between sixty and eighty years old who were sympa-
thetic to the anti-mafia cooperatives. In discussions, they would stress 
that among moments in the history of the anti-mafia movement, the 
Fasci, the post–World War II land occupation movement and the 1960s 
cooperative movement reigned as most important.
In Spicco Vallata, the Casa del Popolo (People’s House), a social centre 
in the village of Cembali, five kilometres from San Giovanni, was most 
active in the salvaging and shaping of local historical narratives, espe-
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cially regarding agrarian struggles. The progressive political culture of the 
village allowed for constant re-negotiation of the past aimed at construct-
ing collective memory (Connerton 1990; Fracchia 2004), which I traced in 
oral accounts.1 Early in my fieldwork, trade unionists and members of the 
anti-mafia cooperatives had advised me to visit the Casa to hear ‘the old 
men and their stories’ (i vecchi e le loro storie). Constructed in the 1950s, the 
Casa was a welcoming place, ‘filled with history’, as a resident described 
it. Socialist realism-style paintings resembling the Mexican muralists or 
the Sicilian communist artist Renato Guttuso hung on the walls, depict-
ing mothers working in fields alongside their children and moustached 
men waving red flags over grain piles. A fascinating banner from the 
1930s celebrated early feminist agrarian socialism (see illustration 3.2). In 
the dim light, across tables scattered in the main room of the Casa, old 
men played cards, read the paper and chatted.
When I asked what period the murals and paintings depicted, a man 
simply explained that Sicilian braccianti and contadini (peasants) had been 
involved in so many struggles that it would be misguided to identify the 
paintings with any one specific historical event. The men present, all 
between fifty and eighty years old, then debated what would be most 
important to portray: the Fasci2 movement of the 1890s? The post–World 
War II land occupation movement? The 1960s cooperative movement? 
Everyone agreed that any of these historical moments was equally qual-
ified for artistic depiction. ‘All of these struggles consisted of families 
Illustration 3.1: The entrance to the Casa del Popolo at Cembali.
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claiming land, forming cooperatives to manage it, occupying it to ensure 
it . . . [these were] communist struggles but also family struggles, with 
women and kids involved,’ a trade unionist clarified. Evidently, the peas-
ants’ collective historical imagination was informed by their political 
sympathies and also encompassed the rich variety of actors in these 
struggles. Interestingly, despite the widespread and often violent rural 
unrest in Sicily throughout the nineteenth century (Aya 1976), none of 
the Casa points of historical reference went back to uprisings before 
the Fasci in the 1890s. This suggests that their historical awareness was 
mapped by the limits of genealogical narrative: their grandfathers had 
lived memories of the Fasci.
The Fasci movement was a federation of braccianti – which had a mixed 
(socialist and Catholic) background. It aimed at the collectivisation of 
the latifundia and drew together landless peasants, as well as artisans, 
regardless of gender or age, to demand better work conditions. Fasci-
coordinated groups of braccianti occupied landed estates, challenging 
Palermo-based proprietors’ absenteeism, and formed improptu coopera-
tives to cultivate these lands. Leading Spicco Vallata trade unionists were 
imprisoned in 1894, after the movement was crushed by the state.
Illustration 3.2: A banner on a wall of the Casa. Notice the hammer and sickle 
surrounded by a heart, a symbol of the massive women’s participation in the 
rural communist anti-mafia movement.
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The Fasci have been described as socialist or even anarchist (Ganci 
1977). Marxist-leaning scholars reject the idea that the movement was a 
‘spontaneous’, jacquerie-type outgrowth, insisting on its crucial role in late 
nineteenth-century labour movement (Renda 1977: 328; Santino 2009). 
Kautsky hailed the Sicilian braccianti as ‘the centre of the sympathies 
and thoughts of the international proletariat’ (quoted in Romano 1959: 
547). Labriola reported to Engels about the Fasci as a mixture of ‘social-
ism, anarchism, business and mafia’ (in Santino 2009: 33). Mafia and 
anti- mafia often mingled in the development of the peasant movement. 
Bernardino Verro, a leading figure of the movement in Tarini, the large 
interior town that was its centre of gravity, even joined the mafia him-
self (Dickie 2004: 171), hoping to provide impetus to the Fasci through 
alliances with mafiosi who were also opposed to the state. After martial 
law suppressed the Fasci in 1893, a massive peasant exodus from Sicily 
took place, largely due to fear of state and mafia retaliations. Verro, for 
instance, went to prison until 1896, although he subsequently became 
the town’s mayor in the first elections after the introduction of universal 
suffrage. Capitalising on his Fasci involvement, he sought to establish 
agrarian cooperatives anew, but he was eventually assassinated by local 
mafiosi in 1915 (Paternostro 1994: 48).
Forming a ‘historical bloc’, the state soon after allied with the lati-
fundists (Gramsci 2005: 67). Predicting the violent demise of the Fasci, the 
mafia opportunistically joined the alliance, solidifying the bloc, despite 
having temporarily allied with the peasant movement just previously 
(Lupo 1981). The example of Verro illustrates the Fasci intricacies (and 
contradictions): the fuzzy conceptual and practical boundaries between 
mafia and anti-mafia led to mutual development and eventual cross- 
fertilisation, particularly in times of social turmoil against a conservative 
state, regarding widespread claims for resources. Equally, the mafia arose 
within peasant mobilisation before turning against it. Specifically, before 
they resorted to violence, mafiosi incorporated and emulated the social 
alliances they could not control. This has been a key reason for the rela-
tive social consensus the mafia has historically enjoyed.
Revolutionary Legality (and Violence) before and after the War
Hobsbawm’s take on the mafia might be disagreeable, but his point on 
the ‘entrenched legalism of peasant land invasions’ (Hobsbawm 1974: 
124)  does stand for the immediate post-war period as experienced in 
Spicco Vallata. In spite of the reputed fascist state’s opposition to the 
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mafia (Duggan 1989), fascism did not challenge the latifundo system’s 
vested interests in maintaining the gabelloti, the mafia patrons at the 
time –  middlemen in the agrarian labour market. Local fascists were 
affiliated with mafiosi, and so the latifundia protection (which relied on 
gabelloti) was left intact. Gabelloti landholding was a service to the absentee 
landowners of the big Sicilian estates; in that respect, they occupied mid-
dlemen positions between different levels of power, local and broader 
reaching, securing the landlords’ profits through violent means of con-
trolling the local agrarian landless workforce (Blok 1974: 33).
The reproduction of the agrarian bloc within fascism obviously sug-
gests mutual interests of state and mafia (Lupo 1981). Mussolini’s ‘com-
mitment’ to eradicating the mafia was therefore mere rhetoric. Affluent 
mafiosi actively participated in disbanding agrarian cooperatives along-
side the fascist police. On a wider scale, anti-socialist sentiment shared 
by fascists and mafiosi aggravated mass labour emigration abroad or to 
northern Italy, especially for the radically politicised in the braccianti 
movement (Schneider 1990).
Toward the end of World War II, the mafia capitalised on historical 
changes. Some claim that mafiosi assisted the Allied invasion of Sicily 
(summer of 1943) via flows of intelligence from mafia to the US Navy 
(Follain 2005), while most dispute the reliability of this story (Lupo 1997; 
Lupo 2015: 93–112; Mangiameli 2004). The widely held assumption that 
the US Army reciprocated for this cooperation, assisting mafia politi-
cal influence across the island during the ‘transition to democracy’, is 
definitely debatable (Lupo 2011: 21–33). One thing we cannot afford to 
overlook, though, is that Cosa Nostra did help contain the reach of com-
munism to Sicily after the leftist Resistance to fascism spread in northern 
Italy (Robb 2009: 125).
In the meantime, the Spicco Vallata braccianti, influenced by the PCI 
(the Italian Communist Party), took to the fields en masse, occupying the 
estates under the slogan ‘Give the land to those who work it’. This strug-
gle contributed to the latifundo’s collapse (Blok 1974: 83). The political 
future that braccianti demanded was nothing less than the collective own-
ership of the latifundo. The post-war impetus allowed peasants to seize 
land and transform the exploitative latifundist production system. Events 
such as the occupation of the Spicco Vallata Drago estate in October 1946 
by four thousand peasants, who formed cooperatives to cultivate it, are 
typical of the movement (Di Matteo 1967: 484). (In an important symbol-
ism, the estate is now cultivated by an anti-mafia cooperative).
Immediately following World War II, the braccianti, in a revival of the 
Fasci, organised communitarian uses of land on the occupied latifun-
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dia (Santino 2009) despite ‘the anti-bolshevik crusades’ of mafia patrons 
and their co-opted bandits, like the infamous Salvatore Giuliano (Dickie 
2004: 210). These land occupations and workers’ cooperatives lasted in 
Spicco Vallata from the Liberation (autumn 1943) to the Portella massacre 
that took place in Spicco Vallata (spring 1947). The movement’s legalist 
claims found a response and basis for actions in the Gullo Decree Number 
279 (‘concessions of uncultivated land to farmers’, 19 October 1944). The 
decrees represented a basis for peasant mobilisations and cooperativism 
that corresponded to the peasantry’s ‘legalist sense of justice’ (Rossi-Doria 
1983: 114), as interactions between peasants and political power centred 
on legislative procedures.
The decrees were laws initiated by Gullo, the communist minister of 
agriculture in the Italian coalition government formed in April 19443. The 
minister’s policies were embraced by the southern peasantry. Delighted 
with the cooperative movement, Gullo and his party thought that the 
extension of cooperative property might offer an impetus for communist 
influence in Sicily. In the fifth PCI Congress, Gullo and Grieco (prominent 
MPs in the Constituent Assembly) proposed that ‘at all costs, we have to 
direct the activities of the cooperatives towards collective forms of man-
agement. . . . We always have to search cooperativist forms, to encourage 
the peasants to renounce the constant fragmentation of land [that a 
reform would bring about]’ (in Renda 1977: 60).
A delay in implementing the law angered braccianti, who started apply-
ing it de facto, occupying the latifundia and forming cooperatives to 
manage them. The communist minister Gullo’s law proposal, expressing 
solidarity with the rural poor, aimed to capitalise politically on the peas-
ant movement’s legalism and supported cooperativist management of 
land in Sicily as a projection of a collectivist future.4 The revolutionary 
legality of the landless peasants was coupled with the most progressive 
agricultural law in Italian history, allowing braccianti to impose, through 
activist means, legislation suspended by the Italian state.
Blood in Portella
In the regional elections that took place in Sicily on 18 April 1947, the 
People’s Block (Blocco del Popolo, a coalition of the PCI and the socialist 
party), came first, gaining 30.4 per cent of the vote, and shook the politi-
cal system. The peasant movement’s militancy, coupled with parliamen-
tary representation, aimed to establish a fair agrarian reform that would 
promote cooperativism.
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Signor Nicosia from the Casa del Popolo, who was a twenty-two-year-
old bracciante at the time of the elections, had joined the communist 
party and voted for the Popular Block and felt that ‘the world had started 
to make sense at last’. I was struck by his passionate will to share his 
experience; we sat at the table where he and his friends, such as Signor 
Schirò, passed most of their day. They were eager to discuss contempo-
rary politics, enjoying the company of the young, and noted that many 
youngsters’ interest in the peasant movement was ‘boosted by the [con-
temporary] anti-mafia cooperatives, which do a good job in keeping our 
history alive’.
Nicosia then told me about the events at Portella on May Day 1947: as 
the crowds of largely landless peasants gathered to celebrate a day of rest 
and post-election political euphoria, gunfire into the crowd of braccianti 
families caused mayhem. Thirteen people from the three villages that 
led the peasant movement were killed or wounded. People scattered, 
running across the hills and back to their villages. No one could tell at 
that point who was shooting: ‘bullets came from all sides’ (Casarrubea 
2005: 250). That the action was promoted by a combination of state secret 
services, Giuliani’s bandits and mafiosi is yet to be proven, but this theory 
is widely held in Spicco Vallata today – as much as the belief that Portella 
was a warning to the peasant cooperativists to restrain their radicalism. 
Indeed, the final blow to their political ardour came soon after with the 
long-awaited 1950 agrarian reform.
Many in the Casa del Popolo were Portella survivors, but they let 
Signor Nicosia narrate, as his storytelling was most vivid.
We had won at the eighteenth of April [elections]; we took part in the elec-
tions with the Blocco del Popolo, under the flag of Garibaldi. And we took 
to the street for only the third time after so many years of fascism, to cele-
brate our victory and the first of May. And Barbato’s rock [explained later] 
was approachable for the first time. That piece of granite stood there in the 
midst of the place and had become a symbol for the demonstrations. Before 
and during the early years of fascism the braccianti who demonstrated along 
with their families went there to eat. So we reached that and, as in the days 
of our fathers, set to munch the bread and onion. And then there was the 
havoc. The shootings and the running . . . all of a sudden. People started 
fleeing the place. I was scared. The most incredible thing was the horses’ 
screams . . . like sirens from everywhere around; a hellish sound, very 
frightening. And we saw horses covered in blood. . . . 
[Signor Schirò (interrupting):]
We were the three revolutionary villages. And we took it [to Portella] in 
Mayday; landless peasants. We made our way to Portella, all hugging each 
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other, [people] from San Giovanni, from San Turiddu, on the first of May 
and other occasions. To celebrate the memory of the Fasci. . . . And in ’47, I 
was, when they started shooting, right by Barbato’s rock. I was ten metres 
away from my uncle who was holding the socialist flag all this time, as 
people rose from eating and started running around. And in the end there 
were like six of us [from Cembali] and five from San Giovanni and two from 
San Turiddu who were shot.
Many of those present in the Casa del Popolo agreed that ‘the dead 
of Portella call for justice; they ask who armed the Portella killers’. An 
ex-communist, who had fled Sicily for Australia immediately after Portella, 
told me, ‘Not a single president of the republic came over to apologise and 
honour us for the first massacre of the state [strage di Stato] in modern 
Italian history’. It is widely believed in Spicco Vallata that Portella was the 
first of many ambiguous violent eruptions in which the state’s secret ser-
vices were involved. Interestingly, people today do not recognise historical 
borders between mafia and state violence in events like Portella. There is 
debate among historians about whether the massacre was an ambush of 
the demonstration by mafiosi (Manali 2001) or by the infamous Giuliano 
gang recruited by mafiosi (Dickie 2014; Lomartire 2007) or by an alliance of 
neo-fascists and US secret services working closely with mafia (Casarrubea 
2005: 251). Relations between mafia and banditry in specific moments of 
historical tensions have also been discussed (Hobsbawm 1965; 1972).
My interlocutors, however, do agree on Portella’s solemn commemo-
ration as a site of the ‘most dearly felt’ May Day celebrations in Sicily – 
and one of the most important in Italy. The site is visually remarkable. 
Thirteen rocks lie in symbolic representation of the thirteen people shot 
dead in the tragic event. A sad poem in the Sicilian dialect is carved on a 
fourteenth rock, the so-called ‘stone of Barbato’.
The Agrarian Reform (and Brokerism Thereof)
Researchers regard the 1950 land reform in Sicily as a ‘failure’ (Schneider 
and Schneider 1996: 250–54), ‘a failed land reform’ that had ‘political 
intentions’ (Blok 1974: 79) or an ‘anti-reform’ or ‘counter-reform’ (Santino 
2009). Since the late 1920s, the PCI had been critical of the long-awaited 
reform; as Gramsci pointed out:
The Turin communists . . . warned against ‘miraculist’ illusions in a mechan-
ical sharing out of the big estates. . . . What can a poor peasant achieve by 
occupying uncultivated or poorly cultivated lands? Without machinery, 
without accommodation on the place of work, without credit to tide him 
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over till harvest-time, without cooperative institutions to acquire the har-
vest. . . . (1927: 5)
With the application of the Gullo decrees to the uncultivated and 
poorly cultivated lands, the swiftly constituted grassroots agrarian 
cooperatives managed land across more people, in comparison to the 
post-reform situation. Cooperatives in 1946 shared more than eighty-six 
thousand hectares among their fifty thousand members, while the social 
base of the state’s agrarian reform reached in 1950 was more limited 
Illustration 3.3: The ‘stone of Barbato’ with a poem inscribed on it, at the 
Portella della Ginestra site. Photo by Francisco Calafate.
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in scope (around twenty-five thousand people). A smallholder economy 
substituted the cooperativist organisation that enabled peasants to bar-
gain collectively in urban markets. The 1950 law aimed at shaping a 
small-proprietor class, offering land to individual families as opposed to 
collective organisations. It therefore discouraged the formation of work-
ers’ cooperatives and thus simultaneously deprived the locals of what 
had been their main means of political and anti-mafia organisation. Many 
peasants, bereft of credit facilities and of any machinery to cultivate the 
land, became vulnerable, resulting in another wave of mass emigration 
in the 1950s.
Fragmenting land into family tracts damaged radical bracciante coop-
erativism. Pratt makes a similar case for the 1953 reform in Tuscany,5 
where ‘a class of family members emerged not through market forces 
but through the direct action of the state’ (1994: 63), arguing that the 
de-radicalisation of the PCI-sympathetic ex-sharecroppers was the polit-
ical aim of the land reform. Gaining not only access to markets but also 
bargaining power became the peasantry’s aim in this new context; this 
meant sidelining brokers, the role that mafia had come to monopolise.
Anti-mafia mobilisation interacted with legal and policy frameworks 
and informed the shift from workers’ cooperativism to producers’ coop-
Illustration 3.4: Monument to the mafia’s victims in San Giovanni: the 
intellectual, the peasant and the youth, under the Blocco banner, are portrayed 
in ‘socialist realism’ style, while a mother is protecting her wounded child.
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erativism. There has been a shift in the focus of political struggles regard-
ing alliances, claims and agents, from struggles over land to struggles 
over markets, where mafiosi re-emerge as powerful middlemen in the role 
of market brokers (sensali), the pivotal, shifting moment being the agrar-
ian reform legislation.6
‘Sensali’ Brokers and Cooperative Wineries (1960s)
Peasant integration into broader structures took place through strug-
gles to organise the vinification processes, after a gradual transforma-
tion from dry farming and pasture into wine grape cultivation. This was 
pivotal for political alliances and relationships against the local mafia. 
Mafia brokerage and the political commitment of some locals produced 
local paths towards cooperativism, as peasants sought to reach urban 
markets. The cooperative winery developed into the basic unit of pro-
duction around which interests of various social groups and individuals 
overlapped, regarding political mobilisation and anti-mafia organisation.
Spicco Vallata viticulturists established cooperative wineries for grape 
processing and for engaging with the wine trade, as well as for integrat-
ing production and commercialisation processes. Viticulture peasants 
focused first on the process of transforming the grape into a finished 
product, identifying as the way forward common ownership of techno-
logical means to make wine at reduced costs and organising themselves 
collectively while retaining their families’ economic autonomy. As the 
old (pre-agrarian-reform) co-ops gave way to a new module of coopera-
tivism, cultivators continued the communitarian legacy of the braccianti 
movement while building on the new property dynamics instituted by 
the reform. The ideology of class was now linked to household suffi-
ciency, as noted in Schneider and Schneider’s historical ethnography of a 
Sicilian village’s viticulture economy (1996; cf. Chayanov 1986).
With land reform, vine growers in Spicco Vallata experienced a fairly 
rapid transition from being braccianti to occupying unstable positions 
in new class formations formulated around small property and precari-
ous livelihoods. In guaranteeing a piece of vineyard to each family, the 
reform had tackled only one economic grievance. The problem, which 
inspired cooperative wineries, was the speculative power that the mafia 
exercised in determining market price. Even in the latifundist period, 
a rising class had moved out of rent-capitalism to become middlemen 
(Blok 1974: 67), setting the price of grapes (Bandiera 2003a). Viticultivators 
needed to process the produce; the establishment of cooperative wineries 
came as an outcome of this concern.
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These middlemen are called sensali, the Italian word meaning ‘medi-
ator, agent, broker, matchmaker’, which is exactly what the Sicilian 
sensali did at the traditional animal fairs and in the markets for grain.
The Schneiders call the mafia’s control over routes of grain and labour 
‘broker capitalism’ (1976: 160). In Sicily, like elsewhere, broker capitalist 
activity was identified with the figure of the sensale, central to the hinter-
land’s integration into urban markets. As a technology of brokerism, the 
sensalismo is interesting: it overlaps with mafia but maintains degrees of 
independence from it.
The term is not native to the area; although I have not encountered it 
in sustained usage outside the valley and western Sicily, the phenomenon 
is in no way unique to the region of my concern, and certain comparisons 
can be drawn with other Italian cases (cf. Pratt 2007; 2014). However, the 
association of sensali with mafia and co-ops that tackled them with anti- 
mafia is a Sicilian particularity that in Spicco Vallata has a specifically 
pronounced resonance even today, and it is central to comprehend struc-
tures and agents of dependency in the region.
The sensali worked (‘and still do!’, as many informants complained) for 
wine merchants in Palermo, Rome or abroad, buying the harvests of inde-
pendent producers at low prices. Creating a relative degree of consensus 
and coordination with each other, they became systemic to the commer-
cialisation of wine. Thanks to this coordination, different mafia clans 
could guarantee efficiency for their brokerage, evoking Cosa Nostra. In 
other words, after the agrarian reforms, mafiosi clans7 and their affiliates 
shifted from controlling people’s labour to acting as middlemen between 
producers and the market.
Threatened by low prices and no bargaining power in the late 1950s, 
peasants, who themselves or through their broader families (genealogi-
cally and laterally) were aware of previous bracciante struggles, faced new 
forms of dependence induced by sensali control of prices and markets. 
This gave rise to further struggles that aimed to address market insecu-
rity. The peasant movement recovered, within a generation, the experi-
ence of braccianti mobilisations. The winery replaced land as the strategic 
resource around which peasants’ collective claims were formulated: the 
peasant movement transformed itself into a massive social cooperation 
grounded in reaching urban markets and avoiding mafiosi brokers.
In Spicco Vallata, the cooperative winery Santoleone, established 
in 1968 and located on the outskirts of San Giovanni, was the main 
achievement of the cooperative movement’s mobilisation. The offspring 
of a vanguard commitment of local communist peasants, with imme-
diate experiences of mafia violence and family memories of the Fasci, 
Santoleone began as the cooperative attempt of a few families and spread 
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through kinship and friendship ties (Terranova 2006). It started to grow 
in the early 1970s, largely due to the Communist Party’s pressure and 
influence. Attracting state funding, it aimed to incorporate peasants into 
the political system and contain the mafia’s influence. This was partly 
due to the alliance with the village branch of the CGIL (General Chamber 
of Labour) union, which lobbied the PCI for support. The cooperative thus 
had grown out of a political movement, established itself through political 
institutions and played a central role in integrating people into political 
parties.
At the time of fieldwork, the Santoleone winery had eight hundred 
members. Trade unionists I spoke with described this huge enterprise 
as ‘the FIAT of our area’ – ‘the main source of income for locals’ as well 
as social integration through labour. The winery became, for people in 
Spicco Vallata, a means of community building and policy making, which 
also influenced their political representation. The cooperative movement 
and, with that, the anti-mafia mobilisation of the peasantry peaked in 
establishing the Santoleone. Giulio Rillo, the middle-aged incumbent 
president of Santoleone, spoke to me of its origins:
The Santoleone winery comes from the sixties. . . . It gathered around it the 
communists of the area; my father was also there. Pino Talano,8 together 
with thirty other people, communists and not, created this cooperative 
because in the area there were people buying grapes from the producer to 
determine its price, directing everything. . . . There were those people of 
the area, we call them i sensali [this is how the word is pronounced in the 
area] . . . today they call them brokers. . . . Well, the famous sensale decided 
the price. . . . The word [sensale], translated from Arabic, means ‘people 
roaming like this’, tradesmen. So, they always decided who acquired the 
grape – most often they were linked to the mafia, they were mafiosi. This 
is the reason people made the co-op, basically, to avoid the sensali activity.
The actual mechanics of co-op wineries are simple: each family harvests 
their own grapes which are amassed to make wine on a collective vinifi-
cation site. The integration of producers (around eight hundred members 
during the 1980s and to this day) into cooperativism generated represent-
atives within the peasant movement who translated this momentum 
into political power as cooperative wineries have been led by people with 
explicit political commitments. Nationally, the cooperative movement 
developed through two opposed routes: ‘red’, supported by Legacoop and 
the PCI, and ‘white’ cooperatives, sustained by Unicoop and the DC. What 
is distinctive about the Santoleone cooperative is that, by pursuing links 
to PCI political patronage, it also sought protection against the mafia. 
In this way, peasants sought to de-provincialise their mafia-related con-
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cerns, making sure these are were represented on the state level. Thus, 
with Santamaria, the anti-mafia movement’s politics signified a with-
drawal from immediate post-war claims to revolutionary transformation 
and collective use of land.
In 1994, a local mafia clan burnt the cars and country homes of the 
Santoleone managers. Local unionists insisted this represented the mafia 
policy of destroying the efforts to form a cooperative winery, undertaken 
in order to sideline the mafia sensali, gain direct access to markets and 
consolidate political alliances capable of guaranteeing long-term secu-
rity against mafia. These responses affected both cooperativism and anti- 
mafia politics and constituted a backdrop against which anti-mafia coop-
eratives still operate today, and to which my informants made constant 
references.
The Contemporary Context: Land Confiscations and Anti-
mafia Cooperatives
Members of the anti-mafia cooperatives locate the ‘deep historical origins 
of the anti-mafia movement’ in the history of the Sicilian Fasci. I partici-
pated in one public commemoration of anti-mafia history held in memory 
of Bernardino Verro, which took place in front of his statue in Tarini’s 
main town park. People working the confiscated land for the anti-mafia 
cooperatives9 told me that it was an ‘annual event in memory of a peasant 
leader who paid for his anti-mafia commitment with his life’. Amongst the 
attendees were Tarini’s mayor and trade unionists. They commemorated 
the Fasci leader Verro without mentioning his one-time mafia affiliation, 
indeed stressing his ‘sacrifice’ in the struggle against the mafia. Tarini’s 
mayor read out a list of people who had been assassinated by local mafiosi 
because of their anti-mafia activity. In a narrative genealogy commencing 
with Verro, ‘the anti-mafia forefather’, the list included people as diverse 
as Placido Rizzotto (a communist trade unionist) and Carlo Alberto Dalla 
Chiesa (a military police general and the prefect of Palermo).
This commemorative event illustrates how the anti-mafia legacy is 
renegotiated today. Current anti-mafia activists separate historical actors 
from their time’s messy contingencies to construct a genealogy of names 
retrospectively cast as ‘those sacrificed in the anti-mafia movement’. 
Today’s anti-mafia cooperatives see themselves as the movement’s con-
tinuation and their unique heirs, able to revisit and represent its legacy. 
Activists, in such commemorative narratives, evoke a ‘selective tradition’ 
comparable to the cultural expressions used by labour aristocracies, as 
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Gavin Smith notes, to ‘represent’ the ‘cultural survival’ of working-class 
traditions and struggles (1999: 30). The far-right Tarini mayor’s position is 
indicative: he privately told me at the Verro event that he felt isolated, as 
his anti-mafia commitment derived from the ‘fascist anti-mafia struggle’, 
while contemporary anti-mafia cooperatives identified with the commu-
nist peasant tradition of Spicco Vallata.
There are reasons to qualify the picture of the historical process peak-
ing in the contemporary cooperatives. As discussed in the book’s intro-
duction, the Falcone was established in 2001 and the Borsellino in 2006, 
while the Lavoro e Altro dated from earlier, even before the Consortium 
itself, having been set up in 1998. They all drew inspiration from the 
anti-mafia movement of the past.
Overall, despite the claims to ‘continuity’ with the struggles of the 
anti-mafia peasant movement, this inspiration was ideological rather 
than direct. None of the many people who had been involved in previ-
ous social or specifically anti-mafia struggles was involved in the newly 
created cooperatives. However, Santoleone people like Rillo supported 
the new cooperatives, as did most trade unionists. Their inspiration from 
‘red’ rather than ‘white’ cooperativist models came specifically from 
their administrators’ ideological sympathy with the historical peasant 
movement, their present-day collaboration with ‘red’ consumer co-ops 
in Emilia (northern Italy) and involvement in progressive Palermitan 
civil society. As a proportion of the local population, participation in the 
cooperatives was small (some 150 people’s livelihoods were immediately 
associated to income from the cooperatives, when in San Giovanni only, 
the permanent population was approximately 4,500 people). Unlike the 
history they drew from and referred to, the anti-mafia cooperatives could 
not accommodate massive popular participation and were not grassroots 
organisations. But akin to that history, their existence was interlocked 
with mafia in a number of ways.
One striking way for my interlocutors to remember the anti- mafia 
movement and claim continuity was to recall instances of mafia  violence – 
and indeed the local event of the Portella massacre. Therefore, similar to 
building on the Fasci tradition, the anti-mafia co-op members annually 
participate in the solemn commemoration of Portella della Ginestra. The 
demonstration to the Portella site is the most dearly felt May Day celebra-
tion in Sicily and one of the most important in Italy.
The site is visually remarkable. It is widely believed in Spicco Vallata 
that Portella was the first of many ambiguous violent eruptions that 
over the following decades expressed a hidden mafia-state coalition. On 
May Day 2009, alongside anti-mafia cooperative members, committed 
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unionists marched in the morning from Piana (four kilometres away) to 
the site. They were joined there by hundreds of families coming from 
Palermo in a convoy of cars, parked for a couple of kilometres along 
the main road linking San Giovanni to Piana. A local brass band played 
throughout, adding a suggestive note to the day. The celebratory feel 
peaked when anti-mafia activists walked to ‘Barbato stone’ to lay their 
commemorative offerings.
Contemporary anti-mafia cooperatives invest in projects of ‘social 
tourism’, which include visits to Portella. During the day, urban visitors 
sit next to Portella’s rocks and hear a guide narrate the 1947 events. 
Young Palermitans seasonally employed as guides on day contracts by 
the cooperative Falcone narrate the Portella events by stating that ‘the 
peasants were communists for a piece of bread’. This is characteristic of 
how contemporary anti-mafia cooperatives downplay issues regarding 
the ‘revolutionary legality’ of Spicco Vallata peasants in favour of pro-
moting (and reading historical events through) a moderate political dis-
course, recognising the importance of employing legality (legalità) while 
de- emphasising the politically radical context in which it developed.
Some of the activity of negotiating the movement’s legacy is rooted 
in the management of material possessions, including land. Today the 
Falcone anti-mafia cooperative owns the usufruct of a plot confiscated 
from a Tarinise mafioso in the Drago area, outlining a tangible continuity 
that links contemporary anti-mafia cooperatives to the anti-mafia move-
ment’s past. Local narratives claim that this tract of land was the very place 
where trade unionist Placido Rizzotto made a passionate speech to the 
gathered braccianti before they occupied the estate, faced with the mafia’s 
gabelloti violence. The mafia assassinated him in 1948 (Paternostro 1994).
I visited the Drago in the summer to help there with the agricultural 
works in the wheat field. While there with Piero, a committed left-winger, 
I realised the poetic flair with which he reflected on the charged history of 
those land tracts as well as of the anti-mafia movement’s history at large. 
After work, in the midst of the day, we stood at the side of the field, then 
golden and calmly bent by the soft summer breeze. Lighting a cigarette, his 
coppola, the typically Sicilian flat cap on his hand, he recited a small poem 
he had written which I have reworked to adjust to English rhyming:
Sicilian cities’ light is distant and pale
at the dusk, while the winds exhale
among those great wheat fields of fair.
With a solemn move, I would lay
my coppola on my chest, and say:
‘All that is solid melts into thin air’.
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We should note the importance of leftist politics in forging this 
anti-mafia lived memory. In Italy, the PCI has assisted rural working-class 
people to develop a sense of citizenship and be integrated into Italian 
politics (Shore 1990; Li Causi 1993). In Tuscany, the PCI was ‘the move-
ment . . . [that] produced an historic transformation of peasants into cit-
izens, able for the first time to claim rights and participate in a political 
and civic culture . . . [and] should be assessed on the same terms as other 
civil rights movements’ (Pratt 2003: 85). The specificity of Sicily in this 
citizenship-building configuration, as regards rural communism (repre-
sented by braccianti unionists and backed by PCI politicians) is that it was 
co-articulated with the pursuit of ‘revolutionary legality’.
The emergence of ‘revolutionary legality’ is critical not only because 
it marks out how Sicily is different from other cases where occupations 
are self-consciously in defiance of a legal order (see, e.g., Sitrin 2012) but 
also because, although born in rural areas, it developed with the civic 
engagement of the urban anti-mafia later (Schneider and Schneider 2001: 
432). Sicily in the late 1940s became a point of compromise, where leftist 
politicians managed to get a legal framework friendly to occupations and 
cooperativisation organised by landless workers, because conservative 
forces assumed that these would never be enforced; mafia was the on-the-
ground force that ensured this. This signified an unusual situation where 
occupations were often at least ostensibly legal. This different orientation 
to legality in the Sicilian left is central to current anti-mafia configura-
tions (Rakopoulos 2014a: 115).
Reflecting on the theme of continuity and transformation in the his-
torical trajectory of today’s anti-mafia cooperatives, I should note that the 
contemporary cooperatives are expressions of some historical continu-
ity in that they are both worker-based and producer-based  cooperativist 
 configurations. They also reflect a qualitative transformation in the 
anti-mafia movement in that today there are no mafia-related struggles 
over either land or access to markets. The social struggles of the anti- 
mafia movement today do not face outright mafia’s violence, although 
mafia agents are still active. Rather than having to face mafia patronage 
or brokerage, the cooperatives are assuming the mafia’s control over material 
resources. The struggle is now around the usufruct rights to land and the 
ways the land plots are managed vis-à-vis the local social arrangements 
around them. The struggles around usufruct are akin to the pre-agrarian- 
reform mobilisations, while attempts at commercialisation are akin to 
post-reform. Most importantly, struggles against the mafia now have dif-
ferent priorities. While in the past cooperatives were channels to avoid 
mafia influence (gabelloti patrons, sensali brokers), anti-mafia cooperativ-
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ism today aims at attacking mafia: anti-mafia has become the end of coop-
erativism, not its means.
The negotiation of this legacy is tense. As Smith notes, activists ‘select 
out from and reformulate various patterns of tradition’ (1999: 188); this 
also characterises the anti-mafia cooperatives leaders’ depiction of the 
area’s cooperativism and anti-mafia history. Cooperative models in Sicily 
where cooperativism is mingled saliently with the anti-mafia movement 
are adaptable to local contexts – and give voice to inchoate local desires.
Sharing History: Of Anti-mafia and Cooperatives
The historical case of cooperativism in Sicily shows that specific circum-
stances on the ground associated with mafia activity and the peasant 
movement’s anti-mafia responses have rendered peasant cooperativism 
a practice both distinct in its Sicilian specificities and contextualised 
in two different circumstances in the history of Spicco Vallata, before 
and after the agrarian reform. Contemporary anti-mafia cooperatives 
capitalise on both traditions described through the historical discussion 
above: the post-reform autonomous producers’ and the pre-reform work-
ers’ cooperativism. They are workers’ cooperatives with an explicit anti- 
mafia stance, more akin to 1940s Spicco Vallata cooperativism. At the 
same time, they retain elements of producers’ cooperativism in that they 
are supported by the state (a configuration where politics has shifted 
against the mafia), hence resembling the cooperativism of the 1960s and 
onwards.
Cooperativism as a cultural construct and set of practices is thus, in 
Sicily, adapted to the circumstantial ideological weight it carried in these 
two different periods. Its practicalities were informed by anti-mafia com-
mitment: cooperativism became a model of organisation (as well as an 
ideal of organising to avoid or confront the mafia), alongside exploitative 
landlords and distant urban markets. It has been ‘transplanted’ in the 
current configuration of anti-mafia cooperatives.
Their commemorations and general rhetoric draw on both of these 
traditions: their members speak of ‘thin red lines’, linking these experi-
ences. The convergence between (most) peasants’ positive stance towards 
law as a means of change and (some) politicians’ support for the peas-
ant struggles produced a form of ‘revolutionary legality’ that has, to 
a degree, been rejuvenated in today’s anti-mafia movement. Its actors’ 
claims to revolutionary legality, their rhetoric of ‘reclaiming the com-
mons’ and the fact that they do not own the land they cultivate, having 
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only  usufruct rights to it, strongly echo older developments of Sicilian 
anti-mafia cooperativism. This resemblance is, importantly, utilised ideo-
logically by cooperative administrators. Anti-mafia mobilisation is based 
on a model of cooperativism akin to collectivism: the peasants set up 
worker-cooperatives, based on land owned by the state. This forms collectiv-
ist claims, which are unrealistic, as the Consortium restitutes land back 
to an imaginary ‘collective’.
Nevertheless, this (largely imagined) legacy has to be taken into 
account. What is more, there are particularities in the uncomfortable 
interrelationships in the modernisation of rural Sicily. These interlinked 
histories urge us to think of mafia and anti-mafia as not necessarily inde-
pendent concepts across a strict dichotomy but as two sides of the same 
coin of Sicilian modernisation, where cooperativism has been present. 
The mafia’s continuity as an organisation and its strategic transformation 
from a pre-agrarian-reform, quasi-latifundist network of violent gabelloti 
patrons to a post-agrarian-reform nexus of coordinated sensali brokers was 
crucial for the intersections of political economy and culture in Spicco 
Vallata. Mafia activity and peasant organisation against it – as well as the 
local interpenetration of anti-mafia and cooperative formations – have 
conditioned local particularities of cooperativism and political culture. 
Contesting mafiosi shaped the peasant movement as anti-mafia, contrib-
uting to the establishment of local cooperative wineries and, through 
them, to wider political structures, such as the PCI. This reference to 
wider structures has an impact in anti-mafia cooperativism today, too, as 
will be seen in the next chapter.
NOTES
Some of the material in this chapter has also been published as ‘Cooperative 
Modulations: The Anti-mafia Movement and Struggles over Land and 
Cooperativism in Eight Sicilian Municipalities’ (2014).
1. See Charlton et al. (2006) and Portelli (1991; 1997) for methodological issues in 
collecting oral accounts.
2. The Fasci Siciliani dei Lavoratori movement has nothing to do with Fascism. 
Mussolini appropriated this term from left-wing terminology of the 1920s 
when establishing his movement (Mack Smith 1983), much in the same way 
National Socialism was configured in late-1920s Germany.
3. In the coalition, the conservative Christian Democracy (DC) party was in the 
majority but the PCI also participated. The coalition collapsed due to Cold War 
tensions when the communists were thrown out of government in ‘the May 
1947 crisis’ – partly induced by the dramatic events of Portella (Ginsborg 2003a: 
111–13).
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4. ‘The cooperative is the cell of the future socialist organisation’, noted Gullo (in 
Rossi-Doria 1983: 106).
5. Tuscany offers a well-researched case on politicised agrarian cooperativism at 
large, where the Communist Party had already been encouraging producers to 
cooperate since the 1950s (Pratt 1994: 71).
6. The scheme I suggest is not all-encompassing and allows for differentiated 
routes to development of collective action – as well as for its disintegration. For 
instance, the collapse of the regional association of left cooperatives (USCA) 
was due to corrupt practices internal to USCA rather than the outcome of 
mafia activity (Sabetti 2002: xi).
7. I take into account the attempt by historical anthropologists to see ‘clan’ as 
a male brotherhood, a horizontal coalition of men whose interests lie in con-
trolling female production and reproduction (Tillion 1983; Goody 1983; 2000). 
‘Mafia’ could be approached in a similar way, construed in different ways from 
setting to setting. The ways the clan category is used in historical anthropology 
by Europeanists such as Goody (1973; 1976; 1983) are different from its emic 
use in Italian public discourse such as the media. Libertà and other NGOs, and 
the two most militant anti-mafia newspapers (Repubblica’s Palermo supple-
ment, and the weekly ‘S’), both left-leaning, use ‘clan’ to delineate male broth-
erhoods’ horizontal, compact alliances as opposed to descent-based kinship 
relations. Italian state agents, such as the Consortium, tap into this discourse 
of the need for a move ‘from the clans to the state’ (‘S’ vol. 16). For an African 
example that suggests different lineage continuities, see Gray and Gulliver 
(2004). See also page 90 for a hint on the differences between clan and family.
8. As portrayed in the book-homage to him entitled The Man of the Vines (L’uomo 
delle vigne, Terranova 2006), Pino Talano, eighty-two when I met him, was still 
loyal to the PCI, which he thought was capable of anti-mafia struggle. ‘He has 
the stubborn mind of a peasant’, was the benevolent, yet somehow harsh, 
comment of Luca, when I asked him about Talano.
9. Referring to a plot as Falcone’s or Borsellino’s and so on is obviously not lit-
erally correct, as the confiscated plots belong to the state and are only leased 
for free. However, everyone I met used terms that implied ownership when 
referring to ‘our cooperative’s plots’.
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░ Worldviews of Labour
Legality and Food Ideologies
This book opened with Giampiero’s views on the changes in local labour 
regimes brought in by the co-ops. The same administrator admitted in an 
interview that ‘the wallet’ was not always enough to ‘shift ideas’, as ‘the 
peasants of San Giovanni, those under contract labour from the coopera-
tives, our member-workers . . . are not anti-mafia [loro non sono anti-mafia]’.
This critique of these ‘not sufficiently anti-mafia’ ideas of the local 
workers often resonated with the negotiation of the co-ops’ food produc-
tion policies, as set by administrators. Once, Mina, Falcone’s vice presi-
dent, had invited Flavio, a representative of Bolognese left-wing consumer 
cooperative CoopBrino, to come to San Giovanni to liaise with people 
from the cooperatives as a business partner because CoopBrino had just 
signed a business agreement to distribute the anti-mafia cooperatives’ 
produce in Bologna. This was a success, as it sealed links between north-
Illustration 4.1: Commercial fairs, family and enterprise: an instance where 
members of the two teams came together. Here, a manual worker (Adamo, with 
his daughter Marella) and an administrator (Giusy) co-host a stand with the 
products of the Falcone cooperative on display at a fair in Palermo.
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ern Italian consumer co-ops and the anti-mafia cooperatives. I accompa-
nied some of my research interlocutors as they fetched him from Trapani 
airport. As we returned to the village, Flavio mentioned that he found San 
Giovanni repulsive; he said to me that the village looked like a zoo, and 
the locals (‘imbued with mafia,’ he commented) were the animals in the 
zoo. He imagined that it must take a lot of effort to collaborate with the 
locals and even suggested that I should call myself ‘not an ethnologist’ 
(anthropologist) ‘but an ethologist’. This chapter will attempt to explain 
this animosity and the socio-cultural chasm this implies.
The chapter, as well as the next one, aims to elucidate how two main 
ideologies that drove the anti-mafia cooperativist endeavour are framed 
and deployed by the cooperatives. These ideologies fortressed the co-ops 
as an enclave, sealing them away from local society to a certain extent – 
at least on paper. They are in a way antithetical, but the choice to analyse 
them with some sense of narrative continuity and in quite some detail 
is not arbitrary: they formulate fields of contestation across and over 
which divisions among and between those labouring in the co-ops are 
born and developed. These ideologies concern food activism processes 
and attitudes on food value and values, an issue around which many 
a movement and associations strive (Siniscalchi 2013a; Luetchford and 
Pratt 2014). What follows in this chapter concerns ideologies of food and 
their impact on internal divisions in the co-ops.
An anthropological discussion of cooperatives’ promotion of food 
activism and overall attitudes to food production and distribution neces-
sitates paying attention to the diverse subjective degrees of identification 
with such claims, which can vary for the different work groups developed 
within such organisations, especially between a ‘production’ and a ‘con-
sumption/distribution’ team. In fact, I propose that food activism claims 
are part of what makes divisions of labour within cooperatives more 
pronounced, in stark contrast with cases where democracy is the most 
central aim – at a local and global level – for food activists, and indeed 
contradicting the very meaning of cooperativism as industrial democracy.
There are three points here, all converging to elucidate how the admin-
istration of the co-ops see their endeavour as an enclave of good economic 
practice. First, in ethical production-oriented cooperatives, internal strat-
ifications go well beyond systems of voting and reflect divisions among 
the workforce in terms of remuneration and ideology; second, food activ-
ism can be a set of principles that cooperative administrators identify 
with more than workers do; and, third, a group’s area of  responsibility – 
production or consumption – influences the degree to which their atti-
tudes are shaped as claims to partake in ‘food activism’ or not.
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To trace the local situatedness of food activism ethics – that is, the 
ethical configurations accompanying people’s commitment to collective 
mobilisation around issues related to food – it is necessary to discuss the 
character of the confiscation process as well as the cooperatives’ organi-
sation of labour. To that end, this chapter will scrutinise the cooperatives, 
describing what they do, how they are organised, what the important 
roles are, what the relations are between members, and how they carry 
out food activism.
Divisions in Labour, Fractures of Food
Divisions
As already discussed, there were two types of cooperative members – 
administrators and manual workers. The difference between members 
and other (‘daily’) workers came down, firstly, to contracts: members 
had permanent contracts, although there were important distinctions 
between administrator-members and worker-members concerning 
levels of remuneration and timing of payment, as well as periods and 
time frames of actual work. (While administrator-members enjoyed pro-
fessional terms of continuous work, worker-members were restricted by 
their permanent contracts, receiving actual work and pay for only the 
agricultural season; only three worker-members had a monthly wage). 
The second key feature distinguishing members from non-member daily 
workers was democratic participation, meaning that all members sat on 
the Members’ Assembly, which met annually. By contrast, non-member 
daily workers signed three-month contracts for seasonal agrarian work 
and were paid on a daily basis, but they had no rights to democratic 
participation. (To tell them apart, as and where appropriate, from the 
worker-members, I use the terms ‘daily workers’ or ‘braccianti’.)
However, the member/non-member distinction is misleading. On the 
one hand, worker-members and daily workers had much in common 
despite the (undeniably significant) difference between stable employ-
ment and short-term contractual work. Manual members’ work (and 
hence pay) was as seasonal as that of most daily workers. Due to their 
similar salary, work and living conditions, the situation of the daily work-
ers was similar to the permanent worker-members with whom they iden-
tified, as they equally considered themselves ‘parts of the cooperative’ 
(see table 4.1).
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On the other hand, there were crucial differences among members, 
between the administrator and worker-members. In that respect, diverg-
ing from a marked tendency in anthropology of work to distinguish 
between workers in stable employment and contractual workers,1 I focus 
on another distinction: stratification within those in stable employment 
(administrators and worker-members), not least because the latter, more 
often than not, were allied with daily workers.2 The two-tiered organ-
isation of all Spicco Vallata cooperatives (which, in turn, established a 
pattern followed by anti-mafia cooperatives elsewhere outside Sicily) is a 
salient issue, with repercussions in terms of class, ethics, relatedness and 
the overall meaning of participation in anti-mafia cooperativism. As the 
mechanics of voting and ‘collective’ decision-making were not often dis-
puted in the field, and as internal stratifications go well beyond systems 
of voting, I shall not dwell on this theme in my ethnographic narrative.
In fact, although bereft of voting rights in the cooperatives, daily work-
ers shared a similar experience (and status) with worker-members due to 
their commonalities (and shared values). In addition, worker-members, 
as members, had the burden of sharing potential losses in the coopera-
tive. The lack of ‘voice’ in the co-ops, associated with membership and 
its recurring stable employment, did not mark out a broad stratifica-
tion along the lines of membership/non-membership as much as the 
issue of livelihoods did. In fact, it is part of my argument that, in order 
to understand internal divisions within cooperatives we need to move, 
both methodologically and analytically, beyond a focus on schemes of 
decision-making – not least because they have been appropriated by tech-
niques of ‘governance’, as the relevant literature notes (Zamagni and 
Zamagni 2010). It is telling data, nonetheless, to juxtapose with coopera-
tives’ ‘participatory democracy’ the fact that the Falcone, Borsellino and 
Lavoroealtro all had a similar mode of collective management whereby 
the ideas of the administration teams dictated the overall planning.
In all three, this was arranged in two decision-making bodies. Firstly, 
the Administration Council, which met monthly, and where only 
5 members voted. Electing the Council was among the duties of the 
annual Members’ Assembly, where all members had a vote. I observed 
Administration Council meetings in the three co-ops. In the two co-ops’ 
assemblies I followed in 2008 and 2009, all decisions by the councils were 
approved with a 100 per cent majority, including the councils’ annual 
planning and previous year’s balance (bilancio). The assembly also elected 
the members for the next year’s council, constantly electing a majority 
of administration members over worker-members (thus, for each coop-
erative, three administrator-members and two worker-members) and 
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without exception reflecting the views of the Consortium and Libertà. 
As for the significance of the Members’ Assemblies as ‘democratic par-
ticipation’, it would suffice to quote the opinion of Mina, Falcone’s vice 
president, which she confided to me just after one of the co-op’s annual 
assembly meetings: ‘Well yes, the assembly is important, but too much 
democracy can be a waste of time when deciding things corporate; we 
need organisation and quick decisions.’
While highly suggestive, this data on its own cannot provide the neces-
sary nuances of what the administrator/worker division of labour in polit-
ically driven cooperativism really meant for the lives and livelihoods of 
worker-members. Where collective decision-making falls short of ‘indus-
trial democracy’ (Holmström 1989), this is the outcome rather than the 
reason for internal stratifications. The reasons, as shown here and in the 
remainder of this book, lay mostly outside the cooperatives framework: 
in the backgrounds of the members, in the broader social relationships 
in which they were embedded, and in how these related differentially to 
the political project guiding the co-ops. For this reason, I shall not explore 
the typical and typified decision-making processes in cooperatives in my 
ethnography. I shall, instead, examine disagreements, splits and conflicts 
in the workplace and beyond, as indicative of opinions challenging the 
legality-oriented ideology of the cooperatives that were never expressed 
in the democratic bodies of the organisations, at least not during my 
fieldwork.
Food and Legality: Ideological Overlaps of Administrators
As discussed, anti-mafia cooperatives make explicit references to a polit-
ical struggle waged against the mafia. ‘Legality’, an activist and ethical 
embracing of the law, was members’ constant point of reference. The 
term stems from the history of the anti-mafia movement and has been 
unrelated to other food ethics claims so far, despite having been a central 
tenet of the production of ‘democratic’ public discourse in Italy (Ginsborg 
2003a: 145; Santino 2002; Schneider and Schneider 2003, 2005) and poten-
tially associated with a vocal civil society (Pizzini-Gambetta 2006). Their 
organic produce, small in production volumes but highly valued, quickly 
established the cooperatives as niche exporters of quality food from the 
island to northern Italy and a number of foreign countries and attracted 
the attention of many (often international) food reviews and magazines. 
Journalists noted, in a leitmotif phrase, the ‘combination of nature and 
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culture’ represented by the organic foodstuffs cultivated on confiscated 
land (e.g., Self 2009).
Through the discussion of the cooperatives’ social composition I eluci-
date two issues. I first look at how internal divisions impeded cooperative 
arrangements of internal democracy and associated food-activist claims 
with administrators more than with workers. Second, I trace how these 
divisions were, to an extent, the outcome of food-activism commitments. 
In that respect, I aim to show how cooperatives’ food-activism goals often 
do not necessarily abide by or nurture industrial democracy but actually 
hinder it.
In the anti-mafia co-ops’ case, this process was conveyed in a two-tiered 
organisation, whereby administrators embraced food-activist principles 
more than workers did. Disseminating the co-ops’ reputation, distribut-
ing the produce and promoting consumption were the work of adminis-
trators. Using websites, leaflets and newsletters, Libertà endorsed what 
Lino, a co-op administrator, described to me as ‘the continuation of the 
anti-mafia movement’s history’ (as discussed in the previous chapter). 
Many administrators were Libertà members, and therefore Libertà influ-
enced the administration’s collective decisions substantially. As Checco, 
the cooperatives’ thirty-year-old public relations manager, once told me, 
the food and wine produced symbolised ‘a sense of purity: being the fruit 
of both organic agriculture and legality processes.’ Checco noted many 
times in our interlocutions that awareness of food ethics and anti-mafia 
awareness were two sides of the same coin for the cooperatives. Libertà, 
whose Palermitan branch was most active in the cooperatives’ market-
ing, called the cooperatives’ foodstuffs and wine ‘pure’ and ‘ethical.’ 
Giampiero, the thirty-two-year-old vice president of Libertà Palermo and 
a member of the Borsellino cooperative, told me that ‘because of this 
twofold approach’ (anti-mafia and organic), buying their produce implied 
‘ethical consumption.’
My informants among Palermitan administrators, who were also 
members of Libertà, stressed the ‘purity’ (purezza) of their produce. They 
argued, in different circumstances, that the foodstuffs they produced 
participated in a ‘virtuous economic circle’: the foods and wine were ‘the 
products of legality in all respects.’ Specifically, the administrators under-
lined that the foods the cooperatives produced were cultivated on legally 
expropriated land using organic agriculture, which guaranteed that their 
production was socially and environmentally fair. Moreover, distribution 
took place through consumer cooperatives as well as through outlets 
organised by Addiopizzo.3 Piero, the Borsellino cooperative’s agronomist, 
told me once that this fact was a way to be in line with their food ethics 
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and politics. ‘It is legality all the way,’ Luca, the Falcone cooperative’s 
president, noted in an interview. This idea of legality keyed in well with 
the administrators’ sense that they operated within ‘virtuous networks’ 
of meritocracy (as explained in the next chapter).
Cooperative administrators promoted in a series of leaflets and news-
letters and explained in interviews the idea that their products (organic 
wine, pasta and legumes) embodied – in a play on words – ‘the fairness/
the taste of Sicily’ (Il g(i)usto di Sicilia). It is significant to acknowledge that 
this articulation of nature and culture emphasises the incarnation in 
the landscape of anti-mafia activism. Linking nature and culture in pre-
senting food-activist claims is a central tenet of some associations, such 
as Slow Food (Petrini 2001: 8; Siniscalchi 2013a). Recent studies have 
explored and problematised Slow Food’s interacting principles of econ-
omy/ecology (Siniscalchi 2013b). The choice to cultivate organic foods 
(one not necessarily shared by workers) is, in that sense, the outcome of 
a series of interlocked conditions: it appears ‘fair’ and ‘alternative’ (to 
the dominant system of food distribution as well as to the hegemonic 
mafia influence in Sicily), but, eventually, it serves a marketing logic. It is 
sealed in an understanding of an economic enclave that starts in confis-
cation and ends in the ‘fair and good’ food on the table. The commercial 
recognition of this choice is supported by a system of northern Italian 
consumer cooperatives in ways that underline how the negotiation of 
the anti-mafia legality claims contribute significantly to the branding of 
the cooperatives’ products. This backing also has a Sicilian counterpart 
in the form of Addiopizzo, an anti-racketeering association, that has 
managed to organise a number of Palermo small store owners and small 
businessmen against Cosa Nostra’s pizzo (racket) (see Gunnarson 2015). 
Addiopizzo also backed the Libertà co-ops and their food-activist beliefs.
While all the workers I spent time around insisted that organic agri-
culture and anti-mafia activism were not their primary concerns, the 
middle-class anti-mafia cooperative administrators constantly negotiated 
the discourse of legality in ways that matched current food-marketing 
needs. Their activity merged leisure with work, as they often met on 
occasions such as the biannual Addiopizzo feast or film evenings organ-
ised by Libertà; several of their friends worked at these events. In the 
words of Checco, attending such events was not only political socialisa-
tion but also an ‘ethical obligation vis-à-vis their social allies’ (such as the 
Addiopizzo and the consumer co-ops that distributed their products). It 
involved the promotion of their products in stands that also showcased 
Libertà leaflets that informed the public on anti-mafia initiatives, such as 
demonstrations and talks in schools.
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As Ernesto, a Falcone administrator, told me once, their work entailed 
‘a mission’ to link food with anti-mafia ideas: this was their ‘cultural pro-
ject.’ In order to explore this cultural project in Palermo and San Giovanni, 
I organised focus groups in which the administrators of the cooperatives 
participated. In these meetings, Ernesto solemnly stated that the admin-
istrators ‘embodied’ civil society principles for San Giovanni as well as 
the ‘mission’ to develop organic agriculture in Spicco Vallata, an asset 
underestimated by local peasants. Their mission to produce organically 
on the confiscated land entailed negotiating a balance between the north-
ern Italian consumer cooperatives that were their business collaborators 
and the local peasants working as manual labourers for the anti-mafia 
cooperatives. In the negotiation of food activism among anti-mafia coop-
erative members, fissures did not arise as to whether activism should 
be focused on production (more associated with manual workers) or 
consumption (the task of administrators), since the administrators – who 
liaised with the consumer cooperatives of northern Italy – monopolised 
the cooperatives’ strategic production of discourse on marketing and 
food activism. The local peasants of Spicco Vallata, working in the coop-
eratives in working-class posts, were viewed as outsiders to this process.
Cooperative administrators complained about the locals’ ‘aesthetics’, 
suggesting that the entire village had been constructed on the back of 
mafia-related speculazione edilizia (real estate speculation), done as cheaply 
as possible. In fact, many people visiting the village found the derelict 
facades of most houses embarrassing. Consumer cooperative represent-
atives often came from Bologna (the capital of Emilia in northern Italy) 
to visit the anti-mafia cooperatives and confirm their collaboration. They 
compared San Giovanni to impoverished Bolivian villages they had vis-
ited while backpacking.
I already referred to the case when Flavio, a representative of 
CoopBrino, came to San Giovanni. That very week, another CoopBrino 
representative from northern Italy, Rosy Fernasi, had expressed to me, 
in private, that she ‘shared what my Libertà friends think of this place: 
it’s pretty crap’. But this was a private interlocution between Fernasi and 
me, whereas the Flavio event took place in a car with other co-op admin-
istrators. Flavio and I were strangers to the island and Spicco Vallata, 
differently interested in the cooperatives, and the administration team 
thought they should somehow disassociate from his opinion.
Specifically, later the same day as Flavio’s remark, Luca was somewhat 
embarrassed and apologetic towards me regarding Flavio’s ideas. Flavio 
being their business partner through CoopBrino, Luca thought he should 
stress that he found Flavio’s remark offensive, although he had laughed 
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when he had uttered it. Moreover Luca wished to clarify that the coopera-
tives had a specific role in the area, often not understood either by locals 
or by their Emilian partners:
Here [in San Giovanni] we find ourselves [he spells each syllable out clearly 
and raises his voice] in an unevolved society (una società non-evoluta [emphasis 
added]) – not only due to the presence of the mafia but also due to the fact 
that income, culture and social status are in such a condition that the only 
thing that matters to people is the price [of the produce]. That’s it. It is not 
important how something is produced – the only thing that matters is its 
price, nothing else. And since I work in San Giovanni and not in Bologna, 
I have an eye open for all the world market but I pay attention on how to 
impose change on this reality.
Luca’s disassociation from Flavio’s point is then only partial. The vignette 
above, as well as Luca’s words, point to a classic theme: food ethics do not 
mean the same thing across classes, and the negotiation of a past that 
constructs a retrospective genealogy of ethical food production associ-
ated with peasant struggles and constitutes current food production as 
part of a broader activism is also informed by class (cf. Pratt 2007). The 
relative distance in the above quotations, between the different work 
groups of the cooperatives, underlines that conceptualisations of agrar-
ian change should take class dynamics seriously (Bernstein 2010).
This is influenced by the administrators’ participation in the values 
of the recent anti-mafia movement, in which Libertà plays a crucial role. 
The managerial roles of certain people (like Mina, Ernesto and Luca) in 
associations such as the NGO Libertà on the one hand and the cooper-
atives on the other are central to the merging of two parallel types of 
discourse (the anti-mafia movement and food ethics). At the same time, 
local workers, more focused on their own farms’ produce, were absent 
from this configuration. This was reflected in the two-tiered organisation 
of the cooperatives.
Mina, Giampiero, Luca and several other administrators insisted, in 
several interviews, that in order to support food ethics, and in order to 
guarantee the distribution of their g(i)usto product and the dissemination 
of anti-mafia activism alongside and through the produce, hierarchical 
principles of labour should be applied to the cooperatives. Mina was one 
of the administrators who was more involved with promoting the cooper-
atives as ethical food and wine producers. Part of her job was to nurture 
and develop the business partnership of two Spicco Vallata cooperatives 
(Falcone and Borsellino) with consumer co-ops in northern Italy, where 
their produce was distributed. This work often raised issues of prioritis-
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ing a politicised marketing of the products, often by downplaying equal 
work relations and particularly democracy within the co-ops.
Workers: Worldviews Apart?
The peasants of the cooperatives that Giampiero referred to were the 
people in the manual workforce who were either members of the coop-
eratives or day labourers; alongside their cooperative employment, they 
were also smallholders.4 They earned wages from the cooperatives by 
working in the confiscated land plots and also worked on their own land 
tracts (pezzi di terra), mostly vineyards. One such case was Pippo Pitrè, a 
fifty-eight-year-old from San Giovanni, who used to be a member of the 
Borsellino cooperative but had resigned a few months before I met him. 
His resignation was due to conflicts with the administration over the 
fact that, as a member-worker, he did not receive a monthly wage. This 
mishap took place over a misunderstanding about work the Borsellino 
administrators thought he had offered voluntarily, helping out another 
co-op. When Pippo retrospectively demanded wages, he was astounded 
to hear that he had been ‘a volunteer’. He eventually decided to go back 
to work as a daily worker for the Falcone, as he needed some income. 
I rented the apartment he owned at the centre of the village. Pippo’s 
family lived in a farmhouse two kilometers outside the village, as they 
preferred the tranquility of that area. His wife Maria, sixteen years his 
junior, did not work outside the home; they had a seventeen-year-old 
daughter, Elena.
As I had become good friends with Pippo, the Pitrè family often invited 
me for dinner. After a day of work in the vineyards of the cooperatives, 
Pippo regularly asked me to join him in his house for a warm dish of 
pasta with vegetables from his garden, cooked by Maria. As we sat gath-
ered around the table, he would boast that we were enjoying his ‘own 
wine,’ comparing it to the cooperative’s: ‘the cooperative wine is too 
commercial,’ while the wine from his vineyard was ‘authentic and pure.’
He was proud that he cultivated the red Nero D’Avola variety at 670 
meters above sea level, as it is very difficult to grow red grapes at such 
a high altitude. ‘That’s the heroism, that’s what’s really difficult,’ he 
said, ‘not just co-op activism.’ Pippo was also proud of the fact that he 
matured the wine in his ‘cellar’ (in fact, the garage). Like other daily 
cooperative workers, he thought homemade conventional wine was qual-
itatively superior to the organic wine made at the cooperatives’ winery. 
For him, the only advantage of the cooperative production of bottled 
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organic wine was that they produced it on a larger scale; in terms of 
quality, ‘his wine’ was superior. Pippo, like many other peasants working 
in the cooperatives but also maintaining their own – conventional, not 
organic – vineyards and farms, could not conceive why organic produce 
was any better than ‘the local, traditional one’, as he put it. Tano, another 
worker, emphasised to me that while he enjoyed working in the co-ops’ 
vineyards, he much preferred his own: ‘There is more meaning in work-
ing my own land, despite what people [administrators] say about organic 
agriculture and activism. My own product is better.’
It is telling to juxtapose with cooperatives’ ‘participatory democracy’ 
the fact that Falcone, Borsellino and Lavoroealtro all had similar modes 
of collective management whereby the ideas of the administrative teams 
dictated the overall planning. The main actors in the cooperatives’ deci-
sion-making, the Palermitan administrators, engulfed food activism by 
way of democratic politics. This meant working in terms of a conceptual 
enclave: fusing the ideology of a pure political system (free from mafia) 
with the idea of a pure system of consuming ethical, organic foods. Doing 
this, however, comes with costs for the internal democracy within the 
cooperatives.
This was reflected, importantly, in contested notions across teams’ 
views over such issues as danger and safety or the freedom of speech 
(see also Rakopoulos 2015c for a lengthy commentary). Across such dif-
ferences among the work teams, (ideas on) the relative safety of interloc-
utors and anthropologist sometimes conflicted. For instance, Adamo, a 
forty-year-old agricultural member-worker of Falcone from San Giovanni, 
commented on my unwillingness to meet a mafioso recently out of prison, 
calling me ‘a pussy and a fake anthropologist’ and suggesting that ‘a 
real man and a proper anthropologist should be into this kind of stuff’. 
The mafioso was a friend of his; Adamo insisted I meet him. For Adamo, 
the danger in this case was if the office-based administrators found out 
about our dealings, as this could have had consequences for his position 
as a member of the cooperative. I felt I had to find a balance between 
the danger of being challenged by his perceptions of what constituted a 
‘real man’ and a ‘real anthropologist’ and the danger of being discovered 
by members of the office team as someone who had relations with ‘the 
mafia’.
Adamo often emphasised the fluidity of relations with mafia, arguing 
that mafia and anti-mafia were distinct but did not constitute two worlds 
apart. As he had told me, in connection with another instance, ‘the mafia 
is eternal in San Giovanni: as omnipresent as the fog is in your London’. 
Hence, while mafia clans’ inter-relations are unpredictable, the mafia is 
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seen as a constant, much as ‘family is the centre of Sicilian life’ as earlier 
anthropological research stated in a, slightly debatable by now, fashion 
(Boissevain 1966: 19; but see Rakopoulos 2017a).
The main sense of unease I had was not from Adamo’s comments 
or my own sense of safety, which I understood was guaranteed due to 
my friend’s linking me with the mafioso; it was, rather, that there was a 
danger that the cooperatives’ anti-mafia-committed administrators would 
find out about that link. That Adamo, his mafia friend Gioacchino and I 
had ‘dealings’ should have to stay a secret, because if the administrators 
found out, it might lead to grave consequences for Adamo’s position as 
a cooperative member. Adamo, like everyone else in the co-ops, was not 
free to express any positive views about people he liked who happened 
to be mafia members, let alone to bring others into contact with mafiosi. 
His stance, although not identifying with the silent mafia person, was 
removed from the views of (most of) the members of the anti-mafia team 
who condemned anyone who had relations with the mafia.
Some days after I had met Gioacchino and interviewed him, thirty-
one-year-old Marelio, an administrative member of Falcone, called me in. 
Marelio had overheard me talking on the phone and suspected I had deal-
ings with mafiosi. Finding this situation dangerous, he asked for details. I 
clarified that I could not share information with him in order to protect 
informants. He commented that I was buying into omertà, and thus the 
dangerous ethics of the mafia code of silence. He therefore identified what 
anthropologists perceive as ethical behaviour, with mafia morality. Silvio, 
the thirty-four-year-old president of Borsellino and also an administrator, 
heard about my contact with Adamo and the mafioso through local gossip. 
He thought my contacts with ‘the mafia’ put me in danger and suggested 
disciplining the person who had led me to establish bridges between ‘the 
cooperative and the mafia’. This was the danger Adamo had mentioned, 
as it imperilled his job. Thankfully, he was never disciplined.
This event elucidates the subtle ethical challenges I faced during field-
work. Codes of conduct were informed by the cooperative distribution 
of labour (influenced by people’s class and other backgrounds), revealing 
the often contradictory morals that separated colleagues in the coop-
erative, who were divided across the distribution of labour, personal 
background, participation in local kinship and friendship networks. It 
also shows the relationality of my research position – contingent to each 
specific relationship I established with people. In the background is the 
heavily gendered nature of my fieldwork, as ‘being a man’ was under-
stood as a performed pattern of behaviour that I had to live up to in order 
to fulfil expectations some interlocutors had for me. Episodes like this 
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allowed me to reflect on my gendered position in the field and on how 
the (arguably rigid) ethics of anthropological fieldwork often contrast 
indigenous ideas about respectability, as the fact that confidentiality was 
glossed as ‘omertà’ shows.
An anthropology of such divisions, then, underlines the issue of sub-
jectivity in discussing economic organisation and food ethics and values 
where often a distance between local and ‘authentic’ is present (Pratt 
2007) – in this case, across divisions of labour. Specifically, it is impossible 
to conceptualise cooperatives as united, cohesive actors in democratic 
mobilisation over food concerns. On the contrary, claims about food 
ethics can often underline, and deepen, already existing internal divi-
sions of labour. The positions of workers and administrators (the latter 
being the real actors of activism in Sicily, rather than the ‘cooperatives’ 
they compose) are influenced, among other issues, by their position vis-à-
vis food and legality ethics and their overall viewpoints on production as 
well as their commitment to anti-mafia principles.
Differences across Foodways and Law
The idiom ‘legality’ informs conceptualisations of food ethics and activ-
ism in contemporary Italy. The class-situatedness of this ethics, and the 
associated political activism from which it derives, is the key point for 
conceptualising anti-mafia food activism in Sicily today. Administrators 
stress the discourse on organic production and on anti-mafia principles, 
while their co-members – the local workers – are less interested in fram-
ing their activity in these terms. It is important to conceptualise food 
activism as a classed element of cooperative ideology. Administrators 
are invested in shaping the cooperatives towards ethical consumption, 
while producers (local worker-members) identify much less with these 
proclaimed characteristics. This is identified both in how workers think 
of their activity (prioritising their own produce over the cooperatives’) 
and in how administrators think of their colleagues’ commitment (which 
they see as relatively low).
Internal democracy in cooperatives draws from the ideological inter-
action of food activism and legality activism, wherein the administrators 
‘guide’ the co-ops in their mastering of the food ethics and anti-mafia 
discourses. Much change has taken place in a shift towards the study 
of food consumption since, say Goodman and DuPuis’ essay (2002) that 
noted an asymmetry, with production weighing heavier in terms of schol-
arly focus (such change acknowledged in, e.g., Klein and Murcott 2014). 
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Production of food in a co-op environment is not endowed with the same 
attitude across workers: the obvious two-tiered organisation of labour in 
the agrarian anti-mafia cooperatives of Sicily reminds us that food ethics 
begin way before the consumption of foodstuff. The production of food 
and wine is mostly associated with local workers who care little about 
identifying with anti-mafia or food activism principles and who most 
often prioritise, in terms of their sense of selfhood and pride, their own 
private production of wine. The strict separation of consumption and pro-
duction into different teams within a sharp division of labour is rooted 
in, and informed by, a series of other disconnections between producers 
and managers of distribution/consumption, including personal origin 
(respectively, rural Spicco Vallata and urban Palermo), ethical stance, 
class understood in a range of semantics and other sources of income 
(private farming).
Seeing political movements as moral politics cannot fully account 
for the agrarian moral economies they inspire (Edelman 2001); the anti- 
mafia agrarian cooperatives’ discourse, conveyed by their administrators, 
explicitly attempted to merge moral claims regarding food produc-
tion with a politicised discourse (around legality). In the case of Sicily’s 
anti-mafia cooperatives, principles of food activism are followed only by 
some  members – a condition that emphasises the challenges of achieving 
internal cohesiveness and democratic organisation.
This chapter has briefly situated the actors of Sicilian anti-mafia ide-
ologies, over food activism, in specific divisions. The phenomenology 
of those hints at a classic sociological division of labour. However, as 
illustrated in the story of Pippo over produce, quality and family life and 
in the vignette around talking to mafiosi, this is mostly a division based 
on worldviews, which precedes internal co-op divisions and is rooted 
in class differences. The valuation of their skill and the valorisation of 
their labour follow what are already existing differences among work 
groups that often have contrasting repercussions in the way they operate 
internally.
Most importantly, such dissimilarities underline the significance of 
the difference between people participating in each work team. This 
difference in worldviews, that rarely became palpable, cannot be reduced 
analytically to a ‘division of labour’ framework. As much as they are 
structured in sets of labour differentiation (a two-tiered system), the sig-
nificance of such differentiation cannot be exhausted in ideas on skill 
across a manual and an intellectual part. It is this economistic reduc-
tionism that opened this book (see page 4) that this ethnography wishes 
to tackle, with more fodder to come to that direction in the following 
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chapters. One fundamental area of contradictions outside the economis-
tic realm was that of kinship and its various ideological and practical 
workings in the forging and operation of the cooperatives. Like food, 
attitudes to kinship and recruitment based on kinship proved a great 
dividing mechanism across the co-ops’ teams. But unlike food, claims 
to kinship and family, rather than solidifying, in fact actually acted as a 
gluing device for accommodating cooperative work in people’s lives.
NOTES
Some of the material in this chapter has also been published in ‘Food Activism 
and Anti-mafia Cooperatives in Contemporary Sicily’ (2013).
1. Of course, this is an older discussion, often highlighting gendered stratifi-
cations (e.g., Goddard 1996). Recent anthropological research on industrial 
settings (Parry 2007) where there is a consistent divide between fixed and 
(sub)contracted workers takes the discussion further. The line of argument is 
that those in stable employment, unlike contractual workers, are privileged 
(‘embourgeoised’, as Parry has it) by comparison. The debate on precariousness 
and genealogical differences among workers is also akin to this discussion 
(Procoli 2004; Standing 2011). 
2. This is why, for most of the book, the term ‘manual workforce’ or ‘workers’ 
means both daily and member-workers, unless stated. I do appreciate that, 
legally, administrators were cooperative workers, too. However, the teams 
identified themselves as ‘administrators’ and ‘workers’, respectively. 
3. Addiopizzo is the name of a Sicilian civil society association catering for the 
horizontal organisation of retailers who adopt an ‘anti-racketeering’ policy, 
shopkeepers who refuse to pay racketeering money to the mafia. Today, the 
association has NGO status, and three hundred retailers subscribe to its princi-
ples. Even so, it is estimated that 80 per cent of Palermo’s retailers still pay the 
mafia’s protection (ISTAT 2015).
4. Farmer-owner of a small plot.
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Chapter 5
░ The Limits of ‘Bad Kinship’
Sicilian Anti-mafia Families
Food and general views on legality were in no way the only points of con-
flict across co-op membership. An equally if more important ideological 
concern that drove the Consortium’s project was the consideration of cer-
tain types of kinship as ‘bad’. In anti-mafia cooperatives, the workplace 
is not intended to be conducive of kinship relations. Recruits are not 
allowed, for instance, to have a mafioso kinsperson (this stands for cous-
ins up to thrice removed, inclusive). This situation would normally be 
paradoxical for such small communities where most people are related 
to each other. After all, people would routinely tell me, San Giovanni 
was composed of eight hundred households – which would indeed recall 
the ‘eight hundred Barbetos’ essentialist metaphor (see pages 19–20 the 
colloquial ‘smell of mafia’, a sensorial claim to mafia presence in a place) 
so rampant in San Giovanni. The interaction between ‘family’ and work 
bears interesting tensions, in such settings where kinship is particularly 
laden with negative connotations. This distance, and its expected failure, 
calls for a sharpening of analytic tools that can help us understand the 
context of ‘work families’. The formation of flexible ideas of kinship to 
accommodate ‘new’ ideologies (anti-mafia) and collective platforms of 
work (cooperatives) in Sicily is the focus of this chapter.
The fictional modernist separation of family and work is still perti-
nent as a theoretical fiat in mainstream social science (see, e.g., Putnam 
2007). Current anthropological routes have, of course, continued to stress 
the fictionalisation of this relationship (between ‘production and repro-
duction’). Latourian interpretations in the line of ‘we have never been 
modern’ are often prominent in this discussion (Latour 1993; see Berliner 
et al. 2013: 436 for an account of the idea’s broader appeal). It is, however, 
also useful to consider approaches stemming from political economy 
and feminism. This would enable a tracing of the mutual intelligibility of 
people’s home-work idioms, rather than seeking mediations and transla-
tions. For the sake of the ethnography here, it can help review the divi-
sions within cooperatives from yet another prism. This prism is located 
in significant cosmological ramifications in the lifeworlds of the co-op 
members. Moreover, the ethnography presented here aims to remind us 
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of a main route of anthropological inquiry’s critique to modernist ideol-
ogy: the gendering processes of the co-relationship between home and 
collective work institutions.
Ideologies of the ‘home’ and of the ‘workplace’ cannot be understood 
in separation. Rather, in the context of both anti-mafia and cooperativ-
ism, they are themes intrinsically interrelated in historic and current 
social configurations in Sicily (Rakopoulos 2014a). Any ‘bad kinship’ doc-
trine is meant to prove detrimental to the functionality and horizontality 
of cooperative egalitarianism. The anti-mafia co-ops’ standpoint allows 
for the exploration of how economic institutions are interrelated with 
kinship in both crippling and complementary terms. Studying the repro-
duction and continuities of people’s (co-op members’ and their close 
kin’s) pluriactivity alongside cooperative work opens up ways to redefine 
the very social fabric within which a cooperation operates. It also allows 
us to examine how the activities of co-ops reflect social dynamics around 
them. The entanglement with the home and the kin of co-op members is 
at the heart of cooperativist processes.
An epistemology that does not refute the notions of either home/
family or work/labour but instead underlines their dialectical interre-
latedness might offer a more accurate prism to tackle the collapse of 
modernist fictions in cooperativism. This is particularly salient in a con-
text – such as the Sicilian anti-mafia – where modernist separation is 
thoroughly pursued from above, with the exclusion of certain types of 
kinship from economic life. This shaping of cooperativism as an enclave, 
carefully carving ‘a room of their own’ outside the influence of local kin-
ship connections, has been a typical tenet of anti-mafia Sicilian co-ops.
Bad Kinship
As discussed, the ‘Progress and Law Consortium’ was formed to oversee 
the allocation to, and use of, all of the land by cooperatives. Libertà 
oversaw the public competitions held in 2001 and 2006. Libertà and the 
Consortium strongly ideologised cooperativism as an anti-mafia endeav-
our disassociated from kinship. This is documented in their pamphlets 
and newsletters, which express aversion to nepotistic patronage and cor-
ruption (Libertà 2008; 2009; 2010). This defaming of local kinship was 
premised on anti-mafia activists making analogies of comparatico (god- 
parenthood) and cousinhood with mafia affiliation. Libertà agents saw 
the comparatico, a non-blood kinship institution of great importance in 
rural Sicily,1 as a powerful mafia tradition of Spicco Vallata. The anti-kin-
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ship stance of anti-mafia activists, however, extended to an overall suspi-
cion towards anyone who was related to a mafioso.
Such relationships in Sicily are, of course, of a cognatic nature and may 
include parental and siblinghood relations, but they also retain some 
agnatic symbolism (by way of the clan male descendent membership in 
the mafia). This bilateral descent, so strong in establishing enduring links, 
lands someone in a network in Sicily. ‘An individual is born into a kinship 
system and there finds, ready-made so to speak, a network of people with 
whom he has a series of jurally defined obligations’, notes Boissevain in 
the 1960s (Boissevain 1966: 21), trying to distinguish ‘naturalised’ kin-
ship by ‘social’ patronage among friends and friends of friends. Here in 
the anti-mafia co-op system, both these kinds of networks are prohib-
ited: both by birth and by socialisation, one needs to prove they have 
steered clear from mafia. Importantly, the cooperatives were not allowed 
to employ anyone who had any mafioso in their ‘social circle’, including 
kin (up to the third degree of cousinhood, inclusive), and affines. This was 
not decreed in writing (i.e., in the text of the public competitions through 
which the co-ops were formed), but was a major aspect of the interview 
process conducted by members of Libertà and Matteo Mandola.
Workers then reconciled a relationship of kinship and work in a con-
text that connotes certain types of kinship with negativity. The state 
model of anti-mafia cooperativism was underpinned by the idea that the 
community’s well-being depended on the state’s intervention, which was 
important in displacing and disrupting the problematic kinship-mafia 
juncture that was rampant in local discourse, especially among anti- mafia 
activists. There was schism in this process among work teams. While 
the manner in which co-op administration members constructed their 
recruitment echoed the ideology of an anti-mafia cooperativism detached 
from kinship, locals gradually entered the cooperatives through channels 
of kin or friends’ ‘recommendations’ (raccomandazioni2).
The Background to ‘Bad Kinship’: Administrators’ Biographies
Administrators had a story to tell regarding how cooperativism should 
avoid kinship connections at large. For most, their employment was con-
tinuous with their broader beliefs and ideas; working in the cooperative 
was ‘more than just a job’, as Mauro, the Falcone’s marketing manager 
put it. It was even, as Ernesto told me, ‘a mission’ and ‘a political pro-
ject’. They took pride in acting according to the specific framework of 
regulations and ethics that set the official discourse of the cooperatives, 
a commitment to meritocracy and legality. In focus groups I organised, 
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Ernesto solemnly stated that his job was ‘also about ideology’ and ‘a cer-
tain mission’. Marelio added that they ‘embodied’ civil society principles 
for San Giovanni, in that way acting ‘as an adjunct to Libertà’; in that 
respect, they expressed dominant ideas set by the Consortium, following 
its meritocracy-based, legalist agenda. Their private lives and their lives 
in the office were part of the same continuum.
Administrators thus saw themselves as ‘professionals’ and strongly 
believed that their teams (in the Falcone, Lavoro e Altro and Borsellino 
cooperatives) were based on ‘meritocracy’. They moreover claimed that 
the very term ‘networks’ was an indication of merit, as it was distinct 
from terms like ‘family’ or ‘friends’: it was, as Checco told me, ‘neutral’. 
Most administrators thought that any cooperative formed through and 
along friendship or kinship lines was in principle a ‘failed case’. Matteo, 
the president of the Consortium, stressed to me, as did the presidents 
of the cooperatives, that the experience of making a ‘kinship-based’ 
anti-mafia cooperativism in Spicco Vallata had been ill conceived.
In fact, this explains why in 2001 the Consortium had closed two 
small cooperatives, Akragas and Paradiso, set up in 1998 – without public 
controversy – in order to cultivate confiscated land that was allocated to 
them by the state. Composed of local family members, the cooperatives 
had worked alongside the Falcone in 2000. The Consortium closed them 
down ‘due to the messiness that the kin relations of their members 
brought about’, as Matteo told me. In the case of Akragas, the family run-
ning the cooperative had become indebted to a bank and used their own 
familial assets to pay back their debts, ignoring the Consortium regula-
tions. Matteo strictly advised, against the will of the co-op members, that 
the cooperative should not merge family capital and state (confiscated) 
assets. At the time of fieldwork, years after their cooperative had been 
dissolved, the members of the ‘Akragas co-op family’, as they are known 
in the village, were still suffering major financial troubles. They refused 
to give me an interview. The father asked me to mention only that ‘the 
experience of the confiscated land has been disastrous for our family, and 
we need to keep it in the past, not to remember it’.
The case of the Paradiso co-op was even more dramatic; the data I 
have regarding it comes from the hearings of the Palermitan court that 
oversaw its case. Enrico, the son of the family running the cooperative, 
was a friend of a person related to a minor mafioso. The mafioso ‘recom-
mended’ two people to Enrico’s friend, and the friend convinced Enrico 
to hire them. When the Consortium found that people ‘affiliated’ with 
the mafia were hired, it immediately took back the confiscated plots 
from the cooperative. The family-based cooperative was soon shut down. 
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The experiences of these two cooperatives exacerbated the Consortium 
agents’ mistrust of kinship relations.
In order to sideline kinship, Libertà became the main channel for 
hiring and maintaining the administrative workforce. As part of their 
‘professional skills’, administrators had to have activist credentials, 
obtained through what informants, such as Ernesto, called ‘association 
experience’ (esperienza associazionista). Such experience could include the 
Addiopizzo anti-mafia activism or showing motivation towards ethical 
business practice; for example, two administration members had mas-
ter’s degrees in corporate social responsibility.
When Ernesto explained the social networks in which he was embed-
ded, he took pride in stressing his long-term friendship with Luca, the 
Falcone president (‘We share biographies’, he stressed to me). Luca, the 
son of a leading trade unionist, described what he called the ‘cooperativ-
ist part of my biography’ in terms of a combination of two interrelated 
activities: university activism and allegiance to the centre-left. In an inter-
view, he also used the term ‘shared biography’ to describe his friendship 
with people like Ernesto, but he also used it in regard to other current 
cooperative members and people who (in 2009) were the Falcone’s collab-
orators and suppliers.
Despite holding a PhD, Luca had not pursued an academic career 
because of what he called ‘the nepotistic networks in the University of 
Palermo’. He and his friend Giulio Erice had been overlooked for lecture-
ships, although they were promising academic agronomists. They never-
theless established contacts through research in the Faculty of Agronomy 
and went on to collaborate with each other after university. Today Erice 
administers the Tazza farm in Termini Imerese, on which the state had 
bestowed land sequestrated from a man accused of being a member of 
the mafia, and the two enterprises collaborate: Falcone provides Tazza 
with packaging, marketing and commercialisation services.
Luca’s genealogy of political activism in fact includes his own kin-
ship relations with people in politics; his involvement with esperienza 
associazionista and political activism was heavily influenced by his family 
background. His father was the president of the communication workers 
trade union (a strong union of the public sector in Sicily) and his brother 
was an MP in the Sicilian Assembly (the parliament of the autonomous 
region of Sicily). The lack of kinship ties that supposedly guaranteed and 
promoted administrators’ meritocracy claims in fact refers only to kin-
ship local to Spicco Vallata. It was that locally specific kinship that could 
potentially turn bad.
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In Palermo, instead, administrators like Luca were themselves 
entrenched with kinship and friendship relations that played key roles in 
their own lives and careers.3 Administrators were themselves embedded 
in kinship-informed hubs (not least because, as most were unmarried, 
they still felt attached to their parents). Their own kinship background 
informed and reproduced their class positions. Administrators’ support 
of the Consortium’s rhetoric refers to kinship relations of other people, 
people whom they did not see as equals: Spicco Vallata local workers.
When people joined the cooperative workforce as administrators, they 
were typically already linked together in ‘horizontal’ relations through 
past professional or political bonds, which determined future contacts 
and eventual job recruitment. Mina and Claudia had completed the same 
master’s degree in Milan; Checco knew Marelio and Gianpiero from 
Libertà and Addiopizzo; Loredana knew Luca from his studies in agron-
omy and through Libertà. The list goes on, including everyone involved 
in the administration of the cooperatives. Gianpiero told me that some of 
the people in the administration were his ‘lifelong partners’.
Along with the theme of shared biographies, the idea of ‘lifelong part-
ners’ shows that social networking is understood as a process of building 
bonds of relatedness. Networking can thus be characterised as a related-
ness idiom for the administrators. This in turn provided the lynchpin of 
recruitment: administrators would be ‘brought into a co-op’ on the basis 
of their network linkages – their ‘shared biographies’ with other adminis-
trators or the fact that they were ‘lifelong partners’ in a common political 
or ideological cause. 
When administrator informants explained their own networking 
to me, they often condemned the nepotism and corruption in the city 
(Palermo) and public institutions (e.g., the universities) that had excluded 
them from other labour markets, as in the case of Luca and Erice. This 
throws light on how administrators distinguished their own networking 
practices as ‘virtuous’, as well as on the term ‘virtuous circle’, which they 
repeatedly used to legitimise their own practices. They had crafted the 
neologism as a play on the way they used the term ‘vicious circle’ to refer 
to relations of corruption and patronage influenced by the mafia. They 
deemed the ‘virtue’ of their networks to derive from their ‘meritocratic’ 
formation, part of their commitment to anti-mafia, seeing themselves as 
gatekeepers of legality.
When I asked him to elaborate, Ernesto told me that ‘the household’ 
was a ‘particularistic unit’, while ‘networks’ were the expression of 
‘broader interests’: networks implied politicised solidarity, while house-
holds meant seclusion from society. Administrators thought the respon-
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sibilities of cooperative members towards their families often restricted 
the development of cooperatives, as the obligations and dangers that 
cooperative membership entailed were difficult to reconcile with main-
taining a family. Family and cooperative were mutually exclusive in this 
respect, especially when their interrelationship implied continuities with 
broader local relationships, including relations with mafiosi.
Kinship and friendship, ‘friends of friends’ (amici degli amici) and 
affinity (comparatico) had been historically (in the bigger picture, since 
Boissevain 1974 and up to Di Bella 2011) charged with mafia connotations. 
In the cases of Akragas and Paradiso specifically, administrators therefore 
deemed them ‘vicious circles’. By contrast, Palermitans presented net-
working among activist social circles as virtuous. Claudia, for example, 
stressed the fact that not only was she not from Spicco Vallata but also, 
indeed, that she came from outside Sicily (she had moved in at thirty 
years old). She emphasised to me that she had ‘shared a lot of time, ideas 
and thoughts’ with Mina when their paths crossed studying corporate 
social responsibility in Milan. The fact that Claudia eventually joined 
Libertà and engaged in anti-mafia associationism ‘brought her closer’ 
to the Palermitan Mina and enclosed her in the ‘virtuous circle of the 
anti-mafia’, as she told me.
This project of calling the administrative anti-mafia ‘virtuous’ and 
withdrawn from kinship influence resembles Weberian ‘ideal-type’ con-
cepts of the modern as involving the separation of family and kinship 
relations from work (2009 [1922]). Weber’s notion of bureaucracy itself 
proposes an ideal type separation of kinship and office, which seems to 
reverberate with the ideas the anti-mafia cooperatives’ administrators 
had. The legal and accounting separation of the business enterprise from 
the household was crucial for the emergence of modern Western capi-
talism for Weber – a prerequisite for the deliberate planning of rational 
economic action (1978: 63).
Anthropologists have challenged this hypothesis. Yanagisako’s work, 
for instance, tackles the myth that ‘advanced’ capitalist enterprise is the 
locus classicus for such separation (she writes about the affluent northern 
bourgeoisie of Como). Critiquing Weber, she notes that
while this separation may have been a significant innovation, Weber’s error 
was to misconstrue the legal fiction of separation – which was put in place 
for the purpose of limiting individual and familial financial liability – as 
a de facto separation of family relations from business relations. In other 
words, Weber turned a legal fiction of the separation of the family from the 
firm into a social theory in which the family and the economy in modern 
capitalist society were cast as distinct institutions. (2002: 21–22)
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale. 
 The Limits of ‘Bad Kinship’ 109
Similarly, administrators took at face value the Consortium principle for 
politicised anti-mafia cooperativism, that family/kinship relations and 
cooperative membership were mutually exclusive, in a modernism akin 
to what Yanagisako attributes to the Weberian analytical model. Namely, 
they embraced the political fiction of total separation from kinship 
 relations as part of their cooperative experience, creating a networked 
relatedness of their own.
The Consortium ‘Progress and Law’ picked Palermitans as administra-
tors because of their lack of kinship ties to Spicco Vallata villages. Since 
Luca took over the presidency in the Falcone cooperative, they have been 
reproducing the role of the ‘detached’ administrator through networking 
among commuters to Spicco Vallata. Their teams’ coherent ‘virtuous cir-
cles’ suggested borders within which the ideology of legality (including, 
of course, meritocracy) and development were contained. This ideology 
represented a ‘moral universe’ that the administrators thought was in 
need of protection from the contamination of kinship relations. Their 
specific common backgrounds (young, educated, middle-class) secured 
this system of reproducing the administration teams.
This was not merely in the abstract: in their everyday practice they 
detached themselves from the ‘family’ and the household, the sphere 
of immediate experience for the manual workers’ cooperative recruit-
ment. The virtuous circles, webs of relationships among equals unmedi-
ated by kinship, created a sense of a closed group of relatedness among 
Palermitan administrators – one distinctely different than the positive 
embracing of family life in the context of merging household and work-
life into anti-mafia families.
Anti-mafia Families among Local Manual Labourers
While the ways administration members constructed their recruitment 
echoed this ideology of an anti-mafia cooperativism detached from kinship, 
local workers entered the cooperatives through channels of kin or friends’ 
‘recommendations’ (raccomandazioni, or in Sicilian, raccummannaziuni). If 
‘raccommandazioni’4 provided a thread between kinship and work, what 
does this thread consist of and how does it connect to people’s conceptu-
alisations of the values of family and cooperative – and indeed anti-mafia 
cooperativism?5 The vast majority of my local informants were members of 
a nuclear family, with whom they shared a home. I discuss household com-
position in more detail in chapter 7. As Harris underlines, ‘the household 
denotes an institution whose primary function is co-residence’ (1984: 52).
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‘Virtuous clientelism’, implying ‘benign’, non-nepotistic networks 
that provide routes to jobs, have been proposed as a way to resolve the 
‘Southern [Italian] problem’ (Piattoni 1998). As recent works emphasise, 
much still turns around raccomandazioni in the increasingly precarious 
Italian labour market, a practice that remains a constant, albeit updated 
(Procoli 2004). Zinn views raccomandazioni more through a framework 
of corruption than of patronage, arguing that corruption, as a ‘shared 
knowledge’ that ‘creates actors’ personhood’ has substituted for patron-
age as a ‘hegemonic discourse in the current state of play’ in the social 
sciences (Zinn 2005: 233; 2003). My investigation has contributed a sense 
of flexible family practices to this discussion (Rakopoulos 2017a).
Making ‘Anti-mafia Families’
In 2001, Falcone was composed of fifteen members and no day work-
ers. The members of this original team, coming from various villages of 
Spicco Vallata and from Palermo, had been gathered without knowing 
each other and without prior experience in cooperatives. Ten of the orig-
inal members had gradually left the cooperative out of fear, lack of finan-
cial support or disagreements with other members. Of the remaining 
original five, only Luca had a decision-making role by the time of field-
work (having been the cooperative president since 2004). Continuing rela-
tions of friendship, affinity and kinship supplied the Falcone’s (as well as 
the other two cooperatives’) manual workforce member-teams, formed 
among villagers, to substitute the members who had left. Permanent 
members brought in newcomers – mainly daily, contractual workers. 
Being ‘recommended’ became the only mode of recruitment to the coop-
eratives’ manual workforce teams, marking a divergence from the public 
contests’ principles. The kin of members and workers entered the coop-
eratives ‘by default’, as Enzo described it, explaining that the practice of 
hiring seasonal workers was ‘as natural as the feelings of being related to 
someone’. Men were hired to work the plots and women for services such 
as the agriturismi; all these people were related to existing cooperative 
members.
Pippo introduced Adamo to me as a cousin he had ‘mediated for’. Enzo 
brought in one son, Ciccio, to the Borsellino co-op and another, Lino, to 
the Falcone. Affinity relationships were also important: elder cooperative 
members secured jobs for their brothers-in-law (cognati) or sons-in-law 
(generi). Paolo secured a job for Donato, the boyfriend of his daughter. 
In some cases, relationships between the Falcone and Borsellino work 
pools overlapped: one’s son-in-law could be another’s brother, thereby 
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interrelating the two cooperatives’ common kinship pools. Often, there-
fore, wages from two different cooperatives were brought into the same 
household. It was in those cases in particular that members associated 
the cooperative with home, seeing it as a home. People would use the 
phrase ‘anti-mafia family’ to describe these kinds of household settings.
Examples range from comparatico affinity to direct cognatic descent. 
Pippo introduced Adamo to me as a cousin he had ‘mediated for and rec-
ommended’. Affinity relationships were also important: elder cooperative 
members secured jobs for their brothers-in-law (cognati) or sons-in-law 
(generi). Adamo presented Donato (the 26-year-old boyfriend of Paolo’s 
daughter), saying, ‘His father-in-law mediated for him’. Enzo Riceli was 
proud to state that his raccomandazioni had ‘brought many distant rela-
tives into both San Giovanni cooperatives’. When I traced this back to 
people he had ‘recommended’, such as Cicio and Pippo, they confirmed 
he had mediated for them. In some cases, relationships between the 
Falcone and Borsellino work pools overlapped: one’s son-in-law could be 
another’s brother. This suggests that common kinship pools lay behind 
the rhetoric of ideological ‘solidarity’ between the two cooperatives, rein-
forcing their interrelationship.6 As he had been a member of Falcone 
since 2002, Enzo’s raccomandazione for his own sons Ciccio (a Borsellino 
member-worker) and Lino (a Falcone daily worker) was undisputed.
Boasting that three men of her household worked for two different 
cooperatives, Santa concluded, ‘our family, our Riceli home is a co-op’, 
using the term casa (home: co-residential household). Her sons, Lino (20) 
and Ciccio (25), and her husband Enzo (49), saw their household as an 
‘anti-mafia family’; so did Santa herself who, like Rita, bracketed together 
family and cooperative, ‘one being the other side of the other’. All four 
members of the Riceli family received some income from the Falcone 
and Borsellino cooperatives, albeit in differentiated ways. Enzo was one 
of the only three Falcone member-workers, who received a monthly wage 
(of 1,100 euros); Ciccio received a mean of 600 euros monthly, as being a 
member-worker of the Borsellino as his permanent contract was based 
on daily payments; Lino’s pay, as a daily worker, amounted to a mean of 
600 euros monthly as well; Santa received seasonal daily pay (mean of 150 
euros monthly). This financial situation solidified their belief that theirs 
was ‘the very definition of an anti-mafia family’. Importantly, this belief 
was not based on a common ‘consumption pool’ in the family, as each 
managed the major part of their finances independently.
Santa’s best friend was Rita Giuffrè from Bocca, then fifty years old. 
Paolo, her husband, of the same age and origin, was a permanent worker 
in the Falcone and recommended his wife for casual jobs with the coop-
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erative. I often worked alongside her and other cooperative members’ 
wives. She too referred to the ‘cooperative being our home’, prompting 
other ‘ladies of the co-op’ (as they referred to themselves) to tell me about 
how their households ‘spilled over’ into the cooperative. Some ladies 
used the term ‘anti-mafia family’ to describe their households, in this 
way distinguishing their own from other local families. They employed 
the discourse of ‘anti-mafia families’ in different ways. On the one hand, 
they used it to refer to generational overlaps of family members in the 
workforce of the cooperatives; on the other, they used it to provide mean-
ing to the cooperative experience itself and in this way to ‘familiarise’ 
their relationships with each other. They were proud to stress that being 
part of an ‘anti-mafia family’ was ‘something special’.7
During the preparation of Christmas packages of cooperative prod-
ucts, I worked continuously alongside ‘the co-op ladies’. I observed that 
Rita’s and Maria’s use of ‘home’ idioms to describe ‘their’ cooperative was 
often exclusionary, delineating the social boundaries of the cooperative 
group and setting the terms by which ‘foreigners’ were allowed into the 
cooperative by the grace of homely hospitality. In parallel to that, as 
exclusionary idioms can be extended, some women also used ‘home’ to 
describe Italy in xenophobic tones: Santa thought ‘Islamic’ immigrants 
had to convert to the Christian values of ‘our home’.
Despite her friendly behaviour, Rita often reminded me that I ‘had 
got the job because I was a foreign observer’, while she and her friends 
had the job ‘because we are the other side of the cooperative; the coop-
erative relies on us wives’. Many other women made similar associations 
between their family values and their cooperative experience. Maria, 
Pippo’s wife, likened the ‘unity’ of a cooperative to that of a family. When 
Pippo fell out with the Borsellino cooperative, he told me that some of his 
ex-colleagues were ‘conspiring against him’. Maria, who was particularly 
proud of her husband’s involvement in the cooperatives, severely criti-
cised him for using the term ‘conspiracy’, saying ‘a co-op is like a family; 
conspiracies do not take place in it’.
Therefore, members’ wives actively pro-family views complemented 
the cooperativist experience of their husbands and, by and large, of their 
families. Importantly, what Rita called ‘the other side of the cooperatives’ 
suggests that anti-mafia families were constituted as such by absorbing 
the cooperative into family values and extending family into the cooper-
ative. Maria saw family as a unifying force: she applied this quality to the 
cooperative. This overlooked the fact that some members of the house-
hold received a regular wage from the cooperative while others, includ-
ing herself and the other ‘co-op ladies’, only received sporadic payments 
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for daily chores.8 The differences in pay and wage regimes of local men 
and women reflected divisions of labour and distribution of resources at 
home. The household divisions of labour, in turn, reflected the coopera-
tive’s labour organisation: women did not work the soil and were hence 
not granted member status in the cooperatives. The positions in the 
cooperatives’ manual workforce were strongly gendered9. Rita’s analogies 
between home and cooperative reflected this gendered division of labour, 
brought from the home to the workplace and vice versa.10
Women often discussed the reproduction of people, families and coop-
eratives in the same breath. Caterina, considerably younger than her 
colleagues, had moved to San Giovanni together with Piero, her husband, 
who was a member of Falcone. They had a six-month-old baby, born in 
the village. Caterina worked for Falcone only occasionally, and because 
of her pregnancy and the child’s rearing, she had not done so for a while. 
This did not matter since she saw her recruitment to the cooperative and 
the birth of her baby as all part of ‘the same process of bringing up an 
anti-mafia family’. In a discussion I had with her, Rita and Santa, Caterina 
went to great lengths to portray to us the importance of Falcone for her 
young family. As she narrated her story, ‘the co-op is responsible for the 
whole of my life. I met Piero through the cooperative and my daughter 
was born within it. We were made a family through the cooperative’. ‘No 
doubt her first word will be “co-op”’, added Rita, petting the baby. Rita 
and Santa commented that their families had ‘found the co-op on their 
way and changed through it, while Caterina’s family grew within it’. This 
illustrates how the cross-fertilisation of family and cooperative some-
times took on naturalising undertones: reproduction of family and coop-
erative represented in literal reproduction (babies). Caterina affirmed 
that her young family was an anti-mafia family par excellence.
Apart from changing existing idioms of kinship by mapping family 
onto cooperative, the raccomandazioni acted as vectors of relatedness, 
giving a new directionality as actions that built upon enduring rela-
tionships. Examples of this include a range of different relations. These 
could be the ‘brotherly’ feelings Adamo felt for Pippo; however, they 
also included less fortunate cases such as Giuseppe, who constantly com-
plained about the indifference of his Borsellino cooperative colleagues 
in not allocating him more more work as a day labourer. Pippo saw the 
efforts of Giusy, a Falcone member, as ‘sisterly’, as she used her influence 
to precisely find ways to allocate him more labour days. Raccomandazioni 
thus informed and reconfigured the meaning of kinship in Spicco Vallata, 
creating new linkages. This is one important reason why local workers 
defended and evoked idioms of kinship-based relatedness, as kinship 
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helped them to guarantee jobs in the co-ops despite the cooperatives’ 
rhetoric on meritocracy. In the process of constituting anti-mafia fami-
lies, merging the nuclear family and close kin with cooperative identity, 
the manual workforce stretched kinship bonds in order to maximise 
employment opportunities.
The broader question here is how this discussion feeds back into the 
debate about the role of kinship in shaping the phenomenon of anti-mafia 
cooperatives. Interlocutors from Spicco Vallata (manual workforce mem-
bers and their wives) drew on the idioms of family and kinship to talk 
about other social relations and groups – most prominently, cooperatives. 
This practice proposed a cooperativism inclusive of kinship. It implicitly 
rejected the administrators’ image of anti-mafia cooperativism, a model 
inspired by the Consortium’s modernist ideal of escaping the grip of local 
relations by separating work from family.
People of the local workforce teams renew, revitalise and, at the same 
time, re-work ideas of kinship as a form of cooperative relatedness. 
Rather than promoting a modernist separation of work and family (with 
its corresponding ‘meritocratic’ networking relatedness), their practices 
proposed mediations between work and kinship – or cooperative and 
‘home’ – in ways that incorporated the rhetoric of collective labour rela-
tions (Ashwin 1999). For cooperative workers, the conflation between 
home and cooperative was part of what it meant to them to participate in 
anti-mafia cooperativism. Nor was kinship an inflexible modality; rather, 
it could facilitate and host social transformation as members embraced 
changes in work through continuity in kinship and not against it. The 
workers’ practice actually renovated the relationship between home and 
work.
Modern[ist] Separations: Flexible Families and Cooperative 
Work-Home Bridges
Keith Hart convincingly points out that we conveniently call juxtapo-
sitions of family and business ‘corruption’, although they happen 
practically everywhere (2000; 2005). The ‘state of corruption’, with its 
contaminating potentials (see also the next chapter) spreads through 
mechanisms, like kinship, that one cannot control or contain fully but 
that could be somehow documented and narrated (Gupta 1995; 2005). The 
official policy of anti-mafia cooperatives organised by the Consortium 
and Libertà was led by the enclavist idea that mafia affiliations, associ-
ated with family, should be avoided at all costs – and this in a period 
of routine investigation over ‘crony’ Italian power and capitalism (Lane 
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2004; Ginsborg 2005a). The anti-mafia agenda took an anti-kinship stance 
regarding recruitment. This conflicted with the dynamic interactions of 
home and work, and with the relation between kinship and cooperatives 
as collective endeavours. Kinship, on its cognatic format of anti-mafia 
families, was transmogrified into a flexible institution. Idioms of close 
kinship (‘home’) could facilitate and accommodate change in the rising 
opportunities for labour, with the establishment of cooperatives in 
Spicco Vallata. Manual workforce members, then, embraced changes in 
work, creating anti-mafia families. This was a mutually enriching process 
that enhanced ideologies of household and cooperativism and so shaped 
the workers’ experience of anti-mafia cooperatives within a conceptual 
framework based on kinship. But as house and workplace relations are 
mutually constituted, our analyses should be wary of the possible dan-
gers of reducing this relationship to economism.
Debunking that economism is due in the light of the ethnographic 
 evidence above. For this reason, we need to be reminded that anti- mafia 
families’ flexible homes worked in the specific case of cooperative- 
making. This implies a twofold debate: firstly, we need to be reminded 
of the role of cooperatives in the juncture of family and labour markets; 
secondly, we need to untie kinship from familism in the wider picture of 
kinship flexibilities in ‘Mediterranean’ anthropology.
Seeing co-ops as bounded units of analysis could be understood at best 
as what Gudeman calls ‘enclaves of mutuality’ (Gudeman 2008; see also 
the discussion in chapter 8). This take, however, unties co-ops from the 
broader social relationships (and labour market dependencies) that they 
actually operate within. Such an idea affects our unease to reflect on the 
co-op-wide society relationship. The flexible boundaries of home vis-à-vis 
co-op labour opportunities in Spicco Vallata, however, tell a different 
story.
Seeing co-ops as enclaves of mutual life introduces an alternative 
mode of modernist separation: one based on the co-op as an institution 
that protects local social relations from market forces. In fact, such rela-
tions and their solidification in community ideologies have an immediate 
impact on cooperatives. Conceptualising the co-op as a bounded institu-
tion leaves social life around it comprising a series of ‘social externalities’. 
It takes for granted what it sets to unpack: the relationship of economy 
and community and the suspended, in-between position that co-ops hold 
in this juncture (Rakopoulos 2015a).
We might benefit then from seeing co-ops as any other peopled insti-
tution (Herzfeld 1992) – by institution we mean ‘an established practice 
in the life of a community [and] the organisation that carries it out (Hart 
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et al. 2014: 16). Co-ops are organisations entrenched in a series of social 
obligations from which they cannot be disembedded. Seen in that way, 
we allow investigative leeway for flexible kinship in their constitution. 
This implies seeing co-ops as social configurations composed by members 
whose lives are entangled in other relations and obligations (more press-
ingly, to kin and family life) as much as they are tied to labour markets.
The issue of flexible kinship that is shaped from labour opportunities 
and shapes labour realities becomes central in this analysis. However, 
this should avoid seeing the work/kinship nexus instrumentally, as 
the Mediterranean literature has often done, as a means to resources 
(Goddard et al. 1994). This idea maintains, for instance, that kinship feeds 
into hierarchisation and cannot be bent or re-defined in ways other than 
as ‘entrepreneurial strategies’ (Pardo 1996: 94–95).
Salvaging family from familism is premised on recognising its 
dynamic and flexible features. In a changing Sicily, the continuities 
between home and the workplace mutually constitute both institutions 
and extend their meanings, reinforcing cooperative work. Accordingly, it 
is necessary to conceptualise the home and kinship idioms more openly 
in order to account for social mobility and change in Mediterranean set-
tings and to deprovincialise the modernist fiction of home/work interre-
lationships taking place in southern Europe and a fortiori, the Souths of 
this world (cf Schneider 1998).
After all, long genealogies of association between kinship and industry 
have been noted in cases of family life and values penetrating capital-
ist milieus elsewhere – as, for example, in Lombardy (Yanagisako 2002; 
Ghezzi 2007; Bonomi 2008) – and beyond, where family links stretch (see 
Yanagisako 2013). This is salient where flexible familism contributed to 
the ‘expansion of class’ in industrial settings (Kalb 1997: 91). While we 
seem to have concluded that ‘advanced’ capitalism is laden with family 
life (what modernist purism would call ‘cronyism’ or ‘corruption’; see 
Hart 2000), we are yet to fully account for the flexibilities of kinship vis-
à-vis labour in the Mediterranean.
Pointing to the flexibility of kinship idioms does not, however, suffice. 
We also need to trace this flexibility’s emancipative features (unlike the 
exploitative connotation ‘flexible familist accumulation’ has, as per Kalb 
2005: 122). How these flexibilities operate in an environment (such as 
inland Sicily) conditioned by the fiction of mafia familism in both schol-
arly and popular jargon becomes then more urgent to stress.
Recent work points to transnational cousinhood egalitarianism in 
maritime Sicily (Ben-Yehoyada 2014) or flexible social stratification and 
an upwardly mobile tendency in inland pastoral communities in Sardinia 
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(Mientjes 2010). Such studies pave the way for further analysis, as they 
reveal how idioms of kinship can be stretched to accommodate different 
types of social mobility and lodge the impacts of world markets locally. 
This feature necessarily points to the dynamic interpenetration between 
home and work: changes in family affect the forms of industrial life and 
vice versa. This process can replace political idioms (such as fraternity) 
with new idioms of kinship, as in cousinage (Ben-Yehoyada 2014: 875).
To reconsider cooperativism’s entrenchment with families in this way 
would imply that cooperativism develops because of workers’ families’ 
entanglement with it and not in the face of it. This implies a more open 
analytical attitude to cooperatives, seen as institutions that achieve more 
than the provision of protective enclaves for the continuity of family life. 
This line of inquiry resonates with a long streak of feminist analyses of 
the interactions between kinship and production processes or indeed the 
tensions between family values and market. The anthropology of this 
interaction shows how the boundaries between home and work are, by 
and large, blurry (Hareven 2000). We might benefit from reviving this tra-
dition of a feminist anthropology of work by highlighting how the sphere 
of the home interlocks with economic practices (Zelizer 1995; 2005).
‘Familism’, in this line of thought, has proved to be an insufficient way 
of analysing how boundaries between home and workplace blur, as it 
rests on the assumption that there is already a fundamental gap between 
home and workplace and therefore already implies what is under scru-
tiny (Morris 1992). Rather than associating idioms of the home with an 
immobile, change-resistant world of ‘tradition’, including kinship ideolo-
gising (as per Goddard 1996), anti-mafia families show the interactions of 
waged work with the varied flexibilities of domestic arrangements.
Understanding how co-ops negotiate and are negotiated through the 
system of kinship raccomandazioni in Sicily speaks volumes on the wider 
home-work relationship in ‘Mediterranean’ modernities (of which there 
exists a large discussion, from Pina-Cabral 1989 to Ben-Yehoyada 2011). 
This line of thought can take us away from the stance of ‘never been 
modern’ and into the ground of a gendering economic anthropology 
process, that is, one that blends feminism and political economy, an 
approach that current anthropological critiques to modernist separations 
are yet to fully explore.
This is an approach that takes the lives of co-op members outside of 
the co-op context seriously. For instance, the administrators’ networking 
promoted (and derived from) a model of anti-mafia cooperativism suspi-
cious of kinship. The fact that administrators did not live their private 
lives in Spicco Vallata but commuted there from Palermo, thus effectively 
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separating work and home, meant that their imagined sense of involve-
ment in the local community went unchallenged. Their lack of exposure 
to local obligations and networks involving mafiosi as well as their levels 
of remuneration (sufficient without seeking income outside the cooper-
atives’ employment) allowed them to endorse unhesitatingly the legal 
framework of cooperatives’ waged work.
Anti-mafia cooperatives in Sicily offer us a sound prism with which to 
investigate the interpenetrations of home and work-based institutions. 
They make new kinship forms spring where local and broader notions 
collide. This is particularly so because anti-mafia co-ops claim to operate 
on a basis of seclusion from certain aspects of social life (including mafia 
kinship and affiliation). Anti-mafia families, the flexible notion formed 
from this configuration, suggest how cooperatives in fact are constituted 
in interrelationship with (idioms of) home. Co-ops then function on an 
active endorsement of other idioms, more amenable to an anti-mafia 
arrangement – including alternative ideas of kinship. The case of these 
co-ops shows the contradictions of enclave morality, a system isolating 
cooperative work from the holistic richness of social life.
From Home to Co-op, and Back
I have argued that the cooperatives’ two-tiered organisation implies that 
their reproduction is twofold; the relatedness idioms of that reproduction 
are not interchangeable between (class-informed) teams, which corre-
spond to different spheres of relatedness and different class horizontal-
ities. Both their idioms contribute to the making of the cooperative and 
both are seemingly about the same thing – equality/horizontality. There 
is even some seeming overlap in kinship ‘talk’. Yet these idioms are in 
fact not only different but lead to mutual unintelligibility.
But what is more central here is that cooperatives’ entrenchment with 
families is central to our understandings of cooperativism. Any sense of 
cooperation ideology and practice develops, in the case of workers, because 
of this entrenchment and not in the face of it. The consortium-led idea 
of ‘incompatibility’ of cooperativism and of personalised,  family-based 
networks is therefore dubious. Cooperativism can draw from collectivism 
and political projects while simultaneously being informed by (different 
spheres of) relatedness. This is the way workers experienced coopera-
tives, which consequentially formed their belonging to anti-mafia coop-
erativism, although it developed without a specific rhetoric, like the 
dominant model of the administrators.
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‘Virtuous networks’ in anti-mafia ‘networking’ constitute a sphere 
of relatedness as part of a class-informed modern paradigm of separat-
ing home from work (Yanagisako 2002; Zelizer 2005; cf. Latour 1993). 
Reversely, ‘family’ is not an ahistoric, static category, despite the idea that 
‘families’ in Sicily often reproduce mafia. After all, feminist sociology has 
identified a rising ‘moral familism’ in the anti-mafia movement (Santino 
2007: 104) in women resisting mafia family ethics (Impastato et al 2003; 
Puglisi 2005).
Within each team, shared idioms among equals (networking and vir-
tuous circles, and kinship-based raccomandazioni) construct horizontal 
relations. As we shall see in the next three chapters in terms of gossip, 
land management and neighbourhood with mafiosi, dissimilar idioms 
produced certain degrees of conflict between the teams. Attempts for 
cooperative horizontality to cross over the strict division of labour in the 
cooperatives led to disjunctures (over what counts as, for instance, polite 
communication with people outside the co-op enclaves, in the form of 
contacts in the village or the fields).
Cooperatives are, by and large, incorporated into broad social envi-
ronments. As shown in chapter 9, such environments – and their com-
munalist ideologies – can harness contradictions within and without 
cooperatives, while everyday interactions in local ambiences, as those 
narrated in the next chapter, can also produce distress. Kinship, family 
and home ideologies and practices are also part of this dynamic. As with 
other aspects of their social lives, co-op members’ social  responsibilities – 
including kinship and the household – outside the cooperative context, 
become the cooperatives’ text.
The social relations in the home become the cooperative, while homes 
are shaped according to the broader setting within which the cooperative 
operates (‘anti-mafia families’, in the Sicilian case). Manual workforce 
members and their wives drew upon idioms of family and kinship to 
talk about other social relations and groups – anti-mafia cooperatives. 
This practice proposed a cooperativism effectively inclusive of kinship, 
which implicitly rejected the image of an anti-mafia modelled on the 
modernist ideal of escaping the grip of local relations by separating 
work from family. However, such cooperativist reality in Spicco Vallata 
was  thoroughly guarded with symbolic boundaries, raised especially by 
administrators. Their use of gossip and appropriation of local rumours 
were central to this development, as seen in the next chapter.
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NOTES
 1. As noted later (see page 144), the co-op braccianti, like other local peasants, 
would fully appropriate this idea of affinity and would address each other 
this way. In my own experience of socialising among other social strata in 
Sicily – for instance, with precarious middle-class urbanites – it also has a 
slightly leftist twist in other contexts (‘comrade’). But for Spicco Vallata, it 
is very important to emphasise that the contemporary use of these compar-
atico idioms among people of the anti-mafia cooperatives is completely sep-
arated from the historically (mafia) charged godparenthood fictive kinship 
idiom (Arlacchi 1986). More relevant are analogies with compadrazgo in Latin 
America to elucidate how idioms of work camaraderie develop as positively 
perceived kinship language (Nash 1979). In the previous chapter this is put in 
the context of the problematic view over ‘fictive’ kinship pertaining to the 
official anti-mafia ideology sustained by the Consortium.
 2. Raccomandazione (‘recommendation’ or, more loosely, ‘a reference’) implies 
mediation: to recommend someone for a job. However, it also demarcates a 
variety and flexibility of meanings in Spicco Vallata and in Italy at large, most 
often associated with kin but also with friends (Zinn 2005). Raccomandazioni, 
typically registered under the classic rubric of patronage, are intrinsic to the 
discussion on Italian modernisation, although it remains unclear whether 
they transgress or reproduce class stratification (Sylos-Labini 1975). Ginsborg 
notes their organic role in the Italian political system (2003a: 101, 202), stress-
ing social mobility but also ‘crony capitalism’ (Ginsborg 2003b: 68). While 
they form ‘a system guaranteeing jobs’ (Assmuth 1997: 160), they also repro-
duce a mafia-affiliated ‘atmosphere of clientelism’ (Schneider and Schneider 
2003: 105). 
 3. What obviously comes to mind here is Bourdieu’s problematisation of ‘mer-
itocracy’ and his emphasis on the reproduction of certain fields (such as the 
academy) taking place through ‘genealogical’ succession, where kinship is 
also a factor (1988).
 4. My decision to use the Italian term rather than English equivalents (literal: 
‘recommendation’ or, more loosely, ‘a reference’) is not meant to indicate a 
presumed unbridgeable translation but to demarcate the variety and flexi-
bility of meanings attached to the term in Spicco Vallata and in Italy at large 
(Zinn 2001). Raccomandazione implies ‘mediation’: to recommend someone for 
a job. Palermo has been called ‘sponge-city’ (città-spugna: Cole 1997; 2007), as 
local middle classes have achieved social mobility through accessing jobs in 
the public sector via raccomandazioni. Chubb notes routinised political party 
practices ‘of 30 raccomandazioni per day’ in Palermo (1982: 93), which echoes 
Bayart’s (2008) description of African ‘opportunity states’. The sociologist 
and activist Danilo Dolci’s accounts have stressed how racommandazioni from 
the powerful have framed the working lives of the poor since the 1950s 
(Dolci 1958; 1964; 1968), proposing forms of political mobilisation inspired by 
Gandhian approaches to tackle these problems (2007).
 5. I should also note in advance that, in Spicco Vallata, ‘household’ and ‘home’ 
are used interchangeably.
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 6. In fact, the presentation of ‘solidarity’ among cooperatives was a common 
idiom used to establish political alliances with institutions, as explored later 
in the chapter.
 7. The cooperatives were then symbols of class distinction locally as well as in 
the case of the Palermitan administrators (Bourdieu 1989). 
 8. Women’s discourse on the co-reproduction of families and cooperatives 
rested largely on accepting the very low valorisation of their own work. 
This idea was based on the historical positioning of female labour in Spicco 
Vallata: working the fields was an exclusively male job, which women were 
not allowed to do. As I argue in the following two chapters, this condition was 
also partly informed by local mafia ethic. Ironically, this gendered work ethic 
was a point of continuity between mafia and anti-mafia families, constituting 
the norm of the local anti-mafia families and the cooperatives in which their 
members worked: some in leading roles with steady income (men) and others 
in secondary roles with sporadic daily pay (women, who, as mentioned, were 
never members of the manual workforce teams).
 9. For instance, the term ‘manual’ itself seems selectively applied in a gendered 
way: packing Christmas boxes is seemingly not classified as ‘manual’ but 
‘services’.
10. Chapter 7 will explore ‘traditional’ gendered divisions of labour as a local ‘con-
tinuity’ reproduced unchanged, despite the ‘rupture’ cooperatives claimed to 
inaugurate. 
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░ The Use of Gossip
Setting Cooperative Boundaries
The idea of moral borders is salient throughout this ethnography. The dis-
courses of ‘clean and just’ that co-articulated with the food activism pur-
sued by the co-ops’ administration are indicative of a degree of separation 
and distinction. So were certain views of kinship and relatedness close to 
mafia – relations sealed out from the co-ops by a strict seclusion based on 
ethical boundaries of meritocracy. This idea is drawn from conversations 
with co-op members, overwhelmingly administrators, and is the basis to 
explore the administrators’ social activity in San Giovanni as well as their 
associations while outside the cooperatives’ offices.
Central to this were the contacts they established with people who 
wanted to collaborate with the co-ops. These activities will be analysed 
in the remainder of this chapter, in terms of border marking and cross-
ing as well as of the management of personal and cooperative repu-
tation. The narrative here illustrates how administrators shielded the 
cooperatives from certain local influences, elucidating how they traced 
who was a mafioso in the village and how they negotiated such informa-
tion, shaping their own and their cooperatives’ self-image as against 
the San Giovanni mafia. Their attempts to reinforce anti-mafia change 
suggest interesting continuities with local codes, as they appropriated 
gossip,1 a practice continuous with local ‘cultural codes’ (cf. Schneider 
and Schneider 1976), to seclude the cooperatives from malign (‘unclean’) 
influences. They stand, in this way, as another form of moral quarantine 
in ‘a sea of socio-cultural malice’, a phrase uttered to me by Luca in an 
unsuspecting moment.2
Gossip is of fundamental importance in the ways people experienced 
their involvement in the anti-mafia cooperatives. It became an anti- mafia 
resource because administrators used it to create boundaries around 
their enclaves of ‘good’; while locally, as a cultural code, it in fact blurred 
these boundaries between mafia and anti-mafia. The ethnography shows 
how locals used it in different ways and most importantly as a form of 
metatalk: to examine who talked with whom. Co-op persons most often 
utilised it to prove their anti-mafia credits or to solidify the ‘moral bor-
ders’ between mafia and anti-mafia. Following Schneider and Schneider’s 
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notion of ‘reputational networks’ (1996: 9), I show how, depending on 
the person, reputation through gossip may be used to blur or to set 
boundaries.
Continuity with, and interactions between, the histories of mafia and 
anti-mafia have been hinted throughout this book. The ways administra-
tors followed tactics hostile or simply suspicious of kinship is indicative 
of a tendency to separate the co-ops from local social life and solidify the 
anti-mafia cooperative phenomenon as a presence slightly aloof from the 
doings on Spicco Vallata ground. In this chapter, I decipher how actors 
sought to deal with this problem by using gossip to constitute mafia 
and anti-mafia as separate categories. However, as some vignettes below 
show, the local code of gossip was also used by other people to blur mafia/
anti-mafia distinctions. How did people in public spaces speak to and 
about each other in San Giovanni – and what kind of idioms brought 
them together or kept them apart?
Gossip is twofold: there’s gossip about who was a mafioso and what it 
meant to be one and, especially, about who maintained contacts with 
people considered significant in San Giovanni. Indeed, the police them-
selves tracked gossip, and ‘affiliation’ of someone to mafia was akin to a 
legal category. This dimension further frames the problem of horizontal 
relations in the cooperatives, offering insights into moralities and prac-
tices. Gossip impacted on the equity relations among members of the 
cooperatives as well as on the relationship between cooperative members 
and the local community.
The narrative serves two aims. The first is descriptive: I shall elucidate 
the role of administrators in the local community, highlighting instances 
where they were exposed to local rumours as well as moments when 
they instrumentalised these rumours to demarcate a separation between 
the blurred categories of mafia/anti-mafia on the ground. The second 
is analytical: I suggest that the administrators’ plan to shield the coop-
eratives from local influence, in envisioning and forming cooperatives 
as ‘enclaves of good’, also takes discursive forms. Their commitment to 
virtuous networking and their idea that land boundaries were moral bor-
ders is here reproduced in their appropriation of local gossip. Focusing 
on contamination, they deploy information for purposes of surveillance 
of other cooperative members. This attempt to set moral borders around 
the cooperatives was informed by their own status as outsiders to San 
Giovanni’s social life and reflected their lack of kinship ties to the area 
and their suspicion of locals’ anti-mafia commitment.
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Flows of Rumours in San Giovanni
Claudia, a thirty-year-old administrator for the Falcone co-op, could not 
imagine that men visiting the newsagent around the corner from the 
Rex, a local bar3, entertained mafia sympathies. She was unaware of the 
kin relations between Rex regulars and the co-owner of the newsagent, 
a man called Salvatore, who had spent three years in prison for ‘mafia 
allegiance’. Once, as Claudia and I entered Salvatore’s newsagents to 
buy cigarettes, she inquired whether they sold ‘anti-mafia periodicals’. 
Receiving no answer, she flipped through the magazines and fished out 
the only available copy of the ‘S’, an anti-mafia-committed investigative 
journal. Salvatore’s brother-in-law, who sat behind the counter, gave us 
a cold, hard look as he handed her the change. Claudia did not sense 
his hostility. Some weeks after, when I met the brother-in-law again, 
he explained that he recognised in me ‘someone who lived in the vil-
lage and was hence able to understand’ his look of contempt for my 
companion.
A few days after my visit to the newsagent with Claudia, I was spend-
ing a sunny afternoon coffee break at the Rex with some of the mem-
bers of the Falcone cooperative administration when Valentino Barbeto, 
a mid-range mafioso, appeared in the bar. He was greeted by many of 
those present, but not the co-op members. Valentino had a dandy-like 
persona, with his expensive sunglasses and gleaming-white-teeth smile, 
like a typical male icon from Italian glossy magazines. He was popu-
lar in San Giovanni and the younger brother of the legendary mafioso 
Giovanni Barbeto, and Valentino had spent a few years in prison himself. 
He approached me and asked if he could borrow the Giornale di Sicilia 
once I was done with it. Marelio, a cooperative administrator, quickly told 
him that I would indeed give him the paper as soon as I had finished. I 
noticed in Barbeto’s smile and nod that he understood I was a stranger 
to the mode of newspaper sharing widely practised in bars of the village. 
While I had assumed that the cultural gap between these two individuals 
(self-categorised respectively as mafia/anti-mafia) would be unbridgea-
ble, in this case Valentino and Marelio formed an easy consensus out of 
common sympathy for my ignorance of a local custom.
These two different vignettes, both involving Sicilian periodicals, elu-
cidate the administrators’ varying degrees of knowledge of local codes. 
Adamo, from the manual work team of the Falcone, told me later on, 
when we were talking about the Claudia incident, that ‘the Palermitans 
just cannot get some stuff’, indicating that there were local idioms and 
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shared codes of meaning that only natives of Spicco Vallata were able to 
grasp. In my wider observations of the Palermitan administrators in San 
Giovanni, I noticed that some scrutinised the locals’ channelling of infor-
mation flows through gesturing, engaging in a game of Lotto or offering 
a coffee to somebody they knew or wished to meet. Ernesto told me that 
there was more in spending time in bars than simply occupying one’s 
leisure time:
Ernesto: For us it is a way to learn the local society, see how they behave 
and think, finding out who is on this side and who is on the other side . . . 
Theo: What do you mean by this and other side?
Ernesto: Well, studying locals’ behaviours in bars, me and my friends can 
learn, in the long run, not only how to behave in San Giovanni but also 
who is sympathetic to our cause, and how, and what they do for it, and 
whether they are pro-mafia or anti-mafia, and so on. So, you learn where 
the boundary is, between mafia and anti-mafia, in the village. And of 
course, you learn how to behave and meet people.
Sharing the same newspaper was one way to meet and discuss local 
and national issues, which local men did vociferously almost as soon as 
they entered a bar. The Giornale di Sicilia, a conservative and mafia-tolerant 
newspaper printed in Palermo, was the main means of official informa-
tion in the bars and the most promoted newspaper across all newsagents 
in the village. People consumed it cover to cover between a coffee and a 
sweet on small tables, with friends throwing in a terse comment or two 
on football or politics. Rarely did anyone read an article from start to 
finish. Skipping through the pages as others filled in with informal com-
mentary, readers were satisfied to learn the news and talk to their friends 
at the same time. The paper provided the headlines and photographs, 
while the ‘real news’ was filled in by the live commentary. As the Rex 
bartender told me, ‘no Sicilians really buy the paper, most copies are sold 
to cafés – but everybody reads it. The Giornale is a paper read and shared 
but not bought.’4
The reading and accompanying counter-reading – or, rather,  counter- 
speaking – of newspapers shows the sense of community that is conveyed 
in San Giovanni through the layering of trust that does not simply ‘buy 
into’ the official printed information but, rather, re- negotiates it through 
filters of grounded personal knowledge channelled through rumours, 
which locals were more likely to believe than the newspaper itself. These 
rumours were ‘from the source’, as people put it: from the so-called ‘great 
men’5 of Spicco Vallata (the active mafiosi) or from people linked to mafia 
networks around the island. There was no doubt about the validity of 
information derived from such sources. News spread around as ‘Chinese 
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whispers’ were more reliable than the contested ‘news’ printed in the 
paper.
As the village lacked public spaces such as piazzas or parks, the bars 
attracted locals for recreation and socialising. In total there were thirteen 
bars in San Giovanni and San Turiddu, strung out along via Porta Palermo, 
the road linking the two villages. The administrators of the Falcone and 
Borsellino cooperatives took their lunch breaks either at Virilia or Rex, 
spending most of their free time in San Giovanni in these neighbouring 
Porta Palermo bars. These were relatively close to the cooperatives’ offices 
and generally popular, offering a less exclusively male ambience. By vis-
iting these bars regularly and interacting with the locals, cooperative 
members gradually learnt the local codes of indirect communication – 
common gestures and indirect speech forms employed by the local men 
when discussing the news.
The bar was the locus where male sociability was performed and indi-
rect communication techniques developed their full range of meaning.6 
In San Giovanni, the strongly gendered space of the cafés made them 
the preferred public space for male gossiping (although those engaged 
in this kind of talk would not call it ‘gossip’ but ‘rumour-talking’). To 
circulate convincing and interesting information was a manly capacity, 
and it was only certain men, like the mafioso Baffi (see more in chapter 9), 
who monopolised narratives about the mafia, local politics and power, 
construed in this semi-public ambience. This was a task performed with 
a combination of taking extra care to be distant from others but be half-
heard nevertheless. Bars provided the setting for the reproduction of the 
blurred boundary between the public and the private, in which the figure 
of the mafioso was central as a metaphor of communication through 
silence (Siebert 2000).
The bars were also where cooperative administrators negotiated mafia 
and anti-mafia boundaries. Certain gestures signified specific things: a 
subtle touch of the speaker’s nose delivered the message that someone 
was ‘in odore di mafia’ (literally: in mafia odour), that is, of suspected mafia 
allegiances. Cooperative members replicated this gesture at the Rex as an 
inside joke. Nose touching became a humorous, albeit secretive expres-
sion, shared among friends when they ‘sensed’ mafiosi, a gesture convey-
ing uncomfortable ambiguities that they nevertheless found amusing. 
Similarly, they often mentioned puzza (stench) to denote that they sus-
pected someone in their company of being a mafioso, evoking an intuitive 
sense of unease.7 At the Rex, I also noticed that men pressed a thumb 
against the right cheek to indicate that someone was a mafioso. This 
gesture, at once straightforward and indirect, indicated an idea of mafia 
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potency: accompanied by raising the eyebrow, the finger slightly pointing 
to the sideburns, it emphasised machismo. However, social interactions 
involving people from the ‘opposite sides’ of mafia and anti-mafia man-
ifested connotations that not everyone shared, as is evident in Claudia’s 
case.
Meeting in bars often entailed allegiance to the ‘great men’ of the vil-
lage. Informants spoke of old mafiosi who spent ‘all their elderly lives’ at 
that bar. Adamo told me he was surprised, as a child, to see that the father 
of his fellow classmate Torinese always sat at the bar Circolo. ‘Didn’t he 
have a job to do?’ he asked his school friend. Later, as he started going to 
bars himself, Adamo realised that ‘this was Torinese’s real job: to check 
and control the flows of people in and out of the bar; this was his ter-
ritorial control’. While for local workers such knowledge was acquired 
during their coming of age in the village, in the case of administrators it 
had to be learnt. On one occasion I was enjoying my morning coffee at 
the bar Circolo in the company of Pasquale, a young cooperative admin-
istrator from Palermo. The place was the favourite of Mimmo Netti’s: the 
old mafioso and his friends gathered there to play cards. He had a reputa-
tion for being a peaceful, sage kind of old-school cappoccia (‘gentleman’, 
‘leader’).
Another mafioso, the much younger Ignazio Baffi, a forty-five-year-old 
construction entrepreneur fresh out of colleggio,8 walked into the bar. All 
the men present, working and pensioners alike, greeted him warmly 
and many seemed to compete for his attention. Meanwhile, Netti and his 
company, immersed in the play of cards, and generally distant, remained 
silent. Among the men at the barstools, one offered the newspaper and 
asked if he would like a coffee: ‘So what about a coffee, Ignazio?’ (il caffè 
lo vuoi, Ignazio?). I noticed that the man making this offer was Mr. Tratone, 
Adamo’s father-in-law, a pensioner who rented out office space to the 
cooperatives. Pasquale and I were surprised to witness the particular 
enthusiasm with which Pitone welcomed Baffi. Later on, discussing the 
event, we agreed that he had as much of a right to ‘hang out’ at a ‘mafia-
friendly’ bar as we did.
Of the village’s thirteen bars, not all were mafia-affiliated, of course. 
Mafiosi would visit the most central ones. In that way, the anti-mafia/
mafia rhetoric was somehow inscribed in the local landscape, as certain 
spots of the village were renowned for being mafiosi favourites. The main 
church was one such spot, as leading mafiosi’s alms were displayed in full 
view – and the bar just opposite was a known space for card-playing and 
gambling.
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The intricacies that involved locals such as Pitone with mafiosi were 
entangled with loose local links of relatedness. This meant that Pasquale, 
lacking any kinship or friendship relationships with the village, felt 
unable to explain Pitone’s loyalties to me. Not long after Baffi had made 
his entrance, Malva, the mayor of San Turiddu, also entered the bar. Baffi 
himself treated him to a coffee. Malva remarked smilingly to a few other 
sympathetic men that he was in the habit of meeting Ignazio Baffi in a 
central bar as ‘an act of transparency’, as this way their discussions were 
open to the ‘public’. Probably the reason why the politician highlighted 
this transparency paradox (speaking to a mafioso in ‘public’) was because 
of his role, at the time, as the president of the ‘state-local anti-mafia appa-
ratus’, the Consortium. Pasquale confessed to me that learning of the 
blurred boundaries of mafia and anti-mafia in such palpable way – that 
the incumbent president of the Consortium was a friend of the mafioso – 
was distressing to him but also useful to realise.
Offering coffee was a means to publicly recognise another man’s 
respected position in the local male community, ‘an act of honouring 
someone’, as a bartender told me. Such recognition was often associated 
with people’s mafia connections; for instance, treating signori such as 
Baffi or Netti to a coffee or a sweet was a noble task. This reveals, in micro, 
a tendency to exchange gifts and favours among the higher echelons 
of local society, as well as among the underprivileged peasant popula-
tion, with certain local mafiosi. One is reminded, again, of Carlo Alberto 
Dalla Chiesa’s memorable phrase that anti-mafia activists liked to cite 
to me often: ‘The state gives as a right what the mafia offers as a gift’ 
(see page 9). To start with, this idea resonates in a fascinating fashion 
when thinking back to mafia confessants’ gifts to the state (Moss 2001; 
cf. Rakopoulos 2017c). Despite claims that the mafia engages in free gift- 
giving (Pipyrou 2014), the truth is somewhat different. The mafia needs 
the backing of consent in mobilising networks and organising struc-
tures of support. Such exchanges and gifts sometimes had repercussions 
that would at once put the mafia to shame – for wrongdoings – and be 
a source of pride – for the eventual functioning of the rule of law – for 
Libertà and the Consortium in Spicco Vallata. For instance, Tazio, the 
mayor of Bocca and a Consortium member, was arrested for mafia affil-
iation in 2006. ‘Thankfully, his dealings were revealed soon enough’, as 
Matteo explained to me.
The reciprocity of such dealings was hard to penetrate in fieldwork, 
although I did observe and partake in the most ubiquitous aspect of it: 
offering coffees and meals to shady figures like Baffi. Such petty exchanges 
were thus the main means of engaging with others at a bar, such as offer-
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ing to buy a piece of pastry for the man who first got hold of the news-
paper in order to claim access to the news and his company. In this way, 
consensus and popularity developed around the circulation of the news-
paper and gifts of pastries (sweet in the morning, savoury at noontime) 
rotating among the men. The ‘public, yet hermetically sealed’ (in the 
words of Piero) position of bars as the hub of such information streams 
was fundamental to the development of sociality in San Giovanni. Locals 
communicated in sussuri (whispers), gestures, dialect jargon, narrations 
and rhyming jokes in these semi-public spaces. I consider the gossiping 
and whispering as important data precisely because the actual validity of 
information conveyed through rumours cannot be established.
After going through the whereabouts of such whispers, situating them 
in the sites of male commensality in San Giovanni, I would like to turn 
my attention back to the idea of putting co-ops in moral quarantine 
and forging enclaves of good practice. The ethnographic narrative so far 
might have discussed administrators as somehow removed from local 
life; however, their appropriation of the sussuri was often exemplary. 
Their use of gossip played a crucial role in fostering this protection from 
mafia influence locally.
Marking Boundaries: Idioms, Actors, Practices
The very idea of influence often acquired epidemic connotations and oper-
ated in a jargon of allegories drawn from medical disease. Specifically, 
cooperative administrators and Consortium politicians frequently used 
the term ‘mafia’ alongside idioms of insidious growth and contamina-
tion. They characterised flows and networks deploying interests of people 
thought to belong to mafia clans as ‘mafia diffusion’. The mafia was 
compared to disease and indeed to cancer, a language shared by public 
officials (such as judges and Consortium politicians). Reale’s mayor talked 
to me of the ‘need to isolate the contaminated cells in our society’. The 
mayor of Fonte, another Consortium village, characterised the influence 
of the San Giovanni clans into his community as a ‘metastasis’ (invoking 
the spread of cancer cells to other parts of the body), a term also used by 
sociologists in Italy (Sciarrone 2009). San Turiddu’s mayor Malva, despite 
his friendship with Baffi, told me in an interview that the ‘[mafia] lump 
had to be removed from the body of our community’. Keeping track of 
gossip regarding mafiosi guaranteed, for cooperative members, the pres-
ervation of legality: they saw it as a mode to frame and contain this con-
tamination and a net to impede its spreading.
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The metaphors of diffusion and flows spreading throughout the (com-
munity’s) body indicate the way that cooperative administrators con-
ceptualised mafiosi as potentially contaminating any social networks in 
which mafiosi participated, even marginally. Any connection with mafia 
links was deemed to be morally challenged and permanently at risk 
until ‘the lump is removed’, as Gianpiero emphasised to me, unwittingly 
echoing Malva. Gianpiero, not only a Borsellino administrator but also 
the head of Libertà Palermo, reflected the association’s views. Pamphlets 
and leaflets of anti-mafia civil society associations spoke of the perils of 
‘the disease of the South’ (Libertà 2009; Addiopizzo 2009; cf. Lumley and 
Morris 1997).
Libertà construed this paradigm in terms of mafia as a nucleus that 
transmitted its corrupting influence to the political and economic order. 
Nico, a member of the Borsellino cooperative, compared the members’ 
anxiety about becoming exposed to ‘contamination’ with the fear of 
polluting clean water: a social network was like a river with a dead 
body lying in its stream; when the clean waters pass over it, the stream 
becomes polluted from that point onwards. In that respect, cooperative 
administrators saw a flow (of things, commodities, ideas, jobs, labour and 
similar resources) as wholly ‘impure’ when a mafioso occupied a broker 
position in it. The contamination imagery was constantly evoked in docu-
ments and informal discourses among the cooperatives’ administration, 
the Consortium, local policy actors such as the mayors and civil society 
agents such as Libertà activists. Some of this discourse incorporates the 
flow of gossip and informal information gathered in bars and public 
spaces in Spicco Vallata.
Contamination calls for containment and hence articulated the admin-
istrators’ tendency to form ‘moral borders’ while, conversely, underlin-
ing the ‘cleanliness’ of the cooperatives with their strictly demarcated 
moral universe. By knowing through gossip what was said and who said 
it, the administrators formed discursive moral borders around the coop-
eratives (akin to the moral borders formed around land). This form of 
gossip in San Giovanni was constructed as metatalk, because tracking 
gossip was to talk about talking. A person was ‘clean’ not only when they 
were not a mafioso or a mafioso’s relative but also when it was proved that 
they did not speak with mafiosi or relatives of mafiosi, as this could be 
contaminating for the cooperatives. This metatalk meant sharing infor-
mation about who shared information with whom. Paying attention to 
or tracing whispers, cooperative members identified who was ‘talked 
about’ (chiaccherato). My attention to gossip here suggests analogies with 
what Favret-Saada says about witchcraft in France: aiming to study prac-
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tices, she included discourse in her analysis, pointing out how ‘the act, in 
witchcraft, is the word . . . witchcraft is spoken words; but these spoken 
words are power . . . to talk, in witchcraft, is never to inform . . . words 
wage war. Anyone talking about it is a belligerent’ (1980: 8). Although the 
mafia is more than words, reputations and resources (job positions, state 
funding) were attached to spoken word, as it can, in specific contexts, be 
instrumentalised.
Ultimately, the administrators rendered gossip a powerful resource 
for the dominant model of anti-mafia cooperativism that they promoted. 
This was a vision in which the local community was regarded warily, seen 
as imbued with problematic notions of tradition and where the state and 
law enforcement should be present at all times.
Setting and Blurring Boundaries
For this reason, tracking informal information became part of the coop-
erative administrators’ workload. It involved investigating how ‘clean’ 
the people who approached the cooperatives were by examining the dis-
cursive networks in which they were enmeshed. Secluded in their virtu-
ous networking, Palermitan administrators performed this in two main 
ways. First, they traced information by consulting the prefecture and the 
police. The police provided an outline of a person’s relationships with 
the authorities, as documented in their official archives. Secondly and 
more important, the administrators followed informal means of gather-
ing information, including paying attention to random local gossip, espe-
cially the sussuri that took place in bars. The instrumentalisation of gossip 
therefore developed in a twofold way. On the one hand, state authorities 
documented rumours and shared this information with the cooperatives’ 
administrators; on the other hand, the cooperatives tracked rumours on 
their own behalf. In doing this, they were in fact replicating the state’s 
surveillance practices – but were able to penetrate further. Police prac-
tices correlated with the cooperative members’ interest in local informal 
information.
Specifically, the state’s gossip tracking resulted in ‘signalling’ (segnal-
azione), documentation confirming a person’s contacts with mafiosi. A 
law-enforcement entity (the Carabinieri or the police) inscribed the per-
son’s name as a ‘mafia contact’ and informed the cooperatives that the 
person was to be avoided. ‘Signalling’, therefore, referred at the same 
time to ‘official documentation’ regulations and to informal gossiping 
techniques. As demands for labour intensified with the development of 
the cooperatives, this situation dramatically influenced the anti-mafia 
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cooperatives’ recruitment, as the cooperatives could not hire ‘signalled’ 
people.
When an agrarian labourer (bracciante) asked a cooperative for a 
job or when a peasant who cultivated organic grapes approached the 
 cooperatives proposing collaboration under supplier status, cooperative 
members mobilised a variety of control mechanisms, partly based on 
gossip. Firstly, through rumours documented in the police’s records, they 
traced whether the person was ‘clean’ (pulito) and therefore suitable to 
collaborate with an anti-mafia cooperative. The administrators did not 
accept ‘non-clean’ people as members, workers or suppliers under any 
circumstance, as they thought that this would introduce ‘contamination’. 
The case of Leonardo Barbeto (cousin of mafia leader Giovanni Barbeto) is 
typical. After his release from prison (he had served a three-year prison 
sentence for ‘being a member of a mafia association’), Leonardo managed 
a Barbeto land plot that bordered a Falcone land tract (as discussed later 
in chapter 9). When he approached his old acquaintance Giusy to ask for 
a possible temporary contract as a bracciante in the Falcone cooperative, 
she calmly replied, ‘Are you serious? If I am to take you, I might as well 
consider closing the cooperative down altogether!’
Checking by anti-mafia cooperatives’ administrators on whether people 
approaching them were clean, through actual existing data and through 
informal but valuable gossip in bars, was deemed by the  Consortium 
to be a most efficient way of surveillance. Nevertheless, the coopera-
tives were double-checked themselves for cleanliness by the state’s law 
enforcement agencies. Ironically, given the use of ‘signalling’ by admin-
istrators, the police sometimes ‘signalled’ cooperative members them-
selves and communicated their conduct to the cooperatives’ presidents. 
For instance, Piero once entered a bar at San Turiddu for his morning 
espresso and saw the local Carabinieri marshal having a coffee with young 
Aiola, the first cousin of a San Giovanni mafia clan leader. Piero ignored 
this seeming paradox and had a brief trivial chat with both men.
The next day, he had the police at his door: he was advised not to 
approach that person again, since he was a mafioso. The police officers 
told him that they were obliged to communicate this information to 
the president of the cooperative, and after that ‘it was the cooperative’s 
own issue’ to decide on Piero’s future. When Piero went to the police 
department, he complained that he had approached Aiola only because 
the marshal was there and that indeed the marshal introduced him to 
Aiola. The police replied that they often spent time with known mafiosi 
and ‘it was not his business imitating that conduct’. Therefore, the police 
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took advantage of the mafia/anti-mafia discourse as well and insisted on 
monopolising this system.
‘Signalling’, in this way, did not directly inflict on the rule of law, but it 
did affect the lives of cooperative members themselves. At the very least, 
it made them realise that they were not immune from state surveillance. 
More seriously, it could lead to the signalled person’s expulsion from a 
cooperative. The case of Pino is similar to that of Piero: he underwent a 
segnalazione as he ‘kept contact’ with his village’s mafia boss. Informants 
confirmed, however, that what the police meant by ‘contact’ was that he 
had simply stopped to say hello when he and Netti met on the street. In 
a small village like San Turiddu it was difficult to avoid meeting anyone, 
and Ninno’s civil engineering office was on the main road, some thirty 
metres from the stairs to the main church and to Circolo, Netti’s hangout 
bar. In fact, I came to appreciate myself that his was a strict policy: Pino 
introduced Netti to me, as we met him by chance at Circolo one day. I 
thought the fact that I had met him was perfectly inconspicuous and 
actually part of the daily routine of walking around with a local co-op 
worker.
This strictness is indicative of the normative practice of using gossip 
to strategise the next moves of a cooperative. Such tactics meant iden-
tifying people through specific flows of information in their villages. 
These flows corresponded to networks of acquaintances, affiliations and 
sympathies of the police because of their determination to control repu-
tational networks and the setting/crossing of boundaries. The normativ-
ity in this practice peaks in the role of the police in negotiating the zone 
among mafia/anti-mafia behaviour, a role important to the nature of 
these imagined boundaries that were often demarcated through gossip. 
The police are of course the embodiment of the state’s monopolisation 
of force, and re-establishing that position had a lot to do with re-estab-
lishing legality, normality and, indeed, the perceived boundaries of mafia 
and anti-mafia. This implied that police officers had to be strict with 
cooperative administrators as well, and were often quite arbitrary in the 
way they redrew these boundaries, operating to a degree illegally, at least 
insofar as their own actions were very much unregulated. As the local 
Carabinieri marshal told me, ‘I go about looking for gossip to decide my 
next moves, basically asking mafiosi about mafiosi. You do the same thing, 
Theo. I look for informers, you look for informants’.
The boundaries were imagined through the channel of either words 
attached to people (such as ‘fox’, or ‘pere pere’) or words that people shared 
with others (the discourse about ‘who is talking to whom’). As men-
tioned, I follow Favret-Saada’s take on the power of words being actions, 
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having no autonomous meaning outside the practice of hex (1980); in San 
Giovanni, they construed ‘moral universes’ (and resources attached to 
them, such as jobs, or funds). The social connections sharing words were, 
in their turn, formed in what appeared to be mutually exclusive patterns 
shaped by law and the informal information around relatedness and 
friendship. Therefore, internal strategies in the cooperatives involved 
informal flows of information, as well as firm references to definitions 
of ‘mafia’ in criminal law and procedure. Often, people actively evoked 
the language of law, playing with its applicability, in order to back their 
suspicions. Hence, they talked of Baffi’s release from prison as a legal 
mistake and circulated rumours in the village that he should have been 
imprisoned for ten years more, but a bureaucratic mistake in the wording 
of his sentence led to his early release. Tracing these whispers through 
people back to their source, I found that the person who had initiated 
them was the local Carabinieri marshal.
In that respect, gossip’s relationship to the law, the police and state 
power is explicit and structural. In gossip becoming a resource there is a 
discursive realignment, translated into structural effects, since the banal-
ity of everyday contact is decontextualised to fit within a defined category 
of power and ethics, a moral universe, informed by specific values.
Pursuing ‘The Clean’: Gossip as an Anti-mafia Resource
As mentioned, the bar was the locus for the process of rumour track-
ing. The case of a prospective supplier from the neighbouring village of 
Camo further illustrates this. As Falcone members collaborated with the 
sequestered farm Tazza, which cultivated an olive grove, they became 
increasingly interested in olive oil extraction. Tazza was administered 
by a friend of Luca’s, Giulio Erice, whom he had met through Palermo 
University’s circles (see page 106). Moving around the area where Tazza 
was located, Luca and his virtuous-circle-network friend Paolo were anx-
ious to find a ‘clean’ (pulito) olive mill. Tazza was a long way from San 
Giovanni; therefore, Luca had no information about who to trust in the 
area. Some locals suggested that the co-op members might find relevant 
information in Camo, a village located about forty minutes from San 
Giovanni. There, they could speak with a local olive mill owner who 
could potentially become an excellent supplier.
Piero decided to go to Camo indeed, and I tagged along. Before we did 
anything, though, he asked Luca to find out whether there were nega-
tive penal records on the olive mill owner in the prefecture archives in 
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Palermo. Nothing came out: the entrepreneur had even received public 
funds for his agricultural business enterprise. The documents proved that 
the mill manufactured organic oil exclusively, that the quality was high 
enough and that the owner was ‘clean’. Piero’s job, however, included not 
only performing a quality control for the prospective cooperative collabo-
rators as an agronomist but also ‘tracing a clean person through a spicciola 
[minor but detailed] research on what people said’ about those who could 
become the cooperative’s prospective collaborators. He described this 
process as ‘a small-time control [controllo spiccio] that I do myself, often 
the most important one, as it reaches to webs of contacts the prefec-
ture cannot arrive at’. He generally inquired of local providers or similar 
contacts ‘what is said in the village’ about the prospective collaborators 
or workers. Through this kind of gossiping, the cooperative established 
some security with regard to their next moves in ‘dealing with people 
who are clean’.
I accompanied Piero in his car as he drove to Camo: his first task there 
was to establish whether the mill was sound and appropriate for the job. 
We went to the centre of Camo, a sizeable village, to meet inconspicu-
ously with a grain supplier to the cooperative and ask him what he knew 
about the olive mill. Although the supplier hardly knew anything, he 
introduced Piero confidentially to the owner of the bar where they took 
their coffee. The barman told us he trusted ‘the anti-mafia’: he himself 
was a member of the Addiopizzo organisation of anti-racket retailers. His 
choice to join the Addiopizzo had resulted in his bar being burnt down by 
the main local mafioso clan of the village a year ago – the state had helped 
out with subsidies for reconstruction. Piero knew from this that the 
barman would be very much attuned to local gossip regarding mafia alle-
giances. Indeed, when asked, the barman revealed that the supplier with 
whom the Falcone cooperative was about to sign a partnership contract 
collaborated with that local mafia clan. The relationship with the mafiosi- 
brokers guaranteed the olive mill owner a steady supply of olives and a 
loyal clientele as a result of the mafia’s social influence.9 The cooperative 
cancelled the agreement with the olive mill. Piero explained to me that
small talk in bars is the most efficient way to find out about people’s cleanli-
ness; the whispers you hear here and there make you aware of local doings. 
Of course, we do not want to collaborate with a supplier who walks arm in 
arm with these people [‘vá a bracceto con questi’].
The cases of Pino’s and Piero’s ‘signalling’, as well as the Camo vignette, 
highlight the fundamental assumption I identified regarding gossip in 
San Giovanni: sharing information is precisely about information shar-
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ing. In the context of anti-mafia gossip, people speak about who speaks 
to whom. This metatalk renders gossip a prominent material resource for 
what I am calling the process of constituting the co-ops as enclaves in 
Spicco Vallata – the administrators’ intellectual and cultural labour of set-
ting moral borders. Moreover, it is a means of accessing further material 
resources, thus forming part of the ongoing social arrangements for con-
stituting the anti-mafia cooperatives. By clearly dividing local social rela-
tions into distinct moral universes, access to the cooperatives is ensured 
only to those free from contaminating contact with mafiosi.
In these conditions, anti-mafia cooperatives rendered rumours and 
gossip an instrument of internal policymaking and an even further affir-
mation of the administrators’ leading role in them. The role of gossip as 
fundamental in reputation-building is widely documented (Ghosh 1996; 
Kirsch 2010). What is original in the case of the anti-mafia cooperatives 
is the way tracking gossip in the gendered spaces of the bars is linked 
to processes of separating the cooperatives from their broader social 
ambience. Where anthropological accounts have characterised gossip as 
a resource for accumulating reputation (Engle Merry 1997), here gossip is 
a resource in a different way: a means of exclusion/inclusion in the work 
of creating a bounded universe shielded behind ‘moral borders’, which 
diverged from local values. However, the attempt to construct work and 
experience horizontality within the cooperatives – an important ideal – 
is trumped by the use of gossip by the administrators, as it separates 
cooperatives from local people, including the workers of the coopera-
tives themselves, thereby forming a hierarchy of reputations in which 
the administrators, because they are ‘free’ of any local connections, 
come to be the local representation of an ‘uncontaminated’ anti-mafia 
element.
Schneider and Schneider’s classic monograph proposed that ‘control 
over networks’ is the source of the mafia’s brokerage power (1976). In a 
more recent book, they identified hierarchical ‘reputational networks’ as 
an important means of social cohesion in Sicily, which impacts produc-
tion and reproduction patterns, building people’s and families’ ‘respect-
ability’ (1996: 195–96). The tremendously important discussion on the 
pentiti (informators, literally: repentants) among the Sicilian mafia is also 
telling, especially when the mafia confession is seen as a gift to the state 
(Moss 2001). Rumour has been a central anti-mafia resource, one the state 
has drawn from since the 1930s in order to capture and isolate mafiosi 
(Coco 2013). The information leaked by mafia repentants, although det-
rimental for their own reputation, was a main source of understanding 
the mafia (Allum 2006; Dino 2011). Indeed a cognitive anthropology of 
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the mafia might imply paying attention to leaked information. Such data 
allows one to imagine the organisation through confessional narrative. 
It is a method that works its way back from repenting mafiosi in order 
to construct a broader historical framework in which mafia selfhood is 
located (Rakopoulos 2017b).
My ethnographic discussion builds on these insights. Utilising rep-
utational networks, administrators of anti-mafia cooperatives render 
gossip a resource, appropriating it from the local context to use against 
the mafia. These networks mediate categories of cleanliness, as well as 
anti-mafia that are further linked to other resources (land and labour) 
available through the cooperatives. Focusing on the flows of discourse 
and the modes of communication helped them to construct the binary 
mafia/anti-mafia and their conceptual separation in daily discourse.
As noted above, cooperative members instrumentalised information 
gathered through gossip as often as state actors did, although with more 
effective penetration of local networks. The gossip character of such com-
munication was often seen as a way to ‘know a territory’ and infiltrate 
those spheres of information considered too intimate for the state to 
reach. The discourse of ‘cleanliness’ creates a difference from state actors, 
demarcating (in sensorial terms) the social ambience of the anti-mafia 
cooperatives. Whereas gossip and rumours blur the boundaries within 
which the people of the cooperatives were meant to act, they were also 
used to register people on one or the other ‘sides’. This was also true of 
the ‘signalling’ of the cooperatives and the Camo vignette.
Gossip in Spicco Vallata meant both to tell stories (gossip with a nar-
rative) and to talk about talking (gossip about who talks with whom). 
The anti-mafia cooperatives’ administrators mainly utilised the latter 
form to identify who was a mafia affiliate. Gossip thus helps to set the 
limits of the law’s applicability in that it conveys meta-information. In that 
respect, when a person was thought to have had contact (i.e., speak to, 
share words with) with someone recognised as a mafioso in legal terms, 
that person would be excluded from the cooperatives. Using gossip to 
strategise the next moves of a cooperative meant identifying people’s 
location in specific flows of information in their villages. These flows 
corresponded to networks of acquaintances, affiliations and sympathies.
Gossip consequently entailed controlling channels of cleanliness – as 
mafia contamination transmits through words – through sharing infor-
mation and talking with people perceived as contaminated. There is more 
interest in speech about speech, in knowing who spoke to whom than 
what they said. Gossip appears as metatalk to seal co-ops’ enclave borders, 
checking on alliances and liasons. Words here, as in the Bocage (Favret-
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Saada 1980), are not dangerous because of their content but because of 
their mere existence, addressing someone considered potentially contam-
inating. The usage of platforms evoking and conveying informal informa-
tion in the form of gossip construed cooperatives’ ethical positionality. 
This included the use of indirect communication, rumours, whispers and 
gestures, as well as of the purity-and-danger language of contamination. 
Reproducing a clear distinction between ‘the mafia’ and ‘the anti-mafia’, 
administrators employed gossip to distinguish sharply betwwen these 
two ‘moral universes’. This has had impacts on the work relations of the 
cooperatives, in the process of the administrators’ seclusion behind the 
iron cage that these ‘moral universes’ construed.
(Far from) Moral borders
Informal information in the form of gossip is surely important in the 
everyday lives of locals, mafiosi, state authorities and the cooperatives’ 
administrators. But it also involves contradictions. First, the ways gossip 
was used creates fuzziness in the mafia/anti-mafia distinction. As people 
in the village’s bars circulated flows of information construed to lie in 
the zone between mafia and anti-mafia, gossip was a vector of resources 
for locals (barmen and mafiosi in particular) and for state authorities. 
Anthropologists inhabit that area inside and outside of the law (cf. Harris 
1996; Di Bella 2011). That area constitutes a grey zone permeating the 
cooperative endeavour in Spicco Vallata. Secondly, the administrators 
rendered gossip a medium of separation in their need to quarantine 
co-ops from ‘malignant’ or ‘contaminating’ features of local society. As 
has been discussed regarding food activism, the use of gossip was for 
administrators part of their attempts at protective seclusion.
That type of enclaving was particularly the case in San Giovanni, where 
administrators perceived mafiosi and people affiliated to them as a threat 
of contamination with local livelihoods. As the administrators came 
from networks unrelated to San Giovanni, their use of local information 
secured and consolidated their positions in the cooperatives. They par-
ticipated in gossip flows not in order to engage with the life of the local 
community but to identify local mafia affiliations and distinguish them-
selves from them. Their idioms of contamination and cleanliness served 
this aim.
This point feeds into my general argument about the specificities of 
the division of labour of the anti-mafia cooperatives. The outcome of how 
(and to whom) people speak to strategise the next moves of a cooperative 
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implied locating people in flows of affiliations and sympathies in their 
villages: ‘whispers’ around local people often challenged their position 
and status. The flows of gossip functioned as the demarcator of their 
‘moral universe’; alluding to contamination was a means of securing this 
universe’s boundaries. Gossip sits comfortably alongside views of food 
or practices of kinning and dekinning across the co-op workforce and 
reminds us of the material realities that information and ideas of contam-
ination are imbued with and embedded in.
For instance, as explained, the administrators commuted to San 
Giovanni in the morning and returned to Palermo in the evening. The 
cooperatives were their work space; Palermo was their home. The sep-
aration of work from kinship links is a fundamental premise on which 
activities such as gossip-tracking are based. This separation is an axis of 
the antithesis between the two teams of the cooperatives, reproducing 
unequal relations within them. In the following chapter, I suggest fur-
ther ways to tackle this moral and practical facet of the co-op division of 
labour. Like institutions existing outside and around cooperatives, like 
kinship or indeed rumours and reputation, paid and unpaid work must 
be taken seriously if we want to fully comprehend the extent and nature 
of cooperativist realities – in Sicily and beyond.
NOTES
1. The core of my ethnographic attention in describing and analysing gossip is 
verbal communication – taking gossip stricto sensu, as speech about speech. 
However, throughout the chapter I also refer to non-verbal communication 
that accompanied verbal gossip, as these discursive means are part of the 
broader framework of indirect communication in which cooperative members 
are locally entrenched.
2. The phrase is situated right at the opening of this story (page 4).
3. A bar in Italy, unlike the use of the termin English, is a coffeehouse, where 
espresso is consumed while patrons usually stand; sweets and pastries are also 
on sale; there are a few tables available and perhaps a couple of newspapers. 
Most of the clientele spend just a few minutes in a bar, the time it takes to 
consume a coffee shot, while others, locals to specific bars, hang out there for 
hours, especially in bars that have a gaming room at the back, where elder 
men would play cards. (Here, when referring to more than one bar, I use the 
term ‘bars’ in order to avoid confusion (in Italian, the plural is bar). 
4. Incidentally, this perspective offers a potential counterpoint to Anderson’s 
notion of ‘print-capitalism’ (2006: 37, 48): the convergence of capitalism and 
print technology in spreading information and eventually in nation-building.
5. The term ‘great man’ is used as an analytical category in the anthropology of 
Africa (Bayart 2009) and reminds us of the Melanesian Big Men (Godelier 1986); 
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it is operative in discussions about historical agency of people and collectivi-
ties (Sahlins 2004). In the context of this ethnography, ‘great men’ or ‘gentle-
men’ (i grandi, i signori, i cappoccia) were emic designations to speak of mafiosi. 
6. The gendered element is prominent in analyses of indirectness (Hendry and 
Watson 2001). The entirely male-centred bar of Sicily, not much unlike the 
tavern elsewhere, becomes the locus of sociability in the form of  commensality, 
dominated by codes of male ‘hearty’ friendship in Mediterranean ethnogra-
phies (e.g., Papataxiarchis 1991; Almeida 1996; Desai and Killick 2010). 
7. Sperber (1996) suggests a hierarchy of senses, ranging from sight at one 
extreme, which has the most rudimentary terminology based on it (colour 
words), to smell at the other, which is evocative since all one can say is that 
something smells like something else. Akin to symbolism, smell evokes a field 
of associations; it relates to connotation instead of denotation (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995). The emic idea of embodying smell (mafia stench) as an attribute 
people carried with them underlines the intuitive basis they evoked to think 
of mafia.
8. ‘College’ is a popular slang term, referring to ‘prison’, and suggesting the 
educative potential of the prison for mafiosi – educational in terms of criminal 
experience.
9. There is an apparent conflict of values here: what wins a good reputation for 
some, mafiosity, is seen as a contra-indicator by Piero.
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Chapter 7
░ ‘Wage Is Male – But Land Is a 
Woman’
The anti-mafia co-ops’ division of labour is solidified by the most unex-
pected external factors. Gossip in the specific sense of who is talking with 
whom might be one of the most surpising: it became a major resource 
for administrators, in its capacity to identify people with whom the 
cooperatives could collaborate. This further separated the adminis-
trators from their local co-members in the cooperatives, as it forged 
an anti-mafia cooperativism suspicious of local practices – including 
kinship (as seen in chapter 5) but with some appropriation of local 
practices to police the moral borders of the co-ops, as discussed in the 
previous chapter.
But distribution and hierarchy of labour in the co-ops is mainly about 
labour – and indeed, I shall argue here, labour taking place outside the 
co-op environment. This book opened with a vignette on the standardi-
sation of labour that co-ops brought to Spicco Vallata. Here, I discuss the 
interactions between the ‘standardisation’ of people’s registered work 
status (i.e., the legal regularisation of labour relations) in the anti-mafia 
cooperatives and their supplementary informal activities in pursuit of 
a better livelihood. Local practices aimed at guaranteeing households’ 
livelihood security have evolved alongside the cooperatives’ standardised 
employment. These practices involve ‘ghostly’ activities (Smith 1987); 
these activities, as shown later, are often illicit and indeed in line with the 
local mafia’s ‘ideologies’ (Lupo 2015: 161–84). People’s struggles to main-
tain the regular, cooperative wage work alongside these local practices 
make the official, visible political economy converge with an invisible 
and strongly gendered realm of local livelihood practices.
Local co-op members’ ‘mixed’ statuses as employee/wage earners and 
independent peasant proprietors are at once reinforced and contested 
by the standardisation promoted by cooperatives. Their informality is 
exacerbated by the legalistic regulations of a work culture brought in 
from the co-ops, presenting their members with new problematics in the 
lives of their households. In the case of registering land in wives’ names, 
standardisation, ironically, facilitated the flow of unemployment benefits 
that could be classified as illicit.
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‘Standardisation’ and Work in the Fields
Most cooperative administrators were convinced that the process of 
formally valuing agricultural waged work and promoting labour rights 
would be accompanied by ideological change. Luca told me that ‘once a 
labour regime is standardised, it would drag peasants away from mafia 
sympathies. . . . Their ideas will follow their conditions of living’.1 This 
normalisation/standardisation involved a net pay of at least 51.62 euros 
per day (plus an extra 7–9 euros for specialised skills such as ‘tractor 
driver’), as well as taxes plus national insurance contributions accumu-
lated towards pensions.
The braccianti of the cooperatives were also smallholders alongside 
their cooperative employment. They earned wages from the cooperatives 
by working in the confiscated land plots and also worked on their own 
land tracts (pezzi di terra), mostly vineyards.2 Most of them, when I asked, 
acknowledged that the pay from the cooperatives was ‘pretty good’ – 
but they always added that it was ‘not enough’. A part of their income 
came from selling their own grapes to the local wineries, such as the 
Santoleone, of which they were also producer-members. As independ-
ent producers, they called themselves contadini (‘peasants’), a term that 
encompassed all landowners, regardless of the production scale (their 
mean landholding was a modest 3.5 hectares).
Loredana, a thirty-five-year-old female administrator for the Borsellino 
cooperative, was sceptical about the extent to which the standardisa-
tion of labour ‘could work’, querying whether local workers took it seri-
ously. She complained to me, mocking the Sicilian dialect of cooperative 
workers:
When local people applied to join the cooperatives, they expected the stable 
job,3 . . . integration into a system of a stable monthly wage [u trabbagghiu 
fissu . . . a sistemazione]. . . . I have discussed with all members about their 
views of what the pay and the overall remuneration might be like. People 
think that by entering the co-op they have found a steady wage. This condi-
tion is an expected Sicilian disease.
Silvio, the president of the cooperative, shared this view of his col-
leagues, and indeed he thought the workers’ attitude to demand a steady 
wage was counterproductive.4 The production-team members regarded 
these two young and educated administrators as ignorant of agricultural 
matters despite the fact that they were the cooperative’s agronomists and 
the only members with a degree. They thought that the administrators’ 
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insistence on ‘promoting the standardisation’ was naïve if they could 
not back it up with a full monthly wage for all members, administrators 
and workers alike. The explanation administrators gave for the fact that 
they – unlike everyone in the manual cooperative workforce, apart from 
three member-workers of Falcone – received a monthly wage was that 
agrarian work was seasonal, unlike their work, which necessitated their 
constant presence in the office throughout the year.
Unlike Gianpiero, Silvio, Loredana and other cooperative administra-
tors and representatives, whose views on pay were often disliked by local 
workers, I was frequently invited to homes of sangiovannari to spend 
time and discuss their experience of wage work with the cooperatives. 
I soon found that what people mostly wanted to talk about, perhaps 
heated by the flow of their homemade wine at the dinner table, was their 
experiences of working their own plots rather than their paid work for 
the cooperatives. I spent large parts of my fieldwork working alongside 
them in the cooperatives’ vineyards, joining teams of five to fifteen men 
every other morning throughout December, April, August and September 
(months of intense agricultural work). In that context, I witnessed their 
sense of pride in working on ex-mafia confiscated land.5
The cooperatives modelled the recruitment strategies for their manual 
workforce teams on the gendered distribution of labour common in 
Illustration 7.1: Workers in the vineyards, applying wire over the vines. Photo 
by Diego Orlando.
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Spicco Vallata. The absence of women on every plot of the cooperative 
land informed the manual workers’ work identity. Manliness in turn 
was fundamental to the definition of their worker subjectivities and was 
also a form of loose celebration of their class identity. Men experienced 
working the soil of the cooperatives’ plots as an expression of mascu-
linity. Their work discourse often evoked stamina and courage – here 
seen as especially masculine characteristics – which they thought were 
needed to undertake not only the labour process but also the ‘anti-mafia 
burden’. In both the manual and the anti-mafia aspect of their labour as 
fieldhands, they distinguished their work experience sharply from those 
‘of the office’.
Working on the confiscated land was thus ‘even more masculine’, Enzo 
noted.6 These understandings formed bonds of camaraderie among work-
ers and established their practice of calling each other ‘compare’ (godpar-
ent, but also metaphorically, comrade). This condition also underlined the 
distance between the administration and manual workforce teams, mark-
ing the cooperatives’ division of labour. Often, men working in the vine-
yards recited sexist jokes to contrast themselves to the ‘kids in the office’ or 
to celebrate the manual labourer’s manhood compared to the ambiguous 
manliness of the ‘pen pusher’.
Illustration 7.2: Falcone workers about to take a cigarette break in the 
vineyards. Photo by Diego Orlando.
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Through masculinity, the braccianti emphasised the moral superiority 
of their work experiences, which they brought into their new identities 
as wage workers in the cooperative ambience. Phrases like ‘one poor 
man’s cock is better than that of one hundred rich men’ celebrated the 
presumed sexual capacities of ‘the peasant’ and the abilities of manual 
labour, while associations between their own work making the land 
fertile were also rife. At the same time, they often used self-mockery to 
ridicule the exclusively male work of the countryside and derided the 
exclusively male world of the fields (‘In the village you get pussy, in 
the plot arse’). Men asserted that promiscuity and sexual potency were 
‘naturally’ stimulated by work in the open air, whereas they considered 
the ‘closed’ environment of the administrative team’s office unhealthy 
and emasculating.
Despite this overt manliness, they emphasised their fidelity and family- 
oriented ethics, which ‘anchored’ them, as they said, to their homes (and 
anti-mafia family idioms). As Pippo Pitrè put it, ‘in the village, we refrain 
from these jokes: we are faithful to our wives and honour their presence 
in our households’.7 Men’s experience of their employment in the coop-
eratives was not only masculinised as a daring political activity but it also 
fed into their family-oriented livelihoods.
Male workers hardly ever talked about their wives’ contributions to 
their household income. Importantly though, the idea that the wages 
earned in the co-ops’ field-work were a manly endeavour was juxtaposed 
to what they saw as their wives’ ‘land property’. Pippo had put it perfectly 
in a telling phrase: ‘Wage is male – but land is a woman’. The phrase sym-
bolically indicates that what the men called the position of ‘the wife’ (‘a 
mugghieri’) was fundamental for the constitution of the household econ-
omy. They also alluded to ‘other income sources’ coming from ‘the posi-
tion of the wife’, which helped with their households’ financial needs.
Pippo and his cooperative colleagues, second- or third-generation plot 
owners, had become mainly wage earners. The factors at play in this pro-
cess stemmed from the coexistence of farm earnings with wage income. 
This was itself the consequence of the recent transformation that the 
cooperatives had brought about, as they hired peasants under standard-
ised contractual employment terms. But I did wonder what these ‘other 
income sources’ were that men kept mentioning. Were they linked to the 
standardisation process that cooperatives brought to waged work, intro-
duced into local discourse by the administrators? The clue to answering 
these questions seemed to lie with the status of land tenure for the coop-
erative workers’ households.
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Registration of Land to Wives
The Pitrè and Riceli Families: Work, Plots, Benefits
I became increasingly aware that households had other sources of income 
alongside daily wages from the cooperatives and their earnings from sell-
ing the grapes from their vineyards to the local wineries. Many inform-
ants mentioned unemployment benefits and wages from other sources 
of agricultural work. From discussions, therefore, I identified a fourfold 
income for cooperative workers’ families: cooperative wages; the trading 
of their grapes to wineries; waged work; and, exclusive to daily workers, 
unemployment benefits. At the beginning, I thought it odd that people 
were cooperative workers and landowners and yet eligible to claim ben-
efits, as they told me they were. In Italy, being registered as unemployed 
while owning and running a firm, such as a farm, however small, is pro-
hibited by law.
As noted, domestic arrangements in Spicco Vallata were usually organ-
ised around a nuclear family with landownership as the central feature 
of familial economic life. In the majority of the households I studied, 
I visited the homes of cooperative workers or people affiliated to the 
cooperatives who were all members of nuclear-family-based households. 
Commensality and co-residence of a family were the primary factors 
denoting the limits of the households, which were consequently concep-
tually identical to the limits of the family. There were cases of both viri-
local and uxorilocal households among the twenty-five for which I have 
detailed data, but the fact was not central to people’s own understanding 
of family life. Inter-generational co-residence was also surprisingly rare, 
occurring in only three local families where the cooperative member was 
not married.
Most households were composed of a husband (the effective land 
proprietor and waged worker), a wife (housewife and sometimes in irreg-
ular waged employment, and also the nominal landowner, as explained 
below) and children, whether of school age or slightly older (study-
ing, working in waged employment or helping with the family plots). 
Despite women’s absence from agricultural work and their restriction 
to the domestic sphere, the households’ ‘family firms’ (aziende) were 
registered to wives who routinely appeared as capoaziende (i.e., owners of 
the family’s land). Conversely, husbands, who were the actual managers 
of the plots, were called capofamiglie (family heads), a title descriptive of 
the domestic sphere rather than that of economic enterprise. The econo-
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misation of the domestic and the domestication of the economy cannot 
be missed here.
Male power is vested by the state: male heads are made answerable 
to the state, since the household as an institution becomes visible to the 
state through the identification of one person who represents it. Harris 
calls this process ‘a partial devolution of power to adult males’ (Harris 
1984: 59). In Spicco Vallata, this devolution has been forged in terms of 
wives, as those who are accountable for the household’s landownership, 
although this condition did not reflect a matriarchal organisation of the 
household.
Pippo and Maria Pitrè, a couple from San Giovanni, were the first to 
explain to me the details of the gap between legal title and the actual 
practice of land tenure, as I spent a considerable amount of time in their 
home. This ethnographic data confirms Jeff Pratt’s findings from Italy, 
where he notes, ‘Those who do have joint property rights in land do not 
necessarily produce together’ (1994: 104).8 Of course, the term property 
rights in Sicily does not reflect the actual ownership of the plots and is 
only nominal. My findings are also in line with Pratt’s on how agrarian 
transformations (in his case in Tuscan agriculture) led to wage labour 
eventually becoming the main source of income for rural families (1994: 
66). Pippo and Maria’s story can help elucidate the point here.
Pippo, a sangiovannaro, fifty-eight years old when I met him, used to be 
a member of the Borsellino cooperative but had resigned a few months 
earlier (due to conflicts with the administration over the fact that, as 
a member-worker, he did not receive a monthly wage). He eventually 
decided to go back to work as a daily labourer for the Falcone, as he 
needed the money. I rented the apartment he owned at the centre of the 
village. 
Elena, Maria and Pippo’s daughter, always left dinner early to study 
for the university entrance exams in her room. The fact that she had 
chosen Parma (an Emilian city) for her studies reflected her father’s 
involvement in the cooperative, ideologically inspired by Emilian ‘red 
cooperativism’.9 However, when talking about how the family would 
finance Elena’s studies, Pippo barely mentioned his cooperative pay. 
Rather, the plan depended on the year’s harvest turnover: he talked 
more about harvest expenses, including wages paid to friends who 
would help, than his own wage from Falcone.
Maria was a return migrant to the village. Her parents had left San 
Giovanni at a young age as landless peasants, before the agrarian reform 
of 1953. They had immigrated to Argentina,10 where Maria was born and 
raised. She went to live permanently in Sicily in 1985, marrying into the 
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Pitrès, to whom she was related, hardly knowing anyone else and having 
no family assets to her name. When she married Pippo (her second cousin), 
her dowry did not include any land at all. The Pitrès themselves were a 
relatively poor family, whose assets included a house and four hectares 
of vineyard that Pippo had inherited from his father, acquired initially 
through the 1953 reform. Nevertheless, she appeared on the title deeds as 
the owner of the Pitrè family’s plots. ‘I had nothing waiting for me here, 
when I emigrated,’ she clarified. ‘It was my husband who sort of gave his 
plots to me. . . . We agreed for him to transfer them to be registered in my 
name, and here I am, owning four hectares today’. The transfer had taken 
place as soon as the couple married in 1986, as happened with most peas-
ant families. The scheme was widely practised in the area, and the reason 
for it, I was told, was tax avoidance. Registering land to wives minimised 
the couple’s joint tax liability, as the assets were shared between hus-
band and wife.11 The practice of female landownership, discussed below, 
rather than being ‘traditional’ as it was called locally, dated back to when 
tax avoidance started around the mid-1950s (in the post-agrarian reform 
impetus) for most local families, as it did with the Pitrès.
On several different occasions I asked Pippo the same question I asked 
both manual daily workers and member-workers: what were the specific 
sources of his family’s income, given that Maria was not in waged employ-
ment? Like most other daily workers, Pippo worked for the Falcone coop-
erative for about one hundred days a year, earning an annual net income 
of about 5,200 euros. The wage he received from the cooperative for 
those workdays provided the basic subsistence for the family. The Pitrès 
budgeted around that ‘family wage’, as they called it. Unlike the steady 
wage from the cooperative, farming involved risk and unpredictability 
and therefore could not be reliably determined. Pippo, like others, calcu-
lated that the cooperative wage provided for roughly 40 per cent of their 
annual income, while farm earnings yielded around another 20 per cent. 
He was disappointed about the fact that, with the dire prices of the grape 
varieties he cultivated (Cattaratto, Viognier and Nero D’Avola), he had to 
sell a kilogram of grapes for 0.20 euros to the big Santoleone winery of 
the area (see table 7.1). The rest of their income came from ‘other sources’, 
apparently related to his wife’s position in the household economy, on 
the one hand, and to his relations with other peasants on the other. This 
is what he initially told me as we worked together at the cooperative’s 
vineyards. Working at his friends’ vineyards, exchanging labour and cash 
with them, provided another 20 per cent of his earnings. Therefore, 
the family’s livelihood was planned according to a multi-source income, 
sources that seemed connected to each other.
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Table 7.1: Santoleone Grape Prices, in Eurocents














GRECANICO E DAMASCHINO 20.00
Source: Santoleone cantina cooperativa, 2008
Figures: eurocents per kilogram
At our third dinner, he finally disclosed that the rest of the family’s 
income (the final 20 per cent) stemmed from the fact that the plots 
were registered to Maria and had been since 1986. What he, like other 
men, had mentioned to me while working in the vineyards about ‘other 
sources’ now made sense: it was state welfare provision. This came in 
the form of unemployment benefits for Pippo, who legally appeared as 
unemployed for roughly 250 days a year. The fact that his waged work 
was now officially registered with the state made him eligible for benefits 
for the days of the year he did not work. In fact, a good 20 per cent of 
the Pitrè household’s income came from this source. However, if Pippo 
had the farm registered to him, he would not have been eligible for these 
benefits, as he would have appeared to the state as a professional farmer. 
When Pippo started to engage in registered waged employment for the 
cooperatives in 2000, he immediately became officially employed and 
therefore entitled to security, pension and welfare benefits. When asked 
about this, he commented that ‘here in Spicco Vallata, everything is a 
bluff’ (é tutto una truffa ccà).
The incorporation of local male peasants into daily waged employment 
for the cooperatives thus consolidated the pre-existing informal practice 
of ‘traditional’ female landownership, grafting on further positive attrib-
utes. What was already a widely deployed practice by peasant house-
holds, apparently for tax purposes, had become an unexpected source of 
additional income. Locals thought that state policies imposed structural 
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constraints on their households (taxation) and therefore felt justified in 
using these strategies, pointing as well to the lack of welfare provision 
for housewives. In Spicco Vallata, as in the rest of Italy, women working 
as housewives were not recognised as workers in the state’s employment 
registers. Hence, they could not claim unemployment benefits, although, 
according to state regulations they were not in employment;12 in fact, 
they were eligible to claim only the lowest, ‘pauper’, ‘social pension’ of 
160 euros a month when they reached sixty years of age. For this reason, 
the Pitrès planned ahead, taking advantage of the couple’s sixteen-year 
age difference to improve Maria’s pension. With Pippo due to retire in a 
few years, they planned to arrange a reverse transfer of the land’s own-
ership, from Maria to Pippo; he would then head the azienda himself and 
‘hire’ her as an employee until she became entitled to her pension. This 
way, she would be able to put together some years of registered employ-
ment, over this time paying the minimal state contributions to be eligible 
for a pension when she ‘retired’. She did not actually intend to work on 
the farm in her fifties; in fact, like most married women in San Giovanni, 
she had hardly visited the plots she owned.
Similarly to the Pitrès, other anti-mafia families with this household 
livelihood pattern also followed the strategy of nominal female land-
ownership. In the Riceli family, from the village of Bocca, all three of 
the male family members were employed by the cooperative. The father, 
Enzo, after years of cooperative employment, had brought his sons into 
the cooperative through his raccomandazioni. Santa, Enzo’s wife, did only 
petty jobs for the co-op on a daily contract basis and never worked in the 
fields. ‘Agricultural labour is not for us women – everyone knows this in 
Spicco Vallata,’ she clarified when I asked her.
Santa was proud, however, to be the capoazienda of her ‘anti-mafia 
family’. The Ricelis owned a couple of vineyards that they had bought 
when they returned from Switzerland, where they had lived for twelve 
years, between 1985 and 1997. Enzo had initiated the idea of moving to 
Switzerland because, he said, hard as he had tried, he could not find 
work in construction jobs in Bocca; Santa had agreed, and two years after 
they married, when they were both twenty-four, they emigrated there. 
The 1980s saw a sudden burst of public works construction in Spicco 
Vallata, where a significant amount of Cosa Nostra’s heroin profits was 
invested, for money-laundering purposes13 (Sterling 1991; Stille 1996). 
Such works included the Palermo-Sciacca highway, which today passes 
just outside San Giovanni. Enzo told me that workers were paid cash-
in-hand by mafiosi middlemen, precisely to facilitate the mafiosi’s money 
laundering.
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Most of the workers on such schemes were peasants: grape prices were 
dropping in the mid-1980s, and construction work was more profitable 
than cultivating vines. Enzo himself had worked on the Bocca reservoir 
construction project but became disillusioned with how much the pro-
ject was controlled by the mafia, and so he sold the two-hectare vineyard 
that he had inherited from his father and went to Zurich with Santa. 
Their son Ciccio was born there shortly after, and Lino three years later. 
When they returned to Sicily in 1997, they immediately bought four hec-
tares of healthy vineyard close to Bocca, with the official purchase being 
registered in Santa’s name for the usual tax reasons.
In the case of the Pitrès, the transfer of land from husband to wife took 
place at the time of their marriage in 1986. For the Ricelis, the family’s 
investment in land, after their return migration, was directly registered 
to the wife, Santa, in 1997. She was therefore, from 1997, a capoazienda in a 
Table 7.2: Two Families’ Incomes (numbers are approximate)
Pitrès Ricelis
Family members Pippo: working in 
co-op
Maria and Elena: not 
working
Enzo: member-worker on 
permanent wage
Lino: member-worker on daily wage
Ciccio: daily worker working in 
co-op
Santa: working occasionally







[each member kept most of his or 
her own earnings]
Privately owned 












2,300 euros annually Enzo: 2,000 euros
Lino: 1,000 euros
Ciccio: 1,000 euros




Enzo: no benefits, as he was 
in permanent, continuous 
employment, on a monthly wage
Santa: no benefits, as annual 
workdays to make her eligible did 
not suffice
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household with three men who joined the wage employment of the coop-
eratives; this conscious family plan began with Enzo in 2000, and the sons 
followed in 2005. Although Santa appeared as the landowner, Enzo and 
Santa clarified, when sharing their life stories with me, that the money 
for the land purchase came from Enzo’s waged work in Switzerland, and 
it was his idea to buy land in Bocca in the first place. Santa’s landown-
ership ‘produced’ benefits in this ‘anti-mafia family’ only for the daily 
worker Lino, as Ciccio and Enzo, who were cooperative member-workers 
(indeed, Enzo was one of the very few member-workers on permanent 
wage), were never registered as unemployed.
Wives as Landowners in Anti-mafia Families: State, Mafia, 
and Local Codes
The case studies of the Pitrè and the Riceli households are characteristic 
of the broad pattern among anti-mafia families in Spicco Vallata: in all 
households for which I have data, where at least one member worked for 
the cooperatives, the married woman, as the nominal capoazienda, had all 
the landed property in her name.14 This not only includes land brought 
to households of anti-mafia families through the wife’s marriage dowry 
(as was the case with Tano, a Falcone cooperative worker, and his Tarini 
family) but also households where the wife brought no property at all to 
her new household.
Registering land to wives was established practice for both anti-mafia 
families and mafia-affiliated families. These strategies are therefore con-
tinuities of practice in which local cultural codes are sustained under 
anti-mafia cooperativism, despite the cooperativist model, and solidified 
in a standardised political economy of waged employment as proposed 
by administrators.
Married women embraced their exclusion from working in the fields: 
Santa and Maria felt that joining men in farm work would be ‘absurd’. 
Rita Giuffrè also emphasised to me that, although her brother Carelli, her 
husband Paolo and her future son-in-law Donato worked in the coopera-
tive’s vineyards, she was very happy that her paid work for minor tasks 
within the cooperative kept her away from the fields. The cooperatives 
also, as mentioned earlier, employed women for work in the agriturismi, 
the co-ops’ two country houses that operated as boutique hotels (as well 
as, of course, in the administrative teams).
There is an interesting issue here regarding the mafia’s role in shaping 
this gendered division of labour. Local people pointed to mafia proto-
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col specific to Spicco Vallata as a significant factor: the cultural influ-
ence of the monosexual mafia had led to the historical phenomenon 
of women being excluded from working in the fields. The example of 
Antonia Barbeto, analysed in chapter 9, may be taken as indicative of 
San Giovanni mafia norms: when her three male children were arrested 
and charged with being Cosa Nostra members, her stance on those of 
the family’s vineyards registered in her name accorded with the model 
of women’s absence from farm work – she simply abandoned the fields. 
Further evidence in support of this argument can be found through a local 
comparison. Workers such as Pippo or Enzo often contrasted the male 
monopoly on agricultural work in their Spicco Vallata villages with the 
neighbouring town of Alcamo, where women did work in the vineyards. 
Visiting the fertile Alcamo valley, just outside Spicco Vallata, I witnessed 
women working as field hands alongside their male family members 
myself. Importantly, in Alcamo, informants suggested that there had 
historically been different mafia configurations. Evidence from the local 
press confirmed these oral informal communications: seemingly women 
did have leading roles in Alcamo mafia. As soon as local male clan leaders 
were arrested, they were replaced by their wives, who thus moved from 
occupying roles in the home to fulfilling roles in the local mafia: ‘from 
family to clan’, as the local press noted (‘S’ 2009: 15).15 This could suggest 
that there is a correlation between female work activity in the fields and 
contingent characteristics of the Alcamo mafia.
In fact, directions of causality should be left open: it is probably the 
historical interaction between cultural codes local to Spicco Vallata and 
the mafia that explain this situation. Such practices are rooted in local-
ised labour regime histories that spill out of a framework of local political 
economy influenced to a degree by the mafia. In Alcamo, for instance, a 
different historical development of the mafia produced conditions where 
gender had different implications from San Giovanni. Despite the lack of 
grounded ethnographic data from Alcamo, there is evidence of women 
being active in the local mafia, fulfilling roles traditionally adopted by 
men, which relates to the fact that, in Alcamo, ‘female labour in the fields 
was not devalued’ (‘S’ 2009: 14).
Anthropology supporting a shift ‘from structure and agency to liveli-
hoods’ (Rigg 2007: 29–39) ‘draws on families’ strategies to position land-
ownership in an opaque status in order to guarantee their ‘livelihood 
security’ (Chambers 1998: 121). I have talked at some length in chapter 5 
about how cooperativist and familist idioms merge in the context of the 
Sicilian anti-mafia. But household-based accounts may be too blunt an 
instrument to explain why families in villages so close to each other, San 
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Giovanni and Alcamo, follow such differently gendered tactics regarding 
work. Pointing to the complexity of both internal and external factors, in 
Spicco Vallata women’s main income contribution to the livelihoods of 
their families was their position as ‘firm owners’ (capoaziende) – referring 
to the household land – largely through transfers of land that men had 
acquired through inheritance or purchase or as dowry in marriage and 
not through work in the fields. Ethnographic work from southern Italy, 
interestingly, confirms that the exclusion of women from farm labour is 
not a general characteristic of Sicily or of the greater area (Schneider and 
Schneider 1976; Assmuth 1997; Pratt 1994). Pratt notes that in sharecrop-
ping, women’s work was not ‘exclusively concerned with [home-based] 
activities’, and in fact [women] were not ‘isolated from a public world’ 
(Pratt 1994: 38; similarly, Silverman 1970). Their domestic work is inte-
grated in a wider system of political economy and indeed is organic to the 
functioning of its structure (Goddard 1996).
Joining anti-mafia cooperatives constituted a double mechanism for 
local families. On the one hand, it impacted on their status in the vil-
lage as anti-mafia families. For local men who worked as cooperative 
braccianti, this had further positive implications by boosting their feel-
ings of manliness. On the other hand, participating in the cooperatives’ 
regulated employment offered a surprising opportunity to sideline state 
regulations, as it was done in the face of the administrators’ claims 
to legality and regularisation of the local work regime.16 This widely 
adopted livelihood strategy entailed assuming the known risk of a state 
fine for benefit and pension deceit, since the government pursued legal 
enforcement on benefit fraud.17 Registering land to wives continued, 
nevertheless, as it now entailed a wide range of financial benefits for 
families related to state welfare policies.
This informal economy appears as a combination of employment and 
informal livelihood in the interweaving of the domestic with the broader 
political economy. Work is one example. Examining the PAYE (Pay as you 
earn) scheme in Britain, Mollona argues that the benefits provision, based 
on definitions of what counts as valid work, allowed and implicitly encour-
aged informal labour opportunities (2005). This logic also applies to the 
earlier discussion on the boundaries of home and work, which in this case 
also prove blurred, both within and outside the cooperatives’ framework.
The introduction of registered wage work in Spicco Vallata via the 
cooperatives (the ‘standardisation’), almost unpredented for the lives of 
many, affected the relations of their families with welfare state provi-
sions and policies. The sociological literature on labour regulation alludes 
to the Fordist security and stability of employment framework and the 
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accompanying labour rights (Beynon 1984), although this framework 
has long been abandoned in most EU countries. The normalisation that 
administrators talked about resonates with ethnographies of Eastern 
Europe describing people’s aspirations to become part of a ‘normal soci-
ety’ or sometimes speaking of ‘a return to normality’ (Rausing 2002: 127; 
see also page 17). 
 However, local people’s livelihoods were not ‘normalised’ or ‘standard-
ised’. This is the point on epistemological priorities that Chambers under-
lines: we risk error when institutional categories such as ‘employment’ 
count more than people’s actual livelihoods (2000). Men and women in 
Spicco Vallata negotiated the visibility of their ‘real’ roles vis-à-vis the 
state in such a way as to claim more income from its welfare policy. 
Continuing with the practice of land registration to women, they were 
able to accommodate the legal normalisation of the cooperative employ-
ment. One is reminded of the unintended consequences that arise when 
the ‘normative discourse’ of development agencies and the state fail to 
take local categories seriously – a James Ferguson (1994: 26) point as well 
as a leitmotif in our Sicilian story.
Formal, informal and no space in between
While formal employment remuneration through cooperative wages was 
not sufficient, people’s involvement in cooperatives added a surprising 
further source of annual income to families through unemployment ben-
efits, negotiated through the informal practice of registering wives as 
capoaziende. The forms of waged work in the cooperatives, articulated 
together with other, informal means of livelihood (made possible, indi-
rectly, through involvement with cooperatives) did bring transforma-
tions in people’s lives. This was not only because of the financial gains 
that labour standardisation brought to households but also because the 
regulation regime shifted the meaning of informal local practices.
This chapter has elucidated this interrelation of informal and formal 
economic practices, where ‘political economy’ and ‘livelihood practices’ 
are each an element within the other. Overall, participation in the coop-
eratives thus floods into people’s livelihoods in ways that cannot be con-
tained in the political economy of waged labour entailed in cooperativism. 
The rhetoric of a (single) model of anti-mafia cooperativism, assumed by 
administrators and state agents (the Consortium), failed to encompass 
the implicit model of cooperativism practised by workers – the experi-
ence of participating in cooperatives for their anti-mafia families.
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In these gendered household practices there are continuities in ‘cul-
tural codes’ between local and mafia contexts, as Schneider and Schneider 
(1976: 84) have suggested. Michael Blim provides a neat account of the 
Schneiders’ argument, claiming that, while they sought to
disassociate themselves from [Banfield’s] blaming of underdevelopment on 
the Southern Italian and Sicilian people and their familist values . . . , they 
did so ambiguously by arguing that . . . the cultural values so nearly the 
same as Banfield’s familist values were the consequence of as well as the 
response to powerlessness and economic failure. (Blim 2006: 9)
In other words, the problem was that a political-economy-focused 
analysis did not fully displace the ‘honour and shame’ literature, as it 
kept the premise of ‘cultural codes’. But such codes inspire practices 
that co- articulate with anti-mafia cooperativism (see chapter 5). The con-
temporary relevance of local codes lies in their dynamic character and 
development in a new context, alongside regulated wage labour. Just like 
how anti-mafia families formed, articulating conjugal household idioms 
to co-op employment, here the gendering of informal income opportuni-
ties outside official labour also articulates with co-op employment. This 
work outside labour, with its strongly gendered attributes, signals a sur-
vival of local codes associated not with honour and shame but with the 
shady figures of political  economy – the fragility of people’s livelihoods. 
This implies looking at the salience of the informal economy to deter-
mine the ways people pursued their income sources alongside registered 
work. Their livelihoods articulated with both informal and standardised 
means of income in order to guarantee a decent living, mainly because of 
the low level of the cooperatives’ wages, since most workers, as already 
noted, were not paid a monthly wage, unlike administrators. Workers’ 
interlocked condition ‘between’ informal and regulated activity became 
a matter of gendered household plans and political mobilisation – as will 
be seen in chapter 8. Defending the informality of such codes as a matter 
of community became a vital political idiom that mobilised sangiovannari, 
often alongside mafiosi.
The integration of male peasant-workers of Spicco Vallata into a regime 
of standardised regulation/registered work (‘employment’), then, affected 
the established livelihood practices of local households in different ways. 
On the one hand, it reinforced the practice of legally registering land to 
wives, and facilitating unemployment benefits for their husbands. On the 
other, the regime formed part of a broader state strategy to regulate and 
standardise labour relations, which resulted in the penalisation of local 
‘mutual aid’ labour schemes – the matter of the following chapter.
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NOTES
 1. Luca’s account here seems like a slightly ‘vulgar’, simplified Marxism or, 
indeed, the discourse of modernisation as changing mindsets through 
imposed restructuring of economic activity, as explored in post-colonial con-
texts in relation to moral economies (e.g., Taussig 2010 [1980]). 
 2. The co-articulation of waged labour and land cultivation meant that inform-
ants were at the same time both workers and independent peasant producers. 
There is a vast literature on people whose livelihoods combine peasant and 
worker statuses, including ethnographies of Italy (e.g., Pratt 1994; cf. 2003). 
This experience has been identified as a ‘mixed’ one according to the Portici 
school of sociology; in Emilia, the combination of farmer and labourer identi-
ties was incorporated within broader development plans (Mingione 1994). In 
Sicily, it has been linked with household subsistence but has not contributed 
to broader growth (Centorrino et al. 1999). Instead, this ‘mixed’ mode has 
remained in place as a way of sustaining the livelihood of local households, 
precisely due to the 1953 land reform, which fragmented land in small tracts, 
a situation reproduced in inheritance patterns. 
 3. Ethnographies of western Sicily stress how ‘the stable job’ was an idiom of 
the non-productive middle classes of the city rather than a characteristic term 
of the rural workforce (Cole 1997; Chubb 1989).
 4. As noted (see table 4.1), of the manual workforce’s members, only four out 
of ten in Falcone and none in the other cooperatives had a monthly wage; 
although all of them had permanent contracts, they were paid on a daily 
basis.
 5. I refer to both daily workers and member-workers as ‘workers’ in this chap-
ter, unless otherwise stated.
 6. This echoes ideas on the articulation of anti-mafia activity in terms of bravery 
(as hinted historically in chapter 3).
 7. Because of the gendered nature of my fieldwork, the fact that I am a man 
meant that I was not exposed to some of the gendered contradictions in 
households (Morris 1992), about which researchers should be cautious. I have 
not been able to draw much data for analogies with women’s get-togethers. 
The ethnographic discussion here does contribute further work on the sig-
nificance of men’s proverbs (Brandes 1980) in understanding husband-wife 
relationships. There are, indeed, many points to be made by studying these 
symbols, gestures and sayings among men in public spaces (such as the work-
place) to yield an idea of relations in the private space between husbands and 
wives (for Sicily: Blok 2000). Herzfeld underlines the performance of mascu-
linity in Crete (Herzfeld 1985). 
 8. Admittedly, a different history of land tenure (sharecropping as opposed 
to latifundia) as well as a more rigorously attentive exploration of a large 
 household sample by Pratt (1994) in Tuscany are key factors accounting for 
this marked differentiation. Having acknowledged this, I should stress once 
more that my research focused only on families of anti-mafia cooperative 
members. 
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 9. The consumer co-op representatives from Emilia who often visited San 
Giovanni influenced anti-mafia cooperative members, describing the wealth 
of Emilia. 
10. This toponym, like all others, has been changed to anonymise the case. 
11. This is an interesting ‘diverging devolution’ (Goody 1976: 21), implying 
inter-spouse trust. As with the Pitrès, I have tracked an additional sample 
of  twenty-two married families who followed this tactic; I have not heard of 
any couple who had separated, so I regrettably have no data to explore what 
happens in case of divorce. 
12. The fact that they were not ‘actively seeking waged work’ (understood as 
regular employment) is not relevant in this context; their husbands (and 
in some cases, like the Ricelis, their sons) while not seeking regular waged 
employment either, were receiving unemployment benefits.
13. San Giovanni mafiosi, especially Barbeto, were the key figures in international 
heroin trafficking at the time. 
14. It was not possible to use the Italian Land Cadaster (the national land registry) 
to establish the exact picture of land tenure in the village overall: one can 
refer to the Cadaster for details about any one specific plot but not all the plots 
of an area. When I consulted it, to establish the ownership history of some 
plots confiscated from mafiosi and bestowed on the cooperatives, I found that 
in fifteen out of nineteen cases the plots of the mafiosi were registered to 
women: wives or straw-women. 
15. I quote from the actively anti-mafia periodical ‘S’, an investigative weekly. 
The editor, whom I met, was a hardliner regarding mafia. For instance, he 
once told me that capital punishment should be introduced for mafiosi. Many 
articles, like the ones cited, for fear of mafia retaliations, were anonymous.
16. Pointing out contradictions in informants’ positionalities is not intended to 
somehow delegitimise them or diminish the importance of their efforts to 
improve the workings of the local economy. Highlighting the discrepancy 
between discourse and practice is useful because only by acknowledging it 
can we – anthropologists and informants together – start to understand the 
constraints and possibilities under which economic endeavours such as coop-
erativism take place.
17. This discussion proliferated later, related to the international discourse on the 
sovereign debt crisis, where it has been said that Italy’s (assumed) immense 
public deficit and adjunct sovereign debt are largely due to such schemes of 
employers’ contribution avoidance. 




This chapter discusses the nexus between personal relations and cooper-
atives, drawing from the tensions already described previously between 
labour in the co-ops and informal income opportunities around and out-
side their framework. Exposure to the demands of market institutions 
has been noted as the major factor in the development of hierarchies and 
unequal divisions of labour within cooperatives.
I just discussed how state and cooperatives unintentionally reproduce 
women’s roles as registered landowners because of the standardisation 
of labour the state and cooperatives promote. The cultural codes that 
surround these roles also reflect state policies (the benefits system) and 
cooperatives’ strategies (not hiring women as fieldhands) and are there-
fore relevant to both mafia and anti-mafia families. While registration of 
land to women was not a novel idiom but indeed a well-embedded cul-
tural practice considered foundational for local livelihoods and views of 
community life, the role of wives as capoaziende became more entrenched 
in the broader political economy when their husbands entered regulated 
employment, as it brought an unimpeded flow of unemployment bene-
fits for their husbands when needed.
The continuity in cultural codes shows itself to be compatible with 
cultural variation and pluralism in a changing Sicily (Schneider and 
Schneider 2006), which proves the historical dynamism of the concept 
as these codes adapt to novel circumstances – anti-mafia families, benefit 
strategies and the like. Inasmuch as it counts for employment, and all 
work within the household is non-valorised in monetary terms, register-
ing land to wives opened up the potential for more income opportunities 
as well as for stratification within co-ops.
The dynamics of such practices implies they can be open to manipu-
lation by powers external to the co-ops, including the mafia itself. After 
all, my overall analysis of dynamics within anti-mafia cooperatives avoids 
assuming that it is simply the influence of access to markets that com-
promises internal cooperative relations as well as the specific political 
role (‘anti-mafia’) that co-ops had locally. In this way, ‘community par-
ticipation’ appears more of a problem than a solution. The point here is 
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to demonstrate that cooperative participants may well belong to differ-
ent ‘communities’. Hence, appeals to cooperative ‘mutuality’ (Heckscher 
2015) can – unwittingly – very well contradict economic democracy in 
cooperativism. On the one hand, local workers of anti-mafia coopera-
tives are drawn towards ideas of community pertaining to alliances with 
localised, stratified struggles. Such peasant dissent, however, can repro-
duce unequal relations of power that can even reflect mafia rhetoric and 
practice. On the other hand, the co-op administrators’ understanding of 
community in state-sponsored ways also endangered the co-ops’ work 
relations.
Building on points already explored, the chapter hence proposes to 
rethink the dichotomy between ‘community’ and ‘wage employment’ as 
mutually dependent, albeit contradictory. The aim is to examine coopera-
tives within the tensions that their politicised anti-mafia principles create 
as they relate to their participants’ livelihoods. These principles are rooted 
in idealised versions of what community can stand for. Most of the data 
presented here relate to peasant mobilisations in Sicily, where co-op mem-
bers actively participated alongside mafiosi, guided by a sense of ‘commu-
nity’ radically different to the anti-mafia co-ops’ community ideology.
This begs for revisiting a widely influential theorisation of community 
and economy’s dialectics, pertaining to the work of Stephen Gudeman 
on tensions between market and community (2008). The ‘base’, centred 
around the house is, for the influential economic anthropologist, a way 
to think and construct the community. Some of this discussion speaks 
to the present book’s anthropological conceptualisation of cooperatives 
that moves beyond seeing them as enclave institutions committed to spe-
cific views of community. Such views can resonate with what community 
‘is’ (or indeed should be), what community participation implies and how 
community economics can be served by cooperativism. The normativities 
ingrained in these politicised drives of cooperatives are put to the test in 
the complex Sicilian landscape, where people’s lives can involve both the 
social life of mafia and that of anti-mafia. Gudeman’s take can help, but we 
should be attentive when we rely on dichotomies or relational pillars, how-
ever subtle, between community and economy. We can benefit, instead, 
from reviewing whether community is, or can be, a starting point for coop-
eratives at all. Our Sicilian lens here implies that a path laid for cooperativ-
ism by normative distinctions between community and economy, where 
mutuality is served by the cooperativisation project, can prove slippery.
While I have mainly focused on women when discussing anti-mafia 
families, including the narratives of ‘female’ land tenure, the claims 
to community I refer to here are ‘manly’. It is men, situated in the 
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public space that talk about women and about land. Gendered divisions 
of labour in agriculture, often surrounded by ‘mystique’ (Ferguson 1994: 
160–66; Mosse 2004: 62), help comprehend people’s livelihoods outside 
the terms of a standardised wage-employment political economy. I have 
talked already about the masculine idioms of co-op workers I’ve observed 
when working the fields. Their irregular, seasonal and contingently gen-
dered agrarian work is central to the constitution of smallholders’ politi-
cal organisation and dissent.
Claims to Community Participation
It would be a methodological mistake to commence the analysis from 
that idea of community. What matters here is inquiring on what exactly is 
meant by community on the ground – and the point is that there are many 
ideas on community, and thus many ‘communities’ in the co-ops. Learning 
what happens in co-ops’ workforces when groups have different viewpoints 
on what community is could be the anthropological endeavour here.
We can start a critical anthropological take on this problem by being 
reminded of the work of Susana Narotzky and Gavin Smith. Along these 
lines, and in the context of the corporatist hegemony of references to 
‘community’ in regionalist rhetoric in Spain, Narotzky and Smith propose 
a critical reading of ‘community’ ideologies (Narotzky 1988, 1997: 120; 
Narotzky and Smith 2006). Both Narotzky and Smith criticise explicit ref-
erences to cooperativism as ‘community economics’ for being a state-pro-
duced ideologically manipulative scheme that reproduces hierarchy (G. 
Smith 1999; Narotzky 2004).
The analysis that follows here, arguing beyond the paradigm of coop-
eratives as community economics, does not see market influence as the 
only cause of the shortfalls of cooperativist principles, unlike the implicit 
criticism of the market and the political system, in Smith and Narotzky. 
References to community, some of which can be state-sponsored, can 
also hide existing conflicts among co-op participants, as in the case of 
the anti-mafia cooperatives. The data here raises the question of ‘which 
community’ is meant when community participation is understood dif-
ferently by members of cooperatives and especially when different factions 
in an already stratified division of labour make claims to different under-
standings of ‘community’.
My argument hence draws on definitions of what community is under-
stood to be within our research participants’ paradigms. In these Sicilian 
cases, one cooperative faction sees the state as representative of commu-
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nity – as against the Mafia. At the same time, another faction holds an 
understanding of community that is informed precisely by the personal-
ised, unequal relations of patronage associated with the Mafia. How can 
we locate ‘community’ in such contemporary cooperativist configurations?
The main aim of the analysis that follows is to question the concept of 
cooperatives as ‘community economics’, in order to suggest an anthropo-
logical approach that takes into account the internal factions’ differing 
concepts of community. This is associated with a different kind of ethno-
graphic discussion than the chapters on food activism, kinship and house-
holding ideologies and practices. Rather than the somehow introverted 
ethnography of those chapters, which focused on co-ops’ inward-looking 
institutions, what follows draws from members’ activities outside the 
realm of co-ops – activities, however, that constitute, partly, the social 
life of co-ops. The question driving the ethnography here is how claims to 
community often reinforce inequality and reproduce social phenomena, 
such as the mafia, that cooperatives are meant to diminish.
Community for Cooperative Administrators
As discussed throughout the course of this book, the Consortium was del-
egated to distribute all confiscated land within the eight municipalities 
of Spicco Vallata and oversee its use. The rhetoric used by the Consortium 
in this redistribution of assets presents a just state actively intervening to 
restore to an (idealised) community what has been ‘stolen’ from it. State 
documents explaining the rationale behind the confiscations (Focus 2001: 
1) present mafiosi as having ‘usurped’ the agricultural land from what was 
allegedly ‘in the common domain,’ available to ‘the community’ (Focus 
2001: 4). As discussed, the land was allocated to the cooperatives because 
‘they represented the community’ (Libertà 2009: 2) and were founded to 
promote ‘an economy of legality and solidarity’ (Libertà 2010: 2).
Administrators subscribed to the Consortium’s claims to community, 
despite the fact that these claims are largely imaginary. Specifically, there 
was only one short-lived historical case of collectively owned land in 
Spicco Vallata during the 1946 peasant land occupations (Santino 2009), 
but rhetorically the confiscations all draw on this post-war revolutionary 
interlude in the late 1940s (Rakopoulos 2014a; see also here, pages 67–69). 
Accepting the Consortium’s state-produced rhetoric that the confiscated 
land symbolises ‘a resource for the area, an opportunity for development 
and civil growth’ (Frigerio and Pati 2007: 5), the cooperatives’ adminis-
trators perceive that the newly created cooperatives can ‘democratically 
accommodate the land returned to the community’ (Frigerio and Pati: 37). 
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The Consortium’s promotion of state intervention in Spicco Vallata aims 
at the restitution of assets to ‘the community’ (Frigerio and Pati.) in the 
sense of ‘reconstituting unlawfully usurped land back to the collectivity’ 
(Focus 2001). According to the administrators then, the cooperatives rep-
resent the ‘collective’.
As administrators commuted every day from Palermo to work in the 
cooperatives’ offices in Spicco Vallata and were not living there perma-
nently, their understanding of community with regard to the co-ops’ 
activity was divorced from local experience and was more aligned to the 
urban civil society in which their lives were embedded (see the analysis of 
the 1990s anti-mafia movement in Schneider and Schneider 2002b; 2006). 
The administrators’ legally bound regulation of labour, which they called 
‘standardisation’ presented work in the cooperatives as legal, remunera-
tive, safe and non-hierarchical.
The core idea driving administrators was that anti-mafia cooperativism 
was providing employment and all their enclaving attempts were made in 
the good faith of protecting this environment that offered local agrarian 
jobs. But as seen extensively throughout this ethnography, the actual live-
lihoods of co-op worker-members were more complex. As remuneration 
from the cooperative was not sufficient to make a living, the local co-op 
workers continued to seek other means of livelihood. Workers, unlike 
administrators, engaged in the informal activities already described, out-
side the cooperative framework, to complement their family income.
It should be noted that the idea (and ideal) of cooperativism as a form 
of work (implied in the politicised project of curbing the mafia) is critical 
because it opens the way to rethink the definition of work beyond labour. 
This is, of course, already in contradiction with legal definitions, nota-
bly the one encapsulated in the standardisation of waged work on the 
model of employment. The work of what Marxists call social reproduc-
tion (Narotzky 1997: 158–59) always falls off the map since it is mostly not 
commodified and also generally assumed to be mainly women’s work. (At 
the same time, the work of creation of non-market value [e.g., political], 
such as the cooperatives themselves, is, if anything, even more ignored 
as labour). Taking this hidden labour into account re-signifies the range of 
meanings of informal practices. It also points to the direction of politici-
sation around defending this informality. Developing against a backdrop 
of registered (‘standardised’) work, these practices become impregnated 
with new potentials vis-à-vis not only the co-ops but also state regulation 
at large. Informal work activities become a crucial facet of social repro-
duction, as important as ‘employment’ (Narotzky 1997: 36–37) and, in the 
case of benefits, dependent on it.
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Smooth employment relations in the cooperatives were also dependent 
on informal work, as informalities alleviated stratifications (within the 
manual workforce) and across workers and administrators, bringing all 
members to comparable income statuses. But co-op workers were also 
part of a greater community of smallholders, with its own political agen-
das and everyday concerns. Mafia was part of that community. It was, at 
the time of fieldwork, no longer the grandiose and violent mafia of the 
Tarinisi operating in an international heroin ring, with Barbeto as the 
San Giovanni main figure, but rather a more low-key group, operating in 
an agrarian configuration.
As agrarian wage labour in Spicco Vallata has historically been unregu-
lated and highly exploitative, some local networks in the informal econ-
omy were controlled by the mafia (Lupo 2011; and as shown in the urban 
context of Palermo, per Falcone 1993; Cole 2007). In this setting, the 
anti-mafia cooperatives’ promotion of regulated work proved unable to 
contain local workers’ practices that derived from other, more immedi-
ate definitions of community, including ongoing relations with mafiosi (as 
shown in the following section).
‘Mutual Aid’: Informal Work Exchange among Co-op Workers and 
Other Peasants
In late October 2009, just after the harvest, peasants (including most of 
the co-op’s worker-members1) took to the streets, angered because they 
thought that the prices offered by local wineries for the grapes their 
vineyards produced were exploitative, averaging twenty eurocents per 
kilogram (see table 7.1). They demanded compensation for their losses 
through EU subsidies administered by the Sicilian Autonomous Region. In 
a ‘spontaneous protest’, unrelated to the local agrarian unions, thousands 
gathered outside the majestic medieval building of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of Sicily. A coffin engraved with the words ‘Spicco Vallata’ was 
on public display, symbolising the death of the area. One man from San 
Giovanni was quick to explain that ‘there has never been so much law 
enforcement and regulation of our activity . . . and so we have to be more 
vocal’. Some demonstrators held a banner that read: ‘Stop penalising us, 
stop the fines.’ By ‘penalisation’, they meant the enforcement of the law 
against lavoro nero, or unregistered work. After the success of the anti- 
mafia cooperatives and the administrators’ talk of ‘standardising’ labour 
relations, state agents had taken the issue of registered work more seri-
ously. The police often raided the fields to check on labourers’ documen-
tation proving their legitimate, contractual work. The employers were 
penalised with heavy fines for unreported work.
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In discussions I joined at the demonstration, people kept repeating 
the phrase, ‘Ci rubiamo tra di noi’, which literally translates as, ‘We are 
stealing from each other’. Although whimsical, the phrase has a telling 
contextual translation: ‘It’s mutual stealing’. In the heated atmosphere 
of the demonstration, the expression was a response to accusations and 
criminal charges that they as ‘employers’ were robbing their ‘employees’ 
of social security contributions. As a co-op worker clarified to me, ‘if this 
is stealing, it is mutual, as between us it is turn and turn about: today’s 
“employer” is tomorrow’s “employee”; so we are “stealing” from each 
other. Demonstrators referred to this reciprocal exchange of labour as 
‘mutual aid,’ alluding to it as a ‘community practice’; payment for work 
exchanged hands under the table. A day’s work normally amounted to 
a mutually agreed average of thirty euros. People from the cooperatives 
shared the viewpoint that it was unfair for the state to penalise peasants 
for their informal mutual aid networks.
However, deployed in a discourse of friendship and conviviality in the 
village, the claim of mutuality did not recognise the unequal relations of 
power in this agrarian labour market – and the way mafia patrons bene-
fited from the system. In fact, the practice of ‘mutual aid’ was informed 
and encouraged by local mafiosi landowners, who aimed to further rad-
icalise the demonstrations. Sharing with dissenting peasants the term 
‘mutual aid’, they identified in this system a ‘Sicilian way of life’ that they 
wanted to defend, drawing on discourses of ‘community’ understood as 
shared by all peasants. The rhetoric on the maintenance of ‘community 
mutual aid’ obscured the class differences involved. The implied integra-
tion through community mutual aid was equally premised on friendship 
relations among peasants and on the mafia’s overarching patronage.2
In November 2009 in Principe, a Spicco Vallata village, seven hundred 
peasants gathered and burned their citizen ID cards in a public ritual 
disowning their Italian citizenship to express how they felt ‘abandoned 
and penalised by the state.’ The anti-mafia cooperative administrators 
condemned the event as excessive and dangerous. The role of mafiosi and 
politicians close to them was fundamental in encouraging sicilianismo in 
the event, as mafiosi influencing the demonstration hailed ‘the unity of 
the peasantry’ and the ‘common interests of all Sicilians’. Mafiosi who had 
prompted the Principe event called for similar activism across all Spicco 
Vallata villages and publicly encouraged Sicilians to ‘follow the French 
farmers’ example’ (a reference to demonstrations earlier that year) in 
rejecting the state and its symbols. The Carabinieri police marshal thought 
that such massive ‘resistance’ could hardly be prosecuted, so the police 
were deployed in an observational role only.
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The activity of the mafioso Baffi, who we have encountered earlier (see, 
e.g., page 126) is characteristic. He was a widely popular figure, recently 
out of prison, and regarded as an incumbent mafia ‘boss’ of the area. 
The day after the Principe event, hundreds of peasants, among them 
co-op workers, gathered in the municipal hall of San Giovanni to discuss 
the way forward for their demonstrations. The hall was packed. All the 
chairs were given to senior San Giovanni citizens, while the younger 
crowded where they could. At one point, Baffi grabbed the microphone 
and addressed the public of fellow ‘contadini’ (peasants), smiling confi-
dently as he started speaking. His speech animated the crowd. He advo-
cated a mild Sicilianist separatism, an idea with which Sicilians today 
identify very loosely and not in an explicitly political fashion, but that 
has a long and tormented history with the mafia playing a leading role, 
especially in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Paternò 1977; Spataro 2001).
‘His charisma speaks for all of us,’ said an old man sitting beside me. 
Baffi attacked the police prosecution and insisted that the ‘mutual aid’ 
system was ‘established as a tradition in the area’ and was something that 
‘Sicilians just do and should be proud of doing.’ He repeated this tactic 
a few days later at the next gathering. On that occasion, he appealed to 
‘Sicilian unity’ and expressed ‘disregard for the miserly state of Rome,’ 
which ‘wants to suck taxes out of Sicily’ and ‘penalise local peasants’. 
Baffi told me later that ‘the law enforcement uses anti-mafia talk to put 
fines on us, as if everyone here is a mafioso.’
I noticed another mafioso I knew, Numia, of the same generation as 
Baffi, who was present there to discuss with peasants in an affirmative 
manner. This was particularly odd because Numia was not a farmer but 
actually a barber, a profession whose interests were totally unrelated to 
the event. His presence there confirmed that the local mafia was invested 
in influencing, in ‘giving a tone’ to the event and the mobilisation, as a 
farmer told me confidentially. Right beside me stood an old gentleman 
who introduced himself as ‘just another contadino’; I soon found out after 
asking around that he used to be the personal driver of Toto Riina, the 
leader of the Tarinisi clan, back in the 1980s.
That same evening, I joined Pippo for dinner. Having spent the whole 
day in the event, talking endlessly, we were starving by 7 pm. He took me 
to the pizza place at the central square, a beautiful establishment run by 
a cousin of Barbeto, unrelated to mafia. There, we noticed Baffi dining 
with the mayor Malva, who also came from the event and in fact had 
acknowledged the mafioso while the latter was on stage. We went by their 
table to greet them as Pippo knew them both, and we all had a brief chat. 
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Baffi was ‘angered with the politicians’ although he noted that ‘Malva 
was different’.
This high concentration of mafiosi as well as their acceptability with 
peasants and local elites alike in the contadini dissent was indicative of 
their intentions. The mafioso Baffi’s appeal to this assumed sense of com-
munity among the peasants allows for comparisons between the two 
realms in which cooperative workers were involved: what they recognised 
as community (the ‘mutual aid’ informal work exchange) and what their 
administrator colleagues saw as community (the standardised employ-
ment in the cooperatives). Both made ideological claims to be among 
equals when in fact they were segregated across class differences.
‘Community Economics’ in the Context of Cooperatives
The discourse of a ‘community-based’ way of life involving a ‘mutual 
aid’ system is a logical attempt to safeguard a long-standing repertoire 
of commodified informal economy practices considered illicit by the 
state in a context where the rising tide of anti-mafia activity in the area 
has reinforced the state’s regulatory mechanisms. Community rhetoric 
hence forms an integral part of the reproduction of the mafia’s power to 
exercise labour patronage and instigate a cross-class sense of belonging to 
a peasantry that is in fact stratified.
The appeal of mafiosi like Baffi was cross-class. His abstract claims to 
the values of community and ‘mutuality’ as ways of life reproduced this 
class stratification. By obscuring internal stratification, the mafia’s influ-
ence on peasant mobilisation intensified many people’s beliefs that ‘only 
unity can save the peasantry’. In the same way, through their struggles 
they aimed to incorporate this informal status within what were becom-
ing increasingly more complex livelihoods involving ever more regulated 
wage employment frameworks.
It was popular with the administrators in Palermo to think that the 
formal would subsume the informal – as in the rhetoric of anti-mafia 
cooperativism – based on ideas about community promoted by adminis-
trators and state agents (the Consortium Progress and Law). The cooper-
atives, however, did not succeed in fully encompassing locals in a realm 
of stable employment as they, unlike the administrators, continued their 
practices of seeking income outside the regulated cooperative framework.
The administrators’ ideal of cooperativism as a form of regularised 
work in a state-protected community was of course implied in the polit-
icised project of curbing the mafia. Looking at labour more broadly – 
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beyond formal waged work – it becomes clear, however, that informal 
work activities are a crucial facet of social reproduction, as important as 
‘employment’ (Narotzky 1997: 36–37). The integration of peasant workers 
of Spicco Vallata into a regime of regulated work (‘employment’) in the 
cooperatives, then, conflicted with their established ideas of community 
associated with informal work.
An influential theorisation of ‘community’ in the context of cooper-
atives is Stephen Gudeman’s argument on the tension between market 
and community in the modern economy (2008). For Gudeman, econo-
mies vary depending on the degree to which people produce for the self 
or group (community) or for others (market) (2001), a main local model 
being ‘the house’, counterpoised to and set outside market exchange, and 
aiming to ‘maintain’ what are actually subsistence economy relations 
(Gudeman and Rivera 1990). In this model of community economy, the 
‘base’, the making and sharing of a commons consolidates the commu-
nity (Gudeman 2001: 27–30). Caring for the base ‘is a central concern in 
community, for the base makes a community as it is made’ (36).
Relating this framework to the dynamics in Spicco Vallata, however, 
suggests certain deviations. For in Spicco Vallata, the hidden exchange of 
money for labour is glossed over as ‘community economy’. Invoking this 
local ‘way of life’ draws on ideas of mutuality and, alongside those, claims 
to income; maintaining the ‘mutual aid’ scheme was a crucial financial 
matter. But the local ‘traditions’ it refers to should be questioned – the 
‘mutual aid’ scheme of work cannot be classified as exchange as mutual-
ity (2008: 27). In Spicco Vallata, exchange of money implied commodifica-
tion of labour. In comparison, the notion and use of ‘community’ by the 
Consortium Progress and Law and among administrators denotes a sense 
of decommodification of land – setting it outside the market. Among peas-
ants there seems to be a making of (ideas of) commons as political claims; 
but there is hardly a sharing of commons in what seems an internally var-
iegated and compartmentalised peasantry where the mafia obfuscates 
difference.
Moreover, for cooperative workers it is the cooperatives’ employment 
that forms ‘the base’ of their livelihood. The base here is neither work 
on their own plot nor the system of mutual exchange that is a supple-
mentary transaction of work for extra cash. In fact, although the remu-
neration of the manual workforce from the cooperatives was nowhere as 
good as the administrators’, wages from the cooperatives were the main 
source of income for their households.
The workers’ idea of a moral economy, as often happens in agrar-
ian movements (Edelman 2005), centred on belonging to the immediate 
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community, exchanging face to face favours and minor work for pay and 
pursuing their livelihoods outside of and parallel to the ‘standardised’ 
formal economy of cooperatives’ wage employment. Hann’s critique of 
the moral economy concept is hence relevant when approaching the 
mafia’s endorsement of the ‘mutual aid’ practice (2010: 196). It is impor-
tant to note that neither Polanyi – associated with the moral economy 
concept (1957) – nor E. P. Thompson (1971, 1991) – considered to have 
fathered the notion – account for the fact that the normative nature of a 
moral economy appears to include activities that are of ambiguous moral 
content, for the sake of bettering people’s livelihoods. Hann has already 
noted this problem, hinting to the ambiguous morality of the moral 
economy (Hann 2010). In the case of Spicco Vallata, peasant ‘community’ 
struggles often develop in ways not beneficial to the majority of the dif-
ferentiated peasantry they presumably represent (McMichael 2008).
Gudeman points to the dialectic between the different realms of 
‘mutuality’ and ‘market’ (2008: 24), drawing on the presumed solidarity 
of community relations that rest on self-help and subsistence agriculture 
(Gudeman 1978; 1986; Gudeman and Rivera 1990). Nugent points out 
(1981) that in Gudeman’s earlier work he downplayed the issue of com-
modified work, arguing that ‘the ghost of subsistence’ overshadows the 
introduction of wage labour into what Gudeman (1978) calls the ‘commu-
nity’ sphere. In Gudeman’s recent books, this scheme looks more open 
to cross-influence: aspects of mutuality in the market are acknowledged 
(2009: 26). In that respect, cooperatives form enclaves of mutuality, used 
by a community in relation to a market in ways often detrimental to 
other participants in that same market (Gudeman 2008: 103).
This is where it is important to note that the cooperatives are config-
ured into ‘factions’, formed by task-specific tiers whose members come 
from different places and social classes. When assessing what ‘commu-
nity’ might mean for co-ops’ different conceptualisations of community 
by members of different factions thus generates differing relationships to 
the cooperatives’ core aim to curb the mafia.
The administration faction’s take on community is skewed from the 
relationality of their class position, vis-à-vis the locality and the state. 
The Consortium’s promotion of state intervention in Spicco Vallata, 
endorsing an abstract ‘discursive normativity’ (Ferguson 1994: 30), aimed 
at the restitution of assets to ‘the community’ (Frigerio and Pati 2007). 
Administrators, being Palermitans, middle-class and not owning land, 
were more inclined than workers to align with these normative lines, 
their sense of the ‘community’ being divorced from local experience. 
Steinmetz’s idea of the languages of the state’s situatedness in social cir-
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cumstances (1999) can be applied here vis-à-vis the urban civil society in 
which the administrators’ lives were embedded, in line with Schneider 
and Schneider’s analysis of the 1990s anti-mafia movement (2002b).
‘Community’ – so charged a term in Spicco Vallata – for workers 
implied viticulture cooperation intrinsically entangled with the anti- 
mafia movement’s local history. The values they endorsed were  relational 
and dynamic: their cooperative participation expanded notions of kin-
ship, creating anti-mafia families, and endowed work with masculinised 
idioms, as workers felt proud that they ‘embodied’ the co-ops. Continuities 
in their livelihood practices and the proximity with neighbours’ land 
plots (especially as seen in the next chapter) caused creative, albeit messy, 
interactions with fellow locals – even mafiosi – to occur. These interactions 
allowed for interconnections between processes outside (e.g., informal 
work) and inside the cooperatives’ activity (waged labour), often merging 
co-op work with local life (e.g., in ‘uncomfortable’ encounters at confis-
cated plots, as will be seen later), this way imploding the cooperatives’ 
‘standardisation’ framework.
It might be reasonable to point out that the community appeals and 
jacquerie-type dissent of peasants and co-op workers alike in Spicco 
Vallata cannot be accounted for with notions of (post-)peasant ‘hybrid-
ity’ (Kearney 1996: 68). The plural attempts of co-op worker-members 
to defend their livelihoods are not exactly hybrid, I think. ‘Hybridity’ 
suggests mingling. But even though people build on entirely diversified 
and often contradictory categories of income, here the two realms of 
formal and informal labour correspond to two different, juxtaposed ideas 
of community. The first is the Consortium Progress and Law’s idea that 
community is achieved through state intervention; the second implicitly 
pitches community against state regulation. These ideas interpenetrate 
and cross-fertilise each other in the experience of the peasants involved 
in anti-mafia cooperatives. But they cannot be ‘hybridised’ because infor-
mal labour and standardised employment cannot be brought into the 
same space (the cooperatives) without friction.
The Problem of Community
The state’s intervention entailed the promotion of ‘legality’ values and 
relationships antithetical to local obligations, from kinship to local rec-
iprocities. This came at the cost of egalitarianism and industrial democ-
racy within the cooperatives, and the earlier ethnographic narrative is 
another configuration of this idea. Branding and enacting community 
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values was another such field of inegalitarian effects. To brand co-ops as 
community-participation initiatives can often lead to the reproduction 
of unequal structures as well as structures reproducing inequalities out 
there ‘in the community’. Unquestioned claims to ‘community’ for coop-
eratives might unwittingly render them amenable to contradictory influ-
ences. In this case, mafia influence and legalistic state discourse compete 
to become the main determinants of what ‘community’ stands for.
The community participation for which co-ops strive contains inter-
acting realms of labour markets protected by the state and a set of labour 
relations rooted in mutuality with the workers’ peasant neighbors. 
However, the latter are exposed to manipulation by the classed interests 
of the mafia’s agrarian labour patrons. The co-ops, then, contain both 
‘realms’, in Gudeman’s sense (market and community), and their commu-
nity participation practices are rooted in different ideas of community, 
which inform diverse ideas of labour. Thus, co-ops are more complex and 
contradictory than often realised.
The reason is not only, as is often argued, their exposure to impersonal 
institutions such as states (Narotzky 1997) and markets (Kasmir 1996) or, 
indeed, neoliberalism (Vargas-Cetina 2005; Stephen 2005) but also their 
members’ everyday embeddedness in sets of personalised relations of a 
stratified and classed character, glossed as mutuality. The personalisation 
of industrial relations – the instigation of diverse views of community – 
in this case proves detrimental to their egalitarian functions. But most 
importantly, community here (like kinship, food activism or reputation 
in previous chapters) operates as an idiom of division or a standpoint that 
exacerbates stratified difference.
The realm of personalised community is both commodified and une-
qual, while the realm of abstract markets is accessed by institutions 
(including cooperatives) typified as impersonal but actually peopled. 
Cooperative stratification is reinforced and reproduced by different con-
ceptualisations of ‘community’ among co-op members’ groups. Such 
conceptualisations, although enriching the co-ops’ social fabric, also 
undermine their ‘anti-mafia’ consistency and ideological coherence.
My reading of Gudeman’s scheme on tensions between community 
and market calls for such contextualised nuances, acknowledging the 
penetrative power of local actors (in this case, mafiosi) influential in 
the reproduction of ‘mutual aid’ informal economy schemes. In Spicco 
Vallata, cooperatives’ work is conceptualised in different ways by dif-
ferent members. By and large the administrators subscribe to legal 
categories of regulation, such as co-op employment, and the workers 
to non-regulated practices of mutuality. Both these state-sponsored and 
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale. 
172 From Clans to Co-ops
mafia-related categories in turn build strongly pronounced community 
idioms. Their ‘mixed’ livelihoods and ‘pluriactivity’ show that these 
realms permeate each other.
The fact that the main bulk of the cooperatives’ workforce moves in 
both the impersonal market of regularised, ‘fair’ work relations within 
the co-ops and the personalised mutuality among peasants (and mafiosi) 
outside them suggests that the realms of market and mutuality are not 
entirely exclusive but continuously exercise interchangeable influence 
on each other. This can even take place within work institutions set on 
an agenda defending one such realm and condemning, if not struggling 
against, the influence of the other, such as the anti-mafia cooperatives.
How the everyday problems of the cooperatives regarding their land 
management played out on the ground has its own story. The multiple 
fractions and fissures within the co-op workforce resonated with other 
forms of conflictual relations around them, including those with their 
mafiosi neighbours. As the local agrarian community was composed, as we 
just examined, by mafiosi and anti-mafiosi alike, the relationality of their 
proximity became a contested issue. The rich social life it produced was 
ridden with the riddles of the contradictions I mentioned earlier when 
discussing community. The issue became largely how to reconcile being 
different but also being similar with the anti-mafia’s enemies: the mafiosi.
NOTES
Some of the material in this chapter has also been published in ‘Which Community 
for Cooperatives’ (2015).
1. As discussed, workers earned wages from the cooperatives by labouring the 
confiscated land plots and also worked on their own land tracts (pezzi di terra), 
mostly vineyards; therefore, a part of their income came from selling their 
own grapes to the local wineries. Most, when I asked, acknowledged that the 
pay from the cooperatives was ‘not enough’. They called themselves contadini 
(peasants), a term that encompassed all landowners, regardless of the scale of 
their production; their mean landholding was a modest 3.5 hectares. While 
the ‘standardised’ employment of the workers linked them with the co-ops’ 
anti-mafia concept of community, their work as independent peasant produc-
ers implied other influences, drawing from other ideas of ‘community’.
2. As elsewhere in the Mediterranean region, people’s ‘rural pluriactivity’ went 
with a partial integration into wage dependencies arranged around claims to 
continuing the ‘cultural tradition of a place’ (Narotzky and Smith 2006: 27 and 
31).
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░ Divided by Land
Mafia and Anti-mafia Proximity
The co-ops’ story offers an interesting case study of the relationship 
between agrarian transformation and civil society/political projects. But 
it is also an insight into the juncture between similarity and difference in 
an agrarian society. After all, although most of their revenue came from 
rackets and drugs chains, many contemporary Sicilian mafiosi have been 
landowners for three or four generations (Blok 1988; Santino 2006; Dickie 
2013). In Spicco Vallata in particular, a realm where viticulture reigns over 
all other economic activity, confiscations fragmented the areas of land 
that mafia families held, especially vineyards, which were divided into 
a number of plots (Lupo 2011). Breaking land down in pieces meant that 
co-op members were exposed to everyday interactions with many mafiosi 
who still cultivated the nearby plots (‘family’ land) that had not been 
confiscated.
Neighbourhood (vicinato) was a local concept, popular with mafiosi and 
anti-mafia co-op members alike. I will here analyse neighbourhood where 
social difference is examined through interactions between people cate-
gorised as mafia and antimafia respectively. We have already seen the odd 
peasant coexistence of mafia and anti-mafia agents. As the spatial play-
out of power struggles and difference arises at the neighbourhood level, 
this chapter focuses on those dynamic sets of relations pertaining to 
neighbourhood. Through it, I explore the social consequences of agrarian 
change and the condition of neighbourhood as a socio-spatial proximity 
of agents with different, and indeed inimical but surprisingly not irrec-
oncilable, views of the world, despite the polemic undertones in their 
contact and conduct (Chauveau and Richards 2008; Cramer and Richards 
2011). The aim is to embed this discussion in the broader theorem of sim-
ilarity and difference between mafia and anti-mafia and critically contrib-
ute to definitions of difference, proximity and neighbourhood.
I will then examine the social configurations that follow land res-
titutions and are related to political projects of land reform (mainly, 
post-socialist, as per Hann 2007 and Verdery 2002; 2003; 2004). The point 
of comparison here is the role that land redistribution plays in political 
projects that try to lead, and claim to represent, community as ‘amending 
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wrongs’ of the past (Fay and James 2009). The social presence of mafiosi, 
a lingering social reality of active neighbourhood agents in the face of 
restitutions, distinguishes the Sicilian context from that of post-social-
ist discussions. Here, rather than pores in the land, we have on-going 
neighbourliness.
In this chapter I again highlight how these relations are on-going and 
rooted in projects that overlap as well as how this elucidates the embed-
deness of co-ops in surprising social liaisons. Previously, such a point 
was made evident through discussions of the curious overlaps between 
anti-mafia and kinship or mafia and community that presented cooper-
atives with some contraditions. They were also brought forward in the 
unexpected divisions that ostensibly unifying ideologies of activism or 
practices of gossip brought about. Here the border-setting and the bor-
der-crossing between mafia and anti-mafia, from claiming ideological dif-
ference to re-affirming similarity, become more tangible. It is a situation 
that crucially unsettles the enclaving attempts in anti-mafia co-ops and 
illustrates their members’ broader embeddedness in local sociality.
With confiscations and their shortcomings, we are being reminded 
of James Scott’s reading of high modernism (1998; 2010; 2012), an idea of 
statal projects’ detachment from grassroots realities in a critical fashion. 
While Scott conceives of the state as a field of externality towards society, 
in Sicily the anti-mafia state project competes for local ideas of commu-
nity with the mafia. The intersubjective neighbourliness between people 
on each side nuances their antithesis. What is more, because an uncom-
fortable neighbourhood is not seen as a static outcome of state-level 
shifts but as the live interaction of players with different agendas on the 
ground, as per debates on post-socialism (as per Pine 2007 and Alexander 
and Humphrey 2007), this last chapter’s narrative also brings us back to 
the ‘from clans to co-ops’ thought pattern of the book. Not all mafia land 
was confiscated, obviously, and that allowed for the paradox of a clans 
and co-ops neighbourhood. 
The Story of Two Land Tracts
The Land Confiscations
I have already described how Matteo Mandola, the managing director 
of the Consortium Progress and Law, argued that state confiscation ‘cor-
rects’ the mafioso ‘usurpation’ of land that had ‘originally been in the 
common domain’ and was available to all. Mandola, along with other law-
yers and legislators involved in the confiscations and distribution laws, 
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told me that the law’s aim was to isolate the mafiosi and place them at 
some distance from local people. The ideas on bad kinship and the exclu-
sion of the co-ops from kin connectedness was part of this framework 
(see chapter 5, especially pages 103–109). This claim was also made to me 
several times by many cooperative administrators.
And yet, this insisted-upon creation of social distance and formation 
of a community immune from the mafia never fully materialised. What 
posed as a massive difference that was deemed unbridgeble was in fact 
a condition of oft-radical similarity in a reality more complicated than 
analyses of the anti-mafia project’s legal-political configuration might 
suggest (Gunnarson 2015; Orlando 2003). This was similarly played out 
between local anti-mafia co-op members and local mafiosi, with co-op 
administrators more aware of drawing lines – and boundaries – between 
mafia and anti-mafia. As a member of the Falcone co-op, manual labourer 
Enzo, told me once,1 ‘Plot boundaries are an issue made of people, not 
just borders…. They are what people make of them’.
To understand this complexity, it is worth considering again the nature 
of the confiscations law, which did not apply to all mafia land in Spicco 
Vallata. The agricultural tracts considered in this book have different 
histories of acquisition, but in local contextual terms all fall into two 
broad categories. One sort comes to a mafia family as dowry or through 
the legitimate savings of the mafioso himself; in local discourse this is 
typically described as familiare (family) land. The other sort comes to a 
mafioso as a result of his illicit activities – for instance, extortion or money 
laundering – and is typified as propria (own) land. It was only this land 
that eventually became confiscated.
Mafiosi tended to buy, using drug funds, all the land tracts surrounding 
their original familial land, thereby raising their property and clout expo-
nentially. As the outer circles had been acquired through drug money, 
they were confiscated. The anti-mafia cooperatives therefore ‘ringed in’ 
the mafia, since the latter had its legitimately acquired land in the centre 
of a series of concentric circles of owned property. This situation allowed 
for constant interaction between anti-mafia cooperative members and 
mafiosi through the contiguous land plots each controlled.
This is where a second central issue arises, one that runs through 
this book’s analytical narrative; it concerns the social divisions within 
the anti-mafia cooperatives, which reflect a history of social relations 
that pre-dates the co-ops. As we have seen, the local worker-members 
cultivated small tracts of land (mainly vineyards) and worked for wages 
in agrarian settings for generations. Importantly, most had a history of 
agrarian labour on mafiosi land and longer histories of social relations 
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with them, while administrators, on the other hand, rarely, if ever, vis-
ited the land plots. These two issues interact in the uncomfortable coex-
istence of family and confiscated land in the Sicilian landscape, as both 
workers and administrators were exposed to neighbourhood and degrees 
of familiarity with mafiosi. The co-op members had different reactions to 
these contacts, which often were related to their social background. Such 
contact with mafiosi infuriated the co-ops’ administrators, while Spicco 
Vallata workers saw it in a positive light, as I shall show through two 
stories below.
‘Familiare’ Land: The Story of Antonia Barbeto’s Plot
The Barbeto family has been central to the history of Spicco Vallata, Sicily, 
and indeed Italy itself. Their patrilineal genealogy produced three genera-
tions of leading figures of Cosa Nostra. The Barbetos, a multigenerational 
family of mafiosi, owned plots of land near their now-abandoned home on 
the outskirts of San Giovanni. The vineyards on this land were inherited 
by Antonia Barbeto, who then handed them to her older sons Giovanni 
and Vincenzo, both mafiosi, who were arrested in 1996 (Giovanni had 
already been convicted in absentia). The vineyards had not been confis-
cated because the mother was not part of the mafia and thus her assets 
did not derive from ‘mafia activity’. The vineyards were therefore deemed 
familiare (familial) property.
Strolling around the impressive villa of the Barbetos with some of 
the Falcone cooperative workers, I ended up walking amongst the vines. 
Adamo and Nicola, both workers of the co-op, recalled a time in the mid-
1990s when they worked together there on the harvest and agreed that 
the plots had, until recently, been very productive. Both men remarked 
what ‘a pity’ it was that, although not confiscated, these vineyards now 
lay uncultivated. They inspected the vines and showed me that the soil 
was no longer productive.
Antonia Barbeto had never involved herself in managing this vine-
yard, nor did she start to after Giovanni was imprisoned. Adamo said 
that he ‘felt for the vineyard: ‘It just shows how they feel for it . . . the 
mother could not cultivate this familiare plot, which she feels belongs 
to her son.’ I enquired further as to what the workers’ designation of 
this plot as ‘familiare’ meant. Initially I had thought that, if vineyards 
belonged to a mafia family, they would be confiscated. Discussing these 
questions with lawyers and the Consortium administrators responsi-
ble for overlooking the confiscations project, I learned that the term 
‘familial’ implied belonging to the family unit. From the point of view 
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of land confiscation, the term designated plots that had not been con-
fiscated since it had been proven that the mafioso owner had acquired 
them through means other than the ‘usurping’ entailed in ‘mafia accu-
mulation activity’ (Frigerio and Pati 2006). Inheritance and dowry were 
the main techniques by which mafiosi acquired land tracts with familiare 
status. In the particular case at hand, Antonia Barbeto had bequeathed 
the legal title to a male child (a mafioso).
Adamo and Nicola are linked to this story of landownership through 
two kinds of relations: co-op membership on the one hand and a his-
tory of labour, as well as a relationship, with the Barbetos on the other. 
Through the land, they find themselves linked both to the cooperative, 
as members, and to the Barbetos, as ex-workers. These two kinds of con-
tradictory affiliations each stand for the two axes of relations described 
earlier: the relationship between mafia and anti-mafia and between local 
anti-mafia workers and mafiosi. These are sets of relationships that are 
historically defined; for workers, they involve their own histories of work 
relations. Familiare also gives a sense of the familiarity between mafiosi 
and their old workers, in the sense of ‘belonging to the family, not to 
the mafia’. In both cases, familiarity muddies the purities on which the 
anti-mafia project relies. Neighbourhood with mafiosi does this also. The 
co-existence of mafia familiare land side-by-side with their confiscated 
plots yielded surprising continuities in local practices. As with kinship 
and ideas of community, familiarity and neighbourhood belong to his-
tories and continuities of social relations. I shall consider this further 
through the story of the plots of Mimmo Torinese, another local mafioso.
‘Propria’ Land: Torinese’s Confiscated Tracts (and the 
Neighbourhood Thereof)
Torinese was a renowned farmer. Like many of the village mafiosi, he had 
invested racket money in buying land, in addition to and adjoining his 
original familial land in a conscious strategy to expand. Some of his plots 
were now confiscated and managed by the Falcone cooperative, and some 
still belonged to his family due to their familiare status. Some cooperative 
members had vivid memories of working for the Torinese family. Even 
today, there were continuities with that recent past: two cooperative 
seasonal workers, outside their co-op work, still sporadically worked for 
the Torineses on their many familiare plots. Many of these Torinese plots, 
in turn, bordered on plots confiscated from them and now managed by 
the cooperatives.
This open access library edition is supported by the University of Bergen. Not for resale. 
178 From Clans to Co-ops
When convicted, a mafioso has to prove the innocent origin of his assets 
in order to retain them (see also page 14). If he cannot support his claim 
that he acquired a landed piece of property in lawful ways, the property 
is presumed to be the outcome of his mafia activity and is thus associated 
with his mafia membership. By contrast to the category familiare, this 
is locally called ‘own property’ (‘proprietà propria’). Land that falls into 
this category is confiscated because it is legally presumed to have been 
acquired through illicit means.
For example, Mimmo Torinese owned a vineyard in the territory of 
Reale (a Spicco Vallata village) that was used to launder drug money in 
the mid-1980s. The mafioso was the San Giovanni mafia leader from 1996 
until his conviction in absentia in 1999 (he had taken over local mafia 
power after the downfall of the Barbetos). The land plot was confiscated 
in 1999 and passed to the property of the state. The Reale municipality 
then transferred its usufruct rights to the Falcone anti-mafia cooperative 
under a renewable free lease contract, valid for thirty years. Additionally, 
a related winery building surrounded by these vineyards had finally been 
confiscated from Mimmo Torinese in 2007. From March 2010 onwards, it 
became Cento, the cooperative’s winery, bottling under the Falcone label.
Right next to a piece of confiscated land now used by the Falcone 
cooperative and also lying beside their winery, itself the product of 
confiscation and allocation, was a Torinese familiare tract that had not 
been confiscated. Early one April morning, Enzo and Piero, two local 
 worker-members from the Falcone co-op, were working in this part of 
the Falcone vineyard with the Torinese familiare plot just a few yards away 
from them. Suddenly, Enzo’s cell phone rang. It turned out to be Mimmo 
Torinese’s forty-year-old son Ciccio, just out of prison, complaining, in 
the Sicilian dialect, that there was a problem with plot boundaries: he 
was asking to meet someone from the Falcone to discuss it.
The incident caused distress amongst Falcone administrators. Its presi-
dent, Luca and its vice president Mina were particularly upset. They were 
absolutely against a meeting with people they were ‘unable to reason 
with’. They insisted that the cooperative should call in the police as soon 
as possible; even if there was to be a meeting to discuss property bound-
aries, they wanted the Carabinieri to be present. ‘Our boundaries are not 
to be negotiated at a mafioso’s phone call; these lands are not just plots; 
the state is invested in them,’ Luca asserted to me. However, after they 
saw that the manual workforce team was adamant that there should be a 
meeting with the mafioso neighbour on this issue, Luca and Mina yielded 
to the workers’ demands.
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The meeting was therefore arranged for the next morning at 6 am. It 
took place at exactly the boundary spot between the Torinese family plot 
and Falcone’s confiscated plot at dawn. The facial features of the mafioso 
were barely visible in the dim light, causing some distress; but the meet-
ing went well. When I asked Enzo about it later in the day, he reported 
that ‘[Torinese] is a well-mannered gentleman. . . . His ways were noble 
and kind and he was very gentle and careful with us’.
Familiarity can take many forms. Having one’s cellular phone number 
marks a familiarity already unacceptable for co-op administrators. 
Answering a phone call acknowledges that familiarity (Archambault 
2013). Moreover, Ciccio Torinese’s ‘noble and kind ways’, in addition to the 
fact that the co-op members had past or on-going work relations in that 
familiare plot, carried an intersubjective understanding on mutual shar-
ing of the land. The remembrance of the ‘past continuous unity of these 
plots’, as Nicola suggested, was juxtaposed against the current experience 
of working a now-fragmented domain of confiscated and familiare plots 
where the historical connections of land had been  reconfigured –  leaving 
behind, however, on-going, lively neighbourhood relations between 
mafia and anti-mafia. For those cooperative members who, like Nicola, 
remembered working past harvests for the old mafiosi owners on these 
same plots, this sense of a ‘lost past’ was intensified. The remembrance 
of the land plots’ unity reinforced the sense of neighbourliness that local 
workers maintained, namely that the boundaries of confiscated plots 
were less rigid in practice than in legal discourse.
What is more, Enzo and Piero realised that (ironically?) Torinese did 
have a rightful claim over the disputed piece of land between the two 
properties; he proved this to them by providing the legal documents 
during the meeting. Surprised, the co-op members checked them and 
admitted that the mafioso was legally right; they had, albeit by accident, 
extended their plot’s boundaries, and trespassed on their neighbour’s 
familiare property. The prestige of the mafioso, proven by his demeanour 
as reported by Enzo and Nicola, made him loom great; more imposing a 
figure than the current spread of his holdings would suggest him to.
Of Neighbourhood and Difference
These two stories show splits in landownership and across the relations 
between co-op members. Both hamper the working of the anti-mafia 
project. They revolve around the kinds of engagements and continuities 
with mafia that the project finds it hard to deal with: the perseverance 
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of social relations (including labour histories or senses of ‘noble and kind 
ways’). In my discussions with co-op members, the term ‘neighbourhood’ 
was not merely about physical space but appeared, rather, as a relational 
concept: it referred to the material realities of bordering plots across 
which people came into contact. As Adamo said, ‘Here are the confiscated 
plots [managed by cooperatives], there are the non-confiscated plots [still 
managed by mafiosi], and among them, there is life’. The conceptual signif-
icance of their social experiences is important: the local workers, because 
of their long relation with the plots and with some mafiosi neighbours, 
were hardly repelled by mafiosi.
The task here is to decipher why the term ‘neighbourhood’ is not 
only true to the empirical data (vicinato) but is also analytically useful. 
Neighbourhood life can be a vigorous social process that embraces local-
ised, face-to-face sociality, morality and lifeworlds, a scale of relations 
altogether different from the logic of groupings posed in difference. A 
stress on intersubjectivity and the formation of a ‘we-relationship’ among 
neighbours is relevant here (Henig 2012: 16–18). Such intersubjectivity 
within and across groups is shaped through a correlation of continuity 
and change: the ‘we’ can at times cut across the mafia/anti-mafia divide 
and associated differences. This ‘we’ can survive (or even be reinforced 
by) major changes: in the case of Henig, post-socialism and post-war tran-
sition in Bosnia.
The anthropology of post-socialist contexts has largely set the scene 
for exploring land restitutions and their socially configured outcomes. 
Interestingly, that is shaped in a ‘from plan to clan’ formation – from 
centralism to disarray (Stark 1990) – whereas this ethnography follows a 
‘from clans (to state) to co-ops’ movement. At any rate, the conceptualis-
ation of social relations around land found in this anthropology of ‘tran-
sition’ does not suffice to adequately tackle cases such as the Sicilian land 
restitution and resulting uncomfortable neighbourhood with mafiosi.
To be sure, post-socialist literature has noted the assignments of land 
rights to ‘corrective’ or ‘successor’ cooperatives in decollectivisation pro-
cesses (Hann 2007: 302). In Sicily, a conceptual and political relocation 
of what land signifies is also pursued via a long and politicised (often 
anti-mafia) history of cooperativism that emerged from grassroots needs 
for organisation across local peasants (see Rakopoulos 2014a). But while 
in the post-socialist literature restitution laws appear as a meta-narra-
tive (one following and renouncing socialism), the land’s new (but not 
post-mafia) configurations in Sicily are parts of a political project to over-
come the (still active) mafiosi.
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In the theory stemming from transition literatures, land is typically 
understood to be ‘embedded’ in the broader social relations in whom 
actors managing property are involved (Hann 1998: 1; 2009). In Sicily, 
there are tensions in the corrective cooperatives’ internal relations, 
engendering further differentiations among members in the manage-
ment of land. But unlike a transition, we have the coexistence of a project 
– the anti-mafia – and a group that revolves around historical but ongoing 
sets of social relations – the mafia – often entangled between them in 
‘community’ rhetoric.
This coexistence results in people feeling that they belong to sets 
of social relations – involving locality or work history – that pre-date 
the cooperatives and the anti-mafia project and often contradict it. To 
highlight, as in post-socialism, the ‘embeddedness’ of landed property 
here (as per Hann 1998) would tell a different story – especially in the 
Sicilian context of contested views of community and concurrent sets 
of social relations. As Peters (2009: 99; see also Thelen 2011) pointed 
out, models like ‘embeddedness’, stemming from post-socialist contexts, 
cannot be universal. In Sicily, rather than ‘embedded’ land in transition, 
we encounter belongings of people in diverse yet overlapping threads of 
social relations. These people are ‘embedded’ themselves in nexuses of 
relations that can, if momentarily, transcend their land boundaries and 
their ideological divides.
The continuities, fissures and disjunctures that followed the restora-
tion laws in transitory environments play out on two levels: firstly, across 
the ‘murky’ boundaries of land plots; and secondly, between local forces 
on the ground and a newly centralised power. Instead, in Sicily, continui-
ties and fissures are deployed as parallel and competing realities between 
the social presence of mafiosi and an anti-mafia project developing along-
side them. Let’s unpack this more carefully.
Firstly, to analyse neighbourhood, ethnographers of post-socialism 
stressed the fluidity and ‘porosity’ of land restored to communities 
(Verdery 2003; Humphrey and Verdery 2004). Katherine Verdery’s ‘politics 
of elasticity’ underlines that new land claims arising from restitutions 
involved murky negotiations, often imperilling local relations (1996: 159). 
A lot of debate has stemmed from Verdery’s notion of ‘fuzzy’ property, 
focusing on the ambiguities of configurations that lack clarity of borders 
and ownership (Sturgeon and Sikor 2004: 4) or associating the temporal 
aspects of this fuzziness with the endurance of social ties (Fay and James 
2009: 9). The case of ‘clans to co-ops’ in Sicily, instead, illuminates two 
concurrent (rather than successive) social realities in which agents form 
active and intersubjective relations. What lingers is not inertia from the 
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past. Clans are not gone, giving way to co-ops fully, although their land 
is bestowed to the co-ops (Bucchieri 2003). In these concurrent and 
even competing realities, the fact that the anti-mafia project and mafia- 
familiarity social relations are supposed to be mutually exclusive does 
not prevent the crossing over of (existing) categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
This crossing and its communication do not take place through a fuzzi-
ness of property (Sturgeon and Sikor 2004); in fact, the property catego-
ries (confiscated and familiari) are firm, and the way legal documentation 
supports them is not disputed (as shown in the Ciccio Torinese case). 
The contact between people does not take place through ‘pores’ across 
land plots but through a neighbourhood across different plots.
Secondly, while a discrepancy between local forces and the state is also 
central to the post-socialist literature, the Sicilian case elucidates their 
interrelation, especially in co-op administrators’ practices. In Verdery’s 
work, the distance between conception and execution of a land restora-
tion law (2003: 380–82) appears beneficial, toting the side of local political 
elites, who enact laws in ways that deviate from the government’s plan-
ning (2003: 388). Elsewhere – and proposing a seeing like a mayor approach, 
to complement Scott’s seeing like a state one – Verdery notes that, in 
Romania, ‘a local sphere obedient to central directives was a laughable 
image’ (2002: 27; 2003). In line with Scott’s overarching argument, the 
anthropology of local elites seems to underline the distance of the state’s 
meaning from the imaginings of those supposed to enact its aim locally. 
Similarly, Creed points to the oxymoron of ‘conflicting complementarity’ 
between the state and locals’ strategies in land restitution (1998: 8). The 
anti-mafia cooperatives’ administrators, however, are endowed with a 
sense of the state’s mission (as illustrated in Luca’s words: ‘These lands 
are not just plots; the state is invested in them’). In this process of pro-
tecting and ignoring what the state ‘is seeing’ on the local level, Sicilians 
are promised (and to an extent experience) a movement, from a ‘malig-
nant’ private to a ‘benign’ public apparatus – from clans to co-ops. This 
also stands in contrast with post-socialism, where conflicts are produced 
because of a movement from the state to the private, ‘from plan to clan’ 
(Dunn 2004: 79).
Sicily’s case, therefore, helps us situate belonging and difference in 
dynamic grounds. In Spicco Vallata, there are two different realities (the 
anti-mafia and mafia) that emerge and interact through the fact of geo-
graphical proximities. The cooperative members mediating this inter-
action belong to sets of relations that involve both mafia and anti-mafia. 
We encounter sets of categories that correspond to the concepts of the 
anti-mafia project (e.g., ‘mafia’) but also others that undermine it (e.g., 
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locals, Palermitans, neighbours). They are all in constant renegotiation 
through neighbourliness, which consists of phone calls, memories and 
conflicts.
Neighbourhood bridges difference and similarity in the proximity 
between mafia and anti-mafia agents. It is not just the spatial fact of close-
ness (or even of social relations) but also the closeness of sets of relations 
that were not supposed to be close to each other in the first place because 
of the anti-mafia project’s political nature. The spatial play-out of power 
struggles and difference is set on the stage of neighbourhood. This stands 
as the definition of uncomfortable neighbourhood – the socio-spatial 
proximity of two opposing sets of relations, with their respective views 
of the world, that emerges out of an interaction and a struggle over the 
souls of ‘the community’, that is, the people through which the anti- 
mafia tries to articulate to their project. These people, as the familiarity 
raised through a phone call might illustrate, can partake both in the anti- 
mafia project and in local sets of relations where mafiosi are present. In 
turn, this works as the definition of neighbourliness, which alleviates the 
uncomfortable condition of neighbourhood. A return to ethnographic 
discussion will illuminate this further.
Continuities with Uncomfortable Neighbours: Moral Borders 
and Lines of Contact
In the story discussed earlier, I noted the contiguity with the Torineses’ 
plots (confiscated and familiare) and the contact with Ciccio Torinese. 
Opting for a non-conflictual and ‘civilised manner’, cooperative members 
saw the mafioso through a prism of neighbourliness rather than sharp 
moral difference. It is through such communication that people of the 
manual workforce team actually experienced the boundaries of the con-
fiscated plots as lines of contact. As Enzo told me, land plot neighbour-
hood was an ‘issue made of people, not just borders’.
In fringe cases, administration members thought that it was impos-
sible to establish any genuine contact with mafiosi neighbours: their 
actions, it was believed, would always be driven by treachery. Further, the 
members thought that the boundaries between the familiare and the con-
fiscated plots needed to be defended. For most administration coopera-
tive members, the mafiosi belonged, as Mina, its vice president, told me, to 
a ‘different universe’, marked by a separate capacity for moral  judgement. 
In defending physical land boundaries and by invoking the authority of 
law, Mina expressed her sense of this utter difference, protecting what 
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she saw as the moral world of the cooperatives. For this reason, the gen-
eral belief was that court action was the most appropriate solution to all 
problems regarding disputes with the mafia.
Some of the Falcone administration members, in fact, stated that deal-
ing with plot boundaries was a strategy of ‘defending their borders’, 
while others expressed the view that land boundaries were akin to ‘bor-
ders of morality and legality’. Sometimes, they explicitly asserted that 
‘the Italian state was represented’ by and within the confines of their 
plots, therefore marking familiare land as not just ‘non-state’ but as a 
threatening, ‘anti-state’ land. As Silvio, the president of Falcone, put it in 
an interview, there was ‘a lot to defend in our boundaries, not just land, 
but whatever both we and the state stand for, in Sicily’.
Many manual worker-members, on the other hand, felt some degree of 
familiarity with mafiosi and insisted that these ideas of the administration 
were out of kilter. As Pippo stated, adding ironic emphasis to the word 
‘mafia’,
they [the administrators] think we border The Mafia [faccimu confini con A 
Mafia], some abstract thing; in fact, our plot neighbours are actually people 
from the village; yes, they are what they are, mafia and violent . . . once . . . , 
but they are farmers, people like anyone else around here, in the end of the 
day; they have their morals. And, after all, they are our neighbours.
The constitution of neighbourhood here is formed in shaky, intersubjec-
tive terms as workers and mafiosi are part of the same locality, sharing life 
conditions, despite the fact that they recognise gaps due to a violent his-
tory among them. Both administrators and manual workers relied upon 
terms that evoked a rhetoric of war: ‘peaceful coexistence’, ‘boundaries’, 
‘borderlines’ and ‘diplomacy’. These all constitute a range of metaphors, 
which implies that the process of cultivating the confiscated land was 
akin to experiencing the front line of a war. Workers did not use the war 
metaphor and did not vilify the mafiosi. Instead, based on a historical and 
current intersubjective understanding of neighbourhood as a continuum 
of plots, they felt that contact with mafiosi was the best way to resolve 
neighbours’ problems.
On one occasion Adamo told me, ‘We, people of the area, have been 
brought up close to our current neighbours, next door to them’. In this 
way, their opinion on strategising over relations with mafiosi took the 
past into account. Characteristically, the Carabinieri marshal from San 
Giovanni told me, regarding the relation between local mafia and the 
anti-mafia cooperatives, that ‘they need to learn to live together’ (bisogna 
imparare il convivere). He argued that the current neighbourhood between 
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co-op workers and mafiosi was an indication of how innocuous ‘the 
anti-mafia’ was: ‘The cooperatives don’t mean anything to the mafiosi; 
they don’t bother them. The simple fact that they are working right next 
to Torinese, and he offers them water, for instance, means that the mafiosi 
are just not bothered’.
An active neighbourhood is therefore central to this context, as even 
the Carabinieri officer frames relations through this model. The debates 
within cooperatives concern what to do with neighbours, who is wrong 
and who is right. The debate set by a state authority figure external to 
the co-ops shows how neighbourliness could shape the dynamics of anti- 
mafia altogether. 
This illustrates that the administrators thought of the plot boundaries 
as borders for their moral universes, while manual workers did not dis-
count the possibility of contact with mafiosi. Indeed, to a certain degree, 
they recognised them as ‘valid’ and potentially moral people. This was 
rooted in these locals’ common experiences with many mafiosi before the 
confiscations: their tolerance of mafiosi was continuous with these we- 
relationships constructed on through the experiences of living together 
(convivere) with them in the village before the arrests and confiscations. 
Through this living together and the establishment of a we-relationship 
predating the cooperatives, neighbourliness developed among them. As 
a result, the Consortium’s attempts to establish, via the confiscations, a 
local separation of mafiosi from anti-mafia people was not successful.
Neighbourliness meant that turbulent moments with mafioso neigh-
bours were resolved through face-to-face meetings. It came to be accepted 
not only that such a neighbour had a right to ask for a discussion in 
quattro occhi, come signori (face to face, like gentlemen) but also that he 
could be law-abiding and that his immediate claims might be sound. This 
face-to-face contact, workers thought, was dignified and gave a sense of 
good neighbourliness relations, expected from both sides. In this way, 
they understood social neighbourliness as the mutual constitution of an 
intersubjective relation stemming from land proximity. Piero, a worker, 
often de-essentialised mafiosi by respecting the documentation that they 
used to support their legal claims rather than immediately suspecting 
them. He fiercely criticised the ‘zero-tolerance’ stance of his admin-
istrator colleagues, which he found ‘neither polite nor fair’, but also 
counterproductive:
Because of their lack of experience, these colleagues don’t know how to 
work these things out. . . . We really have to show that we do not fear 
 contact. What they do, instead, is to just express distress. . . . They have to 
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see what the ex-proprietor wants, when he approaches them, right there, 
at the plot. It is a matter of being civilised.
Paying attention to the damage done to local social relations because 
of the confiscations of certain plots and the non-confiscation of others 
reveals an interplay between different ideas of neighbourhood. This is 
based on what a tract’s boundaries stand for: moral borders or lines of 
possible contact. This differentiation mirrors the different values privi-
leged by each co-op member’s group. The actual experience of working 
the land, as suggested by workers, points to a different understanding of 
neighbourhood than that held by administrators.
The administrators, by and large, subjugated the moral judgement to 
the political project. The workers, while acknowledging the political pro-
ject, retained an autonomy of their senses of morality from the political. 
That autonomy has the shape of precedence over the history of social 
relationships and to the intersubjective condition of neighbourhood, 
the way they experience it. Social relations endured and, in fact, were 
reproduced throughout this patchwork of different pieces of land. In the 
earlier cases, nevertheless, there were different, divergent senses of how 
plot boundaries were important affirmations of moral behaviour and of 
local codes of conduct. Land boundaries represented more than the mate-
rialisations of a legal scheme: they also become signifiers of contact with 
locals and mafiosi.
For the anti-mafia administrators, mafiosi and their land plots are 
matter out of place; they were not supposed to be there. The fact that 
they are is the beginning of the act on stage. What has been under ques-
tion in this analysis is who is proximate to whom among and across 
the social categories (mafiosi, workers, co-op administrators). Difference 
among cooperative members and between cooperative members and 
their neighbours is rooted in the fact that mafiosi are active actors on 
the ground. My argument poses an idea of neighbourhood that is expe-
rienced in – to an extent – intersubjective ways, to understand how the 
actors’ belonging within one group did not impede them from social 
interactions with (the) other(s).
Towards an Anthropology of Neighbourliness
Like borders of a state, the plots’ boundaries represented for adminis-
trators a clear division (between mafia and anti-mafia) that would be 
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threatened by social paths of contact connecting the un-confiscated and 
confiscated land. Invisible borders were set around impalpable structures 
of ‘immaterial but objective’ (to nod towards Marx) relationality: gossip, 
kinship, food ideology. But land bordering was obviously more tangible, 
both as a separating and as a linking factor. Legal-political projects of 
land change, such as the anti-mafia (the way administrators served its 
cause), operate on the assumption of a moral unity of cause – which they 
realise on grounds they cannot count on (Mundy 2007). The familiarity 
of neighbourhood breaks the unity of the moral, the political and the 
legal into its various threads. These threads, visible through the prism of 
neighbourliness, are composed of sets of social relations that pre-date the 
cooperatives and the anti-mafia project.
This argument is a contribution to an anthropological take on proxim-
ity and the narcissism of minor differences between enemies bordering 
each other (Blok 1999). Regarding projects of land reform, it stands as an 
analytical theme with general validity, beyond pointing to the existence 
of actors’ empirical differences on the ground. Difference is mitigated 
via the threads of sociality that permeate the application of the pro-
ject. While on paper, mafia and anti-mafia are categories developing on 
opposite sides of land boundaries; on the ground they are both pregnant 
with sets of social relations crossing these boundaries. Local people then 
see land as the fulcrum of these relations; in land’s palimpsest, over-
lapping relations build onto each other, as past obligations persist into 
the post- confiscation period. A seeing like a state (Scott 1998) approach 
cannot fully account for this situation. In Sicily, although the confisca-
tions brought rupture, continuities persisted, and they materialised in 
the neighbourliness of plots and people, not so much in the face of the 
radical legislation’s rupture as, indeed, because of that rupture.
The confiscations brought mafia and anti-mafia together while 
attempting to neatly separate them. While unifying claims to community 
or activism eventually divided co-op people (like elsewhere, see Nuijten 
2003), further fragmenting the cooperatives, constituting property on two 
opposing sets of legal claims actually had surprisingly unifying results. 
This oxymoron established the existence of concurrent, sometimes over-
lapping, state and mafia. It marks a difference from Scott’s approach as 
it poses a critique to a unidirectional politics of the institutional gaze. In 
Sicily, mafiosi are active players, who have their own property agendas. 
Rather than being solely the messy result of, as per Scott, a powerful 
state’s policy, neighbourliness with mafiosi is an intersubjective social 
configuration in which some people from the cooperatives engag, with 
reluctance. Unlike radical high modernism (and its socialist  expressions), 
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the permeability of mafiosi in the landed landscape is posed as an on- 
going renegotiation of the state’s appropriation and the cooperatives’ use 
of land.
These social relations developing around land are not mediated, as in 
the post-socialist literature, through ‘messy’ or ‘blurry’ boundaries on 
the ground. Boundaries, of course, do seem blurry to the administra-
tors, who thought instead that a recognition of their neighbours as valid 
actors would jeopardise the state’s project (the state ‘invested in this 
land’, as Luca would have it). To see land boundaries as ‘blurred’ and, by 
association, landed property rights as ‘fuzzy’ (as per Verdery), implies 
acknowledging an original state of firmness or the capacity to standardise 
these rights. This idea solidifies a view of the ‘thingness’ of property itself 
(Beckman and Beckman 2006; Dorondel 2009). Rather, boundaries present 
conflicting obligations and sets of expectations. Relations do not take 
place through a ‘porosity’ of the land (as in Verdery’s work) but through 
neighbourliness. The boundaries are not porous; they are just prone to 
permeating relations and senses of neighbourliness and are informed 
by histories of work relations and sharing of locality that make workers 
implicitly recognise their mafiosi neighbours as moral agents.
The laws of restitution, as well as the restituted lands, share a situated 
domain. The political side of land restitutions is an underlying feature 
of some of the post-socialist debate. However, it is typically framed in 
a meta-narrative following (and ditching) ‘socialism’ – an organisation 
of property that collapsed alongside its political upkeep. Restitutions 
‘attempted to create the status pro ante’ – returning land to individu-
als claiming it on the basis of pre-socialist rights (Verdery 1996: 133–36). 
Unlike this situation, mafia is still a salient phenomenon in Sicily. The 
post-socialist ‘perpetuated political interpretation of agriculture’ (Creed 
1998: 219) takes place, in Sicily, precisely because of the actual, grounded 
experience of mafia; the project is one of anti- (not post-)mafia.
‘Anti-mafia’ is less rigid a worldview than it looks because people who 
partake in it obtain different views and follow different practices vis-à-vis 
their neighbours than those ascribed to them from the project. While 
the proximity literature takes difference as largely already constructed, I 
show the dynamics of proximity/neighbourhood where the actual social 
boundaries and the very ways to draw them are under dispute. My analy-
sis of the dynamics of neighbourliness turns from the spatial outcome of 
existing social divisions into the realm in which these divisions, and by 
implication the meaning and ascription of neighbourhood (and its moral 
and political and obligations), takes shape through interactions and social 
processes.
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NOTES
1. John Davis’s comment on land disputes in Italy (‘You cannot sue an acre: a 
boundary dispute is not a dispute with land but with people’, 1973: 157) there-
fore offers an insight unwittingly echoed by Enzo here.
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░ The Private Life of Political 
Cooperativism
Co-op Morals: Inside and Outside
This ethnography has brought to the fore a somehow underdiscussed 
issue in the scholarly approach to cooperatives. Taking labour seri-
ously to appreciate the non-lateral character of cooperatives, it stresses 
co-op labour’s co-articulation with the ‘private’ lives of co-op members; 
for instance, with kinship and indeed ‘new’ kinship idioms, gendered 
household economies and ideologies of community and friendship. 
Throughout the book’s narrative, I set out to analyse the contradictions, 
incongruities and inherent differences running through anti-mafia coop-
eratives’ multiple divisions of labour. As member differentiations are 
framed in moral terms, the ethnography has stressed this moralisation 
in the social life of cooperatives. Differences and hierarchies among 
members are equally associated to obligations and social networks out-
side the cooperative’s framework as they are with activities performed 
within the framework of cooperative work itself. This constitutes a dia-
lectic between work in the co-ops and social life around the co-ops – both 
in relation to each other and in relation to bearing new social complex-
ities. This general finding stands as a contribution to our understanding 
of cooperatives as well as to our views on the embeddedness of labour in 
the sociocultural domain at large. People’s participation in cooperativ-
ism is invested in and at times in conflict with their surrounding social 
framework.
Co-ops are suspended between being totalising institutions and organi-
sations tightly tied to the management of material resources, in this case 
labour and land associated with a state’s value, legality. This suspension 
brings tensions: it is at once the driving force and a realm of contentious 
relations over what is moral and how everyday life outside the co-op 
framework is in line with the regulations within it. Systems and idioms 
of kinship, household organisation and social memory of landscape and 
work build into this tension and often bring forward uncomfortable 
contiguity. This book brings concerns over household economic organi-
sation, kinship practices and gendered views of the self to the fore of the 
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anthropological concern with cooperatives, cooperativism and coopera-
tional work.
The familial configuration of cooperatives is central to this under-
standing of stratification that accommodated families and new models 
of relatedness, inclusive of labour and politics (anti-mafia families). This 
dynamic role of kinship proved a fundamental aspect of the cooperatives’ 
conflicting complementarity. Strict divisions of labour, on the one hand, 
determined each team’s relatedness idioms, which in turn reinforced 
the division; on the other hand, these idioms merged kinship with work, 
thus also contributing to the development of cooperativism. Anti-mafia 
cooperativism developed through distinctive kinship idioms rather than 
against them. Kinship and gender are central, albeit hidden, facets in 
constituting experiences of a work collective, which gender solidarity 
renders a ‘second family’ for members (Ashwin 1999: 146).
This book’s narrative follows a basic principle: the ethnography shows 
how differentiations within cooperatives move beyond divisions of 
labour, expressed in an array of moral evaluations. These moral divides 
include different opinions and practices concerning material resources 
available to the co-ops, including labour and land. They also comprise, 
however, diverse practices and ethical stances regarding relational pat-
terns of sociality, including reputation and kinship. These relational set-
tings condition the cooperatives with regard to agents fully external, 
even theoretically inimical to them, including mafiosi. Members’ different 
ideas over community, activism and indeed landed property, brought 
contradictory and uncomfortable relationalities to the social lives of the 
co-ops.
In anti-mafia cooperatives, workers moving between the co-ops’ 
employment and local ‘community’ codes and informal practices out-
side the co-ops alleviated tensions within them in ways that prevented 
class conflict between administrative and workforce teams. Even more 
so, legality-oriented formal labour in cooperatives secured new infor-
mal livelihood opportunities for workers, such as welfare benefits. 
Informalities in workers’ livelihoods developed not only alongside legal-
ity but also, often, because of it. The realms of mutuality – pregnant with 
claims to community – and of employment existed in interdependence. 
Encompassing systems accommodate different subsystems, undermining 
them in a potentially globalised total system (Hann and Hart 2011a: 162). 
Such systems can include politicised pockets of protected wage labour 
and diversified ‘community’ claims in an area thoroughly introduced in 
global processes of economy.
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Ideologies of Enclaving, Practices of Embedding
The main tensions co-ops are suspended between are the claims that 
they are enclaves of good that are sin-proof (to provide an ecclesiasti-
cal metaphor), and the contrast this claim has with reality, that is the 
sets of practices of co-op members’ embeddedness in the social realm. 
The conflict between embedding and enclaving has been central to the 
anti-mafia experiment. This conflict has been solidified, by and large, in 
an almost binary opposition within the labour division’s system. In the 
move from clans to co-ops, divisions developed in close connection with 
food, anti-mafia, wage labour and reputational networks. The adminis-
trators’ food activism, virtuous circles of networking, moral bordering 
of landed property and reputational use of gossip are all part of their 
attempts at protective seclusion. But this monograph does not operate 
on a sociological typology of ‘power from above’/‘resistance from below’. 
The exegesis pursued here allows for nuances to power, understanding 
the inegalitarian effects of cooperativism as embedded in broader strati-
fications and antagonisms of Sicilian society.
The book thus has not adopted, à la James Scott (1998; 2011), a sense 
of structures that (un)see local nuances or ungoverned agents that resist 
them. In fact, it is my conviction that no agent actually sees like a state: 
certainly not the administrators of the anti-mafia cooperatives, who 
claim that confiscated land and anti-mafia represent the state. Their 
own agency is conditioned by class belonging and the specifics of mem-
bers’ social situatedness. The same stands for the livelihoods of manual 
worker- members of the co-ops: their relative subordination but also 
their deviation from the paper tigers of legality and anti-mafia strictness 
regarding, say, kinship or community ideologies is in turn influenced by 
their belongings in webs of local obligation. Members’ positions in the 
co-ops relate not only to labour tasks and divisions but to their broader 
relationships in their community, including a range of loyalties such as 
kinship, which thus becomes a crucial feature of cooperativism.
The divisions developing in cooperatives are then going way beyond 
a two-tiered scheme, revealing a multileveled relationality of differ-
ence that plays out not only in labour but also in ideas and practices 
beyond it. This relationality is the deepest crack in the wall that ideology 
builds around cooperatives, sealing them off from their environments 
as enclave economies of good. This is an approach that moves beyond 
an analytical axis of divisions of labour. It also challenges the normative 
sociological stress on how co-ops are becoming coopitalists (Sacchetto 
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and Emenzin 2016, Erratxi et al 2016) or the anthropological critique 
as to how institutions such as state(s) or market(s) impose stratification 
from above or from outside (see for instance Oakeshott 1978; Kasmir 
1996; Smith 1999; Narotzky 2007; Stephen 2008; Vargas-Cetina 2011). 
Social stratification in egalitarian institutions is a political project that 
has a micro-life of everyday contradictions. This position’s main ethno-
graphic point is that members of lateral work institutions are embedded 
in many a relation outside their work environment. This social life of 
members around the co-ops impacts on relations within them; these 
relations are absorbed and reified in vested stratifications.
For instance, cooperatives’ community participation retains the value 
of labour for labour, guaranteeing industrial democracy within them (V. 
Smith 2006). Community participation is hailed as cooperatives’ demo-
cratic essence, enhancing the assumed emancipatory potentials of the 
social economy (MacPherson 2008: 640). The anthropological sympathy 
towards them takes place on the ground of their serving the/a commu-
nity, distinguishing co-ops from capitalist corporations due to the latter’s 
limited-liability shareholding (Vargas-Cetina 2011: 133). The community 
orientation of cooperatives is then related to their material accountabil-
ity to local communities. This structure is reflected in their investment 
policy, as profits are invested only locally, suggesting an idea of develop-
ment that, unlike expansive growth, endorses an intensive and produc-
tive channeling of capital and labour into local arrangements (Sapelli 
2006).
The idea of co-ops as enclaves is often implicitly enhanced by the 
anthropology of co-ops. This is so even when dynamisms are recognised 
and co-ops are seen as ephemeral associations, highly context-depend-
ent and in constant flux (Vargas-Cetina 2005: 246–47). The fluidity and 
labour insecurity that neoliberalism introduces to local communities is 
taken to mean that the desired community participation makes reform- 
oriented grassroots cooperatives a cause of resilience for communities 
(Ferry 2005). The idea of workers’ control is stimulating (Dow 2003; 
Restakis 2010; Azzellini 2015); it is also forcing us to rethink how this con-
trol is in its turn controlled, or at least dependent on, market structures 
and local moralities in and through which co-ops operate. This forms part 
of a community striving for more autonomy from markets, an idea that, 
unlike autarky, brings co-ops into some relation with market exchange. 
This is at times a relation of ‘closed’ circuits of food production that pro-
tect local interests (Luetchford and Pratt 2013: 14–16).
The idea of open and closed economies is useful as it allows for muta-
bility of relations. It can be enriched, however, with an attention to 
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ideology and the claims to (and ideological uses of) community that can 
obfuscate stratifications they profess to transgress. Claims to community, 
in Sicily, reflect and tie in with those presumably constituting good kin-
ship or good food. They are not only mobilised as a democratic counter 
to external influences but are also often at the centre of already existing 
conflicts between factions within cooperatives.
In chapter 4, debating the moralities over food production in the 
co-ops, we saw how constant claims to food-activism principles had the 
seemingly paradoxical effect of intensifying inequalities and solidifying 
a seemingly two-tiered division of labour in the co-ops. This division 
was premised on the accessibility that members had towards making 
such principles an aspect of their everyday lives: experiencing food activ-
ism, that is. Further solidification of labour stratification was introduced 
according to anti-mafia norms regarding kinship, as explored in chapter 
5. These ideas further divided people in the co-ops according to what pos-
itive or negative kinship circuit they could tap into.
Abstract principles like food activism or anti-kinship transparency are 
normative settings that promote a certain framework of operation for 
co-ops. On paper, they are points of departure for industrial democracy 
and labour egalitarianism. In actual fact, they have the opposite effect: 
their application on the grounded life of co-op participants has divisive 
outcomes as they feed in the valuation and valorisation measurements 
of cooperative members. They exacerbate existing social inequalities by 
promoting an all things being equal line, according to which people’s work 
and worth is valued and valorised on the grade to which they can adhere 
to principles of food activism, anti-mafia kinship or moral ascription to 
landed property.
Like community, and to an extent drawing from the concept’s con-
notation, food activism, ‘clean’ kinship and the idea of being uncon-
taminated by mafia are, in effect, ideologies understood in the Marxian 
sense (as per The German Ideology). In that respect, they obscure existing 
differences and operate on a twofold level in what they do with these 
differences in actual effect. On a quantitative level, they create more 
differences out of existing ones. On a qualitative level, their application 
makes for a leap in kind: they create divisions out of these differences, 
as they pose as evaluating mechanisms of the work and worth of co-op 
participants. They inform the division of labour in co-ops and eventually 
deepen those differential properties that hinder industrial democracy. 
On the one hand, this concerns the recognition of skill on a hierarchical 
basis (where management is seen as amenable to the abstract principles 
of food and anti-mafia activism, and is thus valued more). On the other, it 
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concerns the actual remuneration of people on the basis of this valuation, 
both in terms of the stability of work offered to them and in terms of the 
actual valorisation of their work for the co-op.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the encompassing ideological 
realm of ‘community’ – an issue that is at once an attempt at enclaving 
and at embedding. This abstract notion is forged in an idealised fashion in 
the lab of Libertà and the Consortium. These institutions, detached from 
San Giovanni’s everyday life – the site being so close geographically to 
Palermo yet so far away in terms of stratification mechanisms –  promote 
a specific view of community that has normative ambitions. This norma-
tivity is reflected in attitudes to material (as per land), immaterial (as per 
reputation) or relational (as per kinship) attributes of social life in and 
around the cooperatives.
I would need to stress that this finding does not promote ideas of 
agrarian labour institutions as harmonious hybrids; rather, it means that 
cooperatives operate within and among tensions. This is because they 
are at once personal and impersonal institutions, incorporating claims to 
market and mutuality as well as to economy and community. Members’ 
claims to ‘community participation’ or their policing of the moral bor-
ders of a co-op do not always ease such tensions, as is often assumed, and 
can instead exacerbate them.
The case of the anti-mafia cooperatives brings together the contrasting 
views of Marx and Mauss. The Maussian perspective is that cooperatives 
become vectors for people’s lived practice, models of economic activ-
ity that offer alternatives to hierarchies of power in labour relations. 
Cooperativism arose historically to combat wage labour and the associ-
ated division of labour, with the aim of correcting the resultant social 
inequalities. But it was also a response, already since Rochdale, to mar-
kets for labour (in the case of Sicily, conditioned by mafia) that often left 
people without regular work. It developed, often on moral grounds, by 
drawing on ideas of ‘community’, regionalism, and communalism – and 
in some cases, like Mondragón, politicised nationalism. The fact that 
anti-mafia cooperatives do not defy the state but involve positive engage-
ments with it also confirms the Marxian critique that stresses their con-
tradictions. In that respect, co-op horizontalism is framed in dynamic 
configurations ‘between’ the market and state policy.
‘Cooperatives’ is then not a self-explanatory term but one claimed and 
contested by varied groups, associated with different political and ideo-
logical allegiances and formed as a response to different problems and 
needs. Cooperatives arise in relation to a broad range of ideals and actors, 
from state to social movements, from fascist to communist or anarchist 
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ideologies. They are often outcomes of top-down planning rather than 
grassroots initiatives or experiences – not divorced from the local con-
text but not derived from it either. Market structures and political ideas 
imposed from ‘outside’ shape and are shaped by members’ everyday 
work experience and social relations. It is this experience that we need to 
pay attention to – appreciating the enclaving ideologies but focusing on 
the embedding aspect of co-op life.
Cooperative Futures as an Anthropological Concern
Arguably the most cited phrase in modern European literature regard-
ing fin-de-siècle capacity for historical change comes from Tomasi di 
Lampedusa’s Sicilian masterpiece The Leopard: ‘Everything must change 
so that everything can stay the same’ (‘Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga com’è, 
bisogna che tutto cambi’, 2010: 23). A lot changed in Spicco Vallata, no 
doubt. This book’s opening vignette, with a minor mafioso and Piero 
debating over labour, suggested that the pursuit of workers’ rights in 
Spicco Vallata (through the co-ops) has had positive results. This may 
seem to be undermined by what the ethnography has shown about the 
fissures and contradictions of this endeavour, underlining the richness 
of local life (unfolding in bars, in confiscated land plots and in the coop-
eratives themselves), which proved impossible to contain in strict jural 
categories.
Nonetheless, the cooperatives did introduce significant positive 
changes to the lives of an increasing number of people in Sicily and, by 
now, southern Italy at large. The confiscation of assets owned by mafias 
and organised crime is debated in many fora outside Italy – including the 
European Parliament – to possibly be adopted as a micro-developmental 
project across the European Union. What is more, the values the coopera-
tives represent (albeit in dynamic relation – and conflict – with local ones) 
still count as the most tangible success of the anti-mafia movement in 
Italy. It is up to future developments to see whether this configuration of 
cooperativism within broader neoliberal developments, and indeed in a 
time of austerity for Italy, will further affect people’s livelihoods in Spicco 
Vallata and elsewhere in Sicily, and it is also for them to decide how such 
effects can be beneficial.
It is also for this reason (studying livelihoods as an anthropological 
drive) that, to re-establish cooperativism as an anthropological concern, 
we need to return it to the subjective experience of participating in ‘it’. 
The idea of cooperation as non-ideological and experienced is a start, 
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but tracing where this experience is deployed is a necessary next step. 
Members’ practices outside politicised cooperative contexts deserve more 
attention in order to comprehend not only their livelihoods but also 
inequalities of cooperatives. As co-ops’ aim and praxis generally cannot 
engulf members’ lives altogether – in the holistic sense institutions like 
monasteries do – members’ lives and livelihoods around and outside 
their co-op life matter as much as cooperativist ideologies – like ‘anti- 
mafia’. In anti-mafia cooperatives, the political project of curbing mafia 
was defined in terms of disembedding cooperative economic activity 
from certain traditions.
Class position was informed by members’ different negotiations of 
the local arrangements in which resources (land, labour) were embed-
ded, especially regarding local obligations and networks (e.g., mutual 
aid work) that are not in line with the movement’s political principles. 
The movement from clans to state to co-ops has some clan residues in it: 
inertia brings them along the stream of centralisation and ‘standardisa-
tion’ (the idea that opened this book, in Gianpiero’s words). While con-
solidating cooperatives’ internal division of labour, the tension between 
different values also indicated the dynamic nature of workers’ kinship 
relations or the use of local codes (gossip) by administrators. In Spicco 
Vallata, the realm of standardised employment and jural codification of 
property in land was both contested and complemented, in members’ 
experience, by local values, which unfolded in informal economic activ-
ity in a project seemingly ‘protectionist’ for labour.
The major breakthrough of anti-mafia cooperatives, recognised by the 
majority of informants, was the creation of jobs in an area of chronic 
informal economic activity and unemployment. Cooperative employ-
ment, however, converged with continuities on the ground and often 
intensified informal ideas about recruitment, work and land among coop-
erative participants, developing alongside informal economy practices 
(e.g., benefit fraud and lavoro nero, ie. informal and hidden labour). Locals’ 
livelihoods integrated the stable income from cooperatives’ waged 
employment, maintaining community schemes of ‘mutual aid’ through 
which households informally exchanged money for (unregistered) work. 
Moreover, the moral connotations of ownership constantly challenged 
the rigid framework that sought to contain confiscated land within new 
property boundaries.
This is not a matter of Lampedusa’s fatalism vis-à-vis change. It is about 
admitting that cooperatives are, willy-nilly, embedded in a particular 
social context which, for historical, economic and political reasons, does 
not ‘fit’ their ideology – though the cooperatives’ pragmatic support in 
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the form of jobs is appreciated. As ‘cooperatives’, like ‘livelihoods’, are 
entangled in broad social realities, the future development of cooper-
atives should be more appreciative of local context, attentive to local 
livelihood models, codes and kinship in order to contribute to deeper and 
more enduring social change.
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